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Abstract 
 
The Effects of Transaction Costs on the Performance of Foreign 
Direct Investments – An Empirical Investigation 
 
 
The multinational companies’ (MNCs) use of foreign direct investments as a 
governance mechanism in the globalization of businesses has a cost. 
Together with expenses linked to production processes, additional costs are 
also generated in the governance of the foreign subsidiaries. These costs, 
defined as transaction costs in this study, are in many cases underestimated, 
unclear, or to a certain extent ignored by the companies before entering a 
foreign market. Unfortunately, studying the effects of these costs have also, 
to a certain extent, been neglected in former empirical research. Hence, as a 
response to the shortcomings, this study has investigated the transaction 
costs effects on foreign subsidiary performance. In addition, the moderating 
role of two different modes of entry on this transaction cost – performance 
relationship has been examined.  
 
By using a transaction cost economics (TCE) approach, four different types 
of ex post transaction costs are identified and measured within a setting of 
160 Norwegian MNCs and one of their foreign subsidiaries. In addition, 
subsidiary performance are identified and measured in various ways. The 
foreign subsidiaries were established as either greenfield operations or as 
acquisitions.  
 
The construct validity of the different measures was examined in LISREL. 
Excellent fit indices, as well as satisfactory reliability measures are 
observed. The main effects were tested by using multiple regression 
analysis, and the findings provide support to three out of four hypotheses. 
There is a significant and negative relationship between bargaining costs and 
subsidiary performance, as well as between monitoring costs and 
performance, and maladaptation costs and performance. Moreover, this 
study also shows that different entry modes create different transaction costs 
effects on subsidiary performance. It is also worth emphasizing that this 
study shows that transaction costs play a significant role in explaining the 
performance of foreign subsidiaries. According to the findings, close to 35 
percent of the variation in performance can be attributed to such costs. This 
is an important observation and strengthens the idea that there is a strong 
relationship between transaction costs and performance, and that reducing 
such costs must be important for the management of MNCs.  
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 1
1 Introduction 
 
The use of foreign direct investments (FDIs) as a governance mechanism in 
the globalization of businesses has been a striking move during the last 
decades, and the importance of the multinational enterprise (MNE)1 in the 
world economy has thereby increased dramatically.2 However, going abroad 
through FDIs has a cost. Together with expenses linked to staffing, housing, 
land, machinery, etc., more subtle costs are generated in the daily 
management of the subsidiary. Before entering a foreign market, these costs, 
call them governance costs for the present, are in many cases 
underestimated, unclear, or to a certain extent ignored by the companies. 
However, when the structure is set and the day-to-day foreign business 
develops, these costs become more manifest and probably play a significant 
role when the MNE is evaluating its subsidiary’s performance. Hence, an 
analysis of the relationship between the governance costs created when 
managing these foreign affiliates and the resulting performance of the same 
investments should be of major importance for both research and business 
communities. 
 
To better understand this relationship, two important issues have to be in 
place: these governance costs are to be identified and measured in a proper 
way, and the understanding of subsidiary performance and its antecedents 
have to be developed. The first has been done, to some extent, within the 
framework of transaction cost economics (TCE) (Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 
1999; Masten, Meehan, and Snyder, 1991; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; 
Walker and Poppo, 1991; Williamson, 1985). Regarding the latter, many of 
the classical MNE studies3 as well as the most recognized entry mode 
                                                     
1  Multinational enterprise (MNE) and multinational corporation (MNC) are used as 
synonymous expressions throughout the thesis. 
2  Particularly distinct has this trend been in the United States, Japan, and Western 
Europe, and, according to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNCTAD (2001), these regions (with some question marks on Japan) will remain 
the major host regions in terms of foreign direct investments despite the growing 
attractiveness of developing economies. The single most important region for FDI 
inflows and outflows in 2000 was EU with respectively 617 billion US dollars in 
inflows and 773 billion US dollars in outflows. The same trend of FDI flows in 
and out of Norway seems to follow approximately the same pattern (Norges Bank, 
2002). 
3  See Buckley and Casson (1976), Caves (1982), Dunning (1988), Hennart (1982), 
Hymer (1960), and Vernon (1966). 
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studies4 (whether it is entry mode studies in general or FDI studies in 
particular), may help us a bit towards a more profound understanding of the 
factors that have an effect on foreign subsidiary performance. However, a 
conception of subsidiary performance based on these works will be rather 
superficial since the majority of the studies do not explicitly examine the 
performance of these investments (Chen, 1999; Osland and Çavusgil, 1996; 
Pan, Li, and Tse, 1999; Woodcock, Beamish, and Makino, 1994). In fact, 
performance issues within international business research rarely enter into 
the core of a study, be it theoretical or empirical; they remain implicit or as 
part of the general backdrop. 
 
Thus, this lack of empirical and theoretical knowledge about foreign 
subsidiary performance has obviously encourage researchers to dig more 
deeply into the area, and during recent years a growing number of studies 
have been concerned in various ways (both empirically and theoretically) 
about the issue (Aulakh and Kotabe, 1997; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997; 
Chowdhury, 1992; Glaister and Buckley, 1998; Larimo, 1993; Li, 1995; 
Makino and Beamish, 1998; Pan, Li, and Tse, 1999). Conceptualizations of 
performance, measurement issues, how and why performance varies, as well 
as identification of important drivers behind performance, are all issues that 
have been touched upon. Even though the understanding of these issues is 
still rather sketchy and unsystematic, these former studies indicate that there 
are numerous variables that affect subsidiary performance, they are often 
intertwined and they also keep evolving over time, which makes it futile to 
present a complete picture of drivers behind the performance of a foreign 
subsidiary in one single study.  
 
Despite this complex picture, few would deny that subsidiary performance 
by and large is a result of human behavior, which is shaped by the 
institutional, economic, and social contexts within which it takes place. In 
international business, contexts are usually a combination of three different 
components: ownership, location and internalization issues as described in 
the OLI framework (Dunning, 1977; 1981; 1988). Hence, the performance of 
international business activities could be expressed as a function of OLI 
factors: 
 
      P = f  [O, L, I]              (1.1) 
 
                                                     
4   See for instance Anderson and Coughlan (1987), Anderson and Gatignon (1986) 
Benito and Gripsrud (1992), Erramilli and Rao, (1993), and Hill, Hwang, and Kim 
(1990). 
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where O, L, and I can be conceived as vectors consisting of a range of 
ownership, location, and internalization advantage elements, respectively. 
The theoretical building blocks of the OLI framework, which in many 
respects comprise the resource-based approach (O factor), the product life 
cycle model (L factor), economies of scale and scope (L and I factors), and 
internalization and transaction cost approaches (I factor), give important 
contributions, though with different points of departure, on the various 
elements in equation (1.1). For example, the resource-based perspective 
claims that successful firms create rents due to their ownership and/or access 
to heterogeneous and unique resources, which can be used to develop and 
implement different successful and sustained strategies (Barney, 1986; 
Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984). Traditional economic reasoning 
concerning production and location issues focuses on the revenues and costs 
of different locations and production technologies. The transaction cost 
approach (or the internalization approach), mainly emphasizes the costs of 
organizing economic activities in various governance structures, and define 
these governance costs as transaction costs (Buckley and Casson, 1976; 
Hennart, 1982; Williamson, 1975; 1985).5  
 
Therefore, going from a relative all-embracing definition of performance (P) 
to focusing temporally on only economic performance (Π), equation (1.1) 
could be expressed as a compound of revenues (R) and costs, where the cost 
element of the equation can be split into production costs (PC) and 
transaction costs (TC). For a given foreign operation j, the performance 
relationship can then be written as:     
 
 Πj = Rj – (PCj + TCj)              (1.2) 
 
The main focus of the present study will be on the relationship between 
performance and the governance costs, or the transaction costs (TC) 
component of equation (1.2). Hence, it is reasonable, at the outset, to lean on 
the transaction cost framework when developing a more detailed 
understanding of these costs as well as when testing the relationship between 
these costs and performance. Nevertheless, due to the needs for a more 
thorough understanding of firm performance in general and subsidiary 
                                                     
5  According to Rugman (1986), internalization theory can be considered to be the 
transaction cost theory of the multinational corporation. In its original form, the 
theory relies on three basic postulates: (1) Firms maximize profit in a world of 
imperfect markets; (2) there is an incentive to bypass imperfect markets for 
intermediates by creating internal markets. These activities, which are linked by 
the market, are controlled and owned by the same firm; (3) internalization of 
markets across national boundaries generates multinational companies (see also 
Buckley and Casson (1976) for a further elaboration). 
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performance and its antecedents in particular, a more comprehensive 
assessment, with a broader theory perspective, will also be conducted in the 
literature review. 
 
The decision to use the transaction cost approach as the principal theoretical 
basis for the present empirical work has been made despite of, but also 
because of, some important gaps in the theory.  
 
First, according to TCE, the normative, and well accepted, ex ante solution 
when a market for intermediates is highly imperfect, has been to internalize 
this market so that transaction costs are kept at a minimum level (i.e. 
internalizing the transactions creates less transaction costs than executing the 
transactions across markets) (Williamson, 1975; 1985). Furthermore, as 
indicated in equation (1.2), there is a presumption that transaction costs may 
have an effect on firm performance, which also is clearly assumed in TCE 
with its normative orientation. Some researchers actually use transaction 
costs as a performance measure in itself (Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999). 
However, with some few exceptions,6 the relationship between transaction 
costs and performance seems to be almost neglected in empirical studies 
within the TCE paradigm. Therefore, the lack of knowledge about an 
important assumption within TCE needs to be reduced, both on empirical 
and theoretical grounds. The present research is therefore a direct response 
to those who encourage researchers to examine this relationship more in 
detail (Benito and Tomassen, 2003; Masten, 1993; Rindfleisch and Heide, 
1997). Hence, in that respect, there is no need, nor any intentions, to test all 
of the performance implications that will be raised through the literature 
review. 
 
Second, most of the empirical and conceptual works within this tradition 
have been concerned about the transaction costs that occur through inter-
organizational relationships.7 Studies assessing the costs associated with 
internal organization are scarce even though this should be of great interest 
when the ex post (i.e. after the structure is set) evaluation of such 
organizational forms takes place (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Because of 
the lack of focus on internally generated transaction costs, there should be 
                                                     
6 Nygaard (1992) tested the relationships between a set of transaction costs and 
performance, where performance was defined as efficiency and effectiveness. 
Based on partly the same data, Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999) used a set of ex 
post transaction costs as a performance measure in itself. The same did 
Noordewier, John, and Nevin (1990). 
7 A review of many empirical transaction costs analysis studies is presented in 
Rindfleisch and Heide (1997, pp. 32-40).   
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reasons for shrinking this theoretical gap by explicitly studying those 
transaction costs that are generated within hierarchical solutions.  
 
Third, few studies have tried to measure transaction costs directly, instead 
the prevalence of transaction costs has been related to observable 
characteristics of the transaction, and based on those observable feature, 
organizational forms have been predicted (Masten, Meehan, and Snyder, 
1991). Hence, the paramount research theme within the TCE tradition has so 
far been the prediction of governance structures based upon transaction costs 
assumptions. Williamson (1985, p. 22) claims that the problem with 
quantifying transaction costs is somewhat mitigated due to the fact that they 
“always are assessed in a comparative institutional way”. It is the difference 
between these costs, rather than the absolute magnitude that is of interest. 
Still it is of major importance to understand and measure these costs 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). How can institutional arrangements be 
compared if the understanding and the measurement of these costs are 
vague? And how can the effect towards performance be evaluated if the 
measurement of these costs is neglected in empirical research? 
 
Foreign direct investment – a brief clarification 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) entails the use of resources abroad, either by 
transfer or purchase of such resources as plants and equipment, where 
operational control over the resources is vested within the parent company in 
the home country.8 Such investments can take a number of different forms 
including the establishment of a new enterprise (organized as a subsidiary or 
as a branch), the expansion of already existing subsidiaries, or the 
acquisition of an overseas company and its assets. In addition, these FDIs 
can be part of a wholly owned operation, where the parent firm owns 100 
percent of the stock, or part of an international joint venture where firms, 
two or more, bring together elements of their resources in one common 
organization with the purpose of entering or developing a foreign market 
(Hennart, 1988; Kogut and Singh, 1988). Only majority controlled9 (i.e. >50 
percent equity stake by one single MNE) start-ups and acquisitions will be 
                                                     
8 There is an important difference between foreign direct investments (FDIs) and 
foreign portfolio investments (FPIs), where the latter consist of investments by 
individuals, companies, or governmental organizations in foreign financial 
instruments, without their taking any substantial equity stake in a foreign business 
unit (Hill, 1998). FPIs will not be considered as FDIs in this study. 
9 The most obvious reason for this choice is the increasing complexity in research 
design if two or more firms should be asked to evaluate the performance of their 
subsidiary and identify the transaction costs between headquarters and subsidiary. 
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focused on in the present research.  A further elaboration on the two types of 
FDIs will be developed later in this research, but briefly looking into the two 
operation methods, distinct differences are certainly observed.  
 
A number of firms choose to accomplish greenfield investments with the 
intention to grow from low to high commitment. These start-ups (or 
greenfields) are usually established by using expatriates (alone, or together 
with a partner with knowledge about local institutions and business practice) 
who are responsible for the hiring of employees and for the development of 
the business. Often, this is done to make use of firm-specific advantages that 
are difficult to separate from the rest of the organization (Hennart and Park, 
1993). By hiring and training the new workforce by themselves it is often 
much easier to integrate firm-specific capabilities from the beginning. 
However, gradually building up a new subsidiary through recruiting and 
training new employees, building new business relationships with 
stakeholders, and establishing the legitimacy of the subsidiary can have 
substantial costs in foreign markets with additional challenges along cultural, 
political and economic dimensions (Hymer, 1960). Therefore, other firms 
have a tendency to commit themselves, initially, significantly more. They 
implement entry strategies in radical ways, such as by acquisitions, often due 
to control, time, speed, availability of extra resources, and market power 
reasoning.  
 
Obviously, managing these two types of foreign subsidiaries, especially 
during the first years after the founding, probably requires different 
management approaches and focuses throughout the value creating processes 
(Harzing, 2002). In addition, they may also have different levels of 
transaction costs, and probably create different types of transaction cost 
effects, which may have further implications for the management of these 
subsidiaries. 
 
Contribution and research questions 
At the outset, this study seeks to identify those transaction costs that occur in 
the relationship between parent company and foreign subsidiary, and this is 
done mainly for the following reasons: First, from a theoretical standpoint, 
the normative presumption in TCE postulates a strong relationship between 
transaction costs and performance. This has yet to be verified, and as such, 
this research is a respond to the demand for more research on this subject 
(Benito and Tomassen, 2003; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). An important 
side effect of this research problem is also the need for a thorough 
understanding of transaction costs and performance in general, and the 
development and operationalization of transaction costs and subsidiary 
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performance in particular. Therefore, valid and reliable measures of these 
constructs are to be further developed. Second, the gap in theory about 
internally generated transaction costs has to be filled in. And third, given 
that decision makers in MNEs intent to be rational, the two types of 
establishment modes10 (i.e. greenfields and acquisitions) should not differ 
with regard to performance if everything else were the same (Masten, 
1993).11 However, one may wonder whether the two types of entry modes 
generate the same type of transaction cost effects towards performance, or 
whether they differ in that respect. The answer to this puzzle may have 
implications for theory as well as for the management of the subsidiaries.  
 
Therefore, the present study will try to reduce the described lacks in 
knowledge by investigating the following research questions: 
 
1. Do transaction costs have an effect on subsidiary performance?  
 
2. What effects do greenfields and acquisitions have on the 
relationship between transaction costs and subsidiary 
performance?  
 
 
These research problems can also be conceptualized through the following 
model: 
 
Transaction
Costs
Subsidiary
Performance
Entry Mode
 
Figure 1-1: Conceptual research model 
                                                     
10 Entry mode, mode of entry, and establishment mode, are used as synonymous 
expressions throughout the thesis. 
11 If so, one certain type of operation method would always have been preferred in 
favor of others (Shaver, 1998). 
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Outline of the study 
The remaining part of this study is divided into five chapters. Chapter two, 
the literature review, starts with an introduction to the multinational 
company, followed by a presentation and discussion of performance and 
performance antecedents. In addition, the TCE framework is reviewed, a 
review that also contains an elaboration on different types of transaction 
costs. At the end of the literature review, different performance measures are 
discussed, and some empirical works presented. The hypotheses are 
developed in chapter three.  Chapter four contains a discussion of causality, 
a description of research setting, measurement issues, an outline of the most 
important statistical techniques used in the study, and a thorough test of the 
measurement model. The tests of the hypotheses are presented in chapter 
five, which also provides a test of a more inductive model. In chapter six, 
which is the concluding chapter, a discussion of the results with theoretical 
and managerial implications, is presented. Likewise, limitations and 
suggestions for future research are proposed. 
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2 Literature review 
 
This section starts with a short introduction to the multinational corporation, 
followed by a brief review of literature that is concerned about different 
aspects of the multinational corporation. After that, a rather comprehensive 
examination of various aspects regarding subsidiary performance is 
presented. As a structural tool for the discussion, the OLI framework is used 
in an attempt to synthesize three different research approaches and to extract 
possible performance drivers. Then, the transaction cost approach is 
reviewed with the intention of identifying measurable transaction costs that 
can be used in the thereto-following sections that contain hypotheses, 
methodology, and analysis. Next, some possible ways of measuring 
performance are advanced, and at the end of this chapter, different empirical 
studies concerning firm/subsidiary performance are presented. 
 
The multinational corporation 
Usually, multinational corporations (MNCs) are defined as companies that 
establish income-generating assets in several countries, be it by market 
oriented activities and/or by supply oriented activities. Many MNCs are huge 
corporations with thousands of employees spread all over the world, but both 
size and organizational forms of the companies can vary enormously. The 
MNCs can be horizontally integrated in the way that they perform the same 
kind of value-added activities in each country, or they can be vertically 
integrated across geographical markets through a network of output 
producing facilities that serve as inputs for other facilities that the MNCs 
own (Jones, 1996). As already referred to in chapter one, the essence of 
being multinational is also that the companies control the income-generating 
entities, and as such, portfolio investments by a company is not regarded as 
sufficient to define the company as multinational (see footnote 8 on page 5). 
On the other hand, by establishing FDIs, the company both owns and 
controls the foreign entity; hence control is the key element when defining a 
firm as multinational. However, the degree of control before a foreign 
investment can be defined as a FDI is disputable,12 so the most 
straightforward example of FDIs is majority-owned or wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, which can be established by acquiring part of a foreign firm, or 
                                                     
12 In the US a foreign investment is regarded as FDI when the company owns at 
least 10 percent of the equity. This figure is also valid for Japan. In the UK, 
however, the percentage is 20, and in Germany as high as 25 percent (Jones, 1996, 
p. 7). In Norway, official statistics define a FDI as 10 percent and more (Norges 
Bank, 2002).  
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the whole of a firm, or by building an entirely new organization from scratch 
(i.e. a greenfield investment)13 in a foreign country. This research takes into 
consideration only majority owned greenfields and acquisitions defined as 
subsidiaries of one single MNC, but without going into details, there are in 
fact a whole range of intermediate and contractual agreements available. 
Joint ventures, non-equity arrangements such as licensing and franchise 
agreements, and strategic alliances, are all important aspects when 
discussing the MNC.  
 
Greenfields or acquisitions? 
When do MNCs prefer greenfields? Greenfields are often established 
gradually, and relative to an acquisition, it takes a substantial longer time 
before the subsidiary is competitive. It also intensifies local competition 
since such an entry just adds a new competitor to the market. Despite these 
drawbacks, many firms prefer to establish foreign greenfields rather than 
acquisitions. First, firms with highly idiosyncratic assets that are difficult to 
separate from the organization often find it difficult to exploit these assets in 
an acquired firm due to organizational mismatches. To fully utilize its 
capabilities, it must therefore “replicate” the parent organization in the 
foreign environment (Hennart and Park, 1993). And this is best done through 
greenfield investments where expatriates very often have a central role in 
selecting and hiring local employees, which also makes it possible to 
incorporate firm-specific advantages from the outset – a key advantage when 
non-separable idiosyncratic assets are to be exploited abroad (Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1998). Second, differences in culture may also favor greenfields 
to acquisitions. Cultural differences may cause conflicts and hostility, which 
often lead to the obstruction of required changes, and in the worst cases – 
failure (Barkema, Bell, and Pennings, 1996; Datta, 1991; Hofstede, 1980). 
And third, there may be so much discrepancy between two firms with regard 
to for example technological capabilities, that the acquired firm have to learn 
completely new rules, and procedures, as well as organizational principles 
and strategies, which can be very costly and challenging due to 
organizational inertia in the acquired firm (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
 
Why then acquisitions? If the MNC does not possess knowledge about the 
local environment and such knowledge is difficult to obtain piecemeal due to 
high transaction costs, then acquisitions are preferred. Likewise, acquisitions 
are the right thing if the company lacks industry-specific knowledge, such as 
product technology for example, that is subjected to high transaction costs 
                                                     
13 Greenfield investments are also called “foreign start-ups” and “de novo entries” in 
the literature; see for example Barkema and Vermeulen (1998). 
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when bought bit by bit in the market (Hennart and Park, 1993). Market 
power is another reason. By acquiring a foreign competitor, competition may 
be reduced in the local market. Other reasons that favor acquisitions to 
greenfields, are speed and scale circumstances. When delayed entry creates 
large opportunity costs, such as in fast growing markets and in oligopolistic 
industries where the late entrants have to react on the threats from the first 
entrants to balance the competition in the industry, then acquisitions are 
preferred (Caves and Mehra, 1986; Knickerbocker, 1973; Wilson, 1980).14 
Similarly, if the competitive position of a firm in an industry is largely 
dependent on economies of scale, then increased capacity through greenfield 
investments is undesirable (Hennart and Park, 1993; Yip, 1982).15 Finally, if 
the MNC is short of personnel (who can be used as expatriates) due to the 
size of the foreign investment compared to the parent (Caves and Mehra, 
1986; Hennart and Park, 1993), or if the MNC is highly leveraged, then 
acquisitions are preferred (Chatterjee, 1990; Hennart and Park, 1993).  
 
Theories of the multinational corporation 
With Stephen Hymer’s doctoral dissertation in 1960 (Hymer, 1960), the 
understanding of the MNC took a great leap forward. Until then, the 
overriding explanation of firm’s cross-border activities through FDIs was 
rooted in the idea that the MNC was moving equity from country to country 
wherever the interest rate was beneficial. On the contrary, Hymer recognized 
that firms transferred a whole package of resources, not only finance, and 
thus, differences in interest rates between countries could only explain a 
small portion of the puzzle. Instead, Hymer asserted, the MNCs were 
“motivated to produce abroad by the expectation of earning an economic 
rent on the totality of their resources, including the way in which they were 
organized” (Dunning, 1993, p. 69). Furthermore, Hymer identified two 
major determinants of FDI: market power trough removal of competition 
and particular advantages that some firms possess in a specific activity. 
Hence, the raison d’etre of MNCs was based on market imperfections. 
Hymer further developed these arguments later by also bringing into the 
analysis the Coasian theory of the firm (Coase, 1937). By using the dynamic 
                                                     
14 However, contradictory to this assumption, Yip (1982) found support for the 
hypothesis that rapid market growth creates disequilibrium conditions and reduces 
the impact of barriers to entry, which favors de novo entry. 
15 Chatterjee (1990) found direct support for this assumption. However, neither Yip 
(1982), nor Hennart and Park (1993) found support for this hypothesis. However, 
the interaction effect between growth rate and concentration ratio in the industry is 
significant in Hennart and Park’s study, which indicates “that a high concentration 
ratio leads to acquisition when not offset by demand growth” (p. 1067).  
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interaction between market structure and internalization of markets, Hymer 
tried to explain the rationale behind the MNC (Hymer, 1968). 
 
Despite Hymer’s emphasis on the firm’s market position and its ability to 
create rents, he was hardly concerned about strategic and managerial issues, 
which really came into focus during the 1970s and 1980s. But until then, 
research on the phenomenon of MNCs followed, according to (Dunning, 
2001b), four main paths. The first was concerned about testing the Hymer-
type hypotheses (see for example Caves (1971; 1974a; 1974b)). The second 
developed Vernon’s (1966) analysis of international investments and 
international trade in the light of the product cycle.16 The third paid more 
attention to the strategic behavior of the firm (see for example 
Knickerbocker (1973)), and the fourth followed in an international finance 
direction, with for example Rugman’s risk diversification hypothesis 
(Rugman, 1979).  
 
After this period with a focus on the act of foreign direct investment, two 
streams of literature emerged: the internationalization literature and the 
internalization/transaction cost literature.  
 
The internationalization literature was concerned about processes and 
dynamics in the internationalization of firms and had important contributions 
from Nordic researchers such as Johanson and Vahlne (1977), Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul (1975), and Luostarinen (1979). Based on the behavioral 
theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963) and Penrose’s (1959) theory of 
the growth of the firm, the internationalization literature suggested that 
market commitment and market knowledge were critical factors in the 
ability to carry out chosen international activities, and that the necessary 
knowledge could be acquired mainly through operations abroad. Hence, the 
MNC is mainly established and developed through a dynamic interaction 
between organizational capabilities and the search for new knowledge.  
 
The internalization literature, which was more occupied with explaining the 
foreign production of firms as a market replacing activity, had its early 
antecedent in Coase’s seminal work on the nature of the firm (Coase, 1937), 
but traces back to Hymer (1960; 1968) were also apparent. With a distinct 
focus on the MNC, McManus (1972), Buckley and Casson (1976), and 
Hennart (1977; 1982) were concerned about the reason why the market for 
                                                     
16 According to Vernon (1966) process and product innovations are best exploited in 
the home country during the initial phases of the product cycle. But at later stages, 
when the product is more mature and the competition is more intensive, 
production may shift to foreign locations.   
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intermediate goods and services very often were coordinated within the 
MNC rather through markets. And to solve this problem, it became 
important to identify and assess those market failures that did endorse 
foreign direct investments.   In addition and parallel in time, a more general 
approach of the same puzzle was also developed, and this general approach 
(i.e. the transaction cost theory) to economic organizations could be 
summarized in four points:  
 
“(1) Markets and firms are alternative instruments for completing 
a related set of transactions; (2) whether a set of transactions 
ought to be executed across markets or within a firm depends on 
the relative efficiency of each mode; (3) the costs of writing and 
executing complex contracts across a market vary with the 
characteristics of the human decision makers who are involved 
with the transaction on the one hand, and the objective properties 
of the market on the other; (4) although the human and the 
environmental factors that impede exchanges between firms 
(across markets) manifest themselves somewhat differently 
within the firm, the same set of factors apply to both.”     
 
(Williamson, 1975, p. 8). 
 
Hence, human beings came into focus in a more explicit fashion than what 
had been expressed before in traditional economics. In addition to the 
characteristics of markets,17 market failure due to human characteristics such 
as opportunism and bounded rationality were emphasized, and as such, the 
transaction cost theory was a serious try to explicitly bring the world of 
human beings into the world of economics. It is also worth emphasizing that 
Williamson concluded that there are no qualitative differences between those 
environmental and human factors that hamper transactions across markets 
compared to those that hamper transactions within organizations. They “only 
manifest themselves somewhat differently”.  
 
In addition to the internationalization and the internalization streams of 
literature, there is also another work worth mentioning, namely Stopford and 
Wells’ book “Managing the Multinational Enterprise” (1972) from the early 
seventies. This work can probably be traced back to among others, Alfred 
Chandler’s work on strategy and structure (Chandler, 1962). According to 
these two authors, firms that are expanding across borders through FDIs do it 
for various reasons. Some try to earn a greater return from their core 
                                                     
17 Those characteristics of markets that Williamson emphasized as problematic in his 
1975 book were: uncertainty and small numbers exchange relations. 
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competencies, others try to realize location economies, greater experience 
curve economies, and or scale economies, to mention some distinct motives. 
And since such motives generally demand strong control over key resources, 
majority owned FDIs are in many cases an appropriate solution. However, 
these international activities are established and organized in various 
fashions by the MNCs. Some are tightly controlled by headquarters through 
centralized MNC configurations, while others live their own lives in a very 
independent way through decentralized control structures. Based on 
historical data about US MNCs, Stopford and Wells (1972) assert that many 
MNCs have followed mainly three paths of structural development. Initially 
they have grouped their international activity in one international division, 
which then was geographically organized. In this structure, the foreign 
subsidiaries have been either sales units for manufacturing firms that 
produce their goods at home, or production units serving the local markets. 
However, this way of organizing the international activity has a tendency to 
create conflicts and coordination problems between domestic and foreign 
operations. Therefore, to solve these problems, two major types of global 
structures emerged: (1) a worldwide product division structure, which eases 
the transfer of core competencies and makes it easier to realize location and 
experience curve economies (Hill, 1998); (2) an area division structure, 
which facilitates local responsiveness due to the fact that decision-making 
regarding key strategic issues (such as local marketing and business 
strategies), are decentralized to local management. Even though the authors 
did not find any positive relationship between structure and performance, 
they conclude that appropriate structures are more associated with better 
firm performance than those structures that are not suitable for the strategy. 
Hence, structural changes are, according to Stopford and Wells (1972, p. 
84), “generally designed to eliminate the mismatch between strategy and 
structure”.  
 
In the following years, different theoretical approaches were used in the 
effort of explaining the existence and the growth of the MNC. Some 
approaches where in contrast with the prevailing explanations at the time, 
whereas others can be seen as an extension and improvement of existing 
theories. Despite of this, Dunning (2001b) accentuates the central position of 
which the transaction cost (or internalization) paradigm has had during the 
last two decades in explaining the growth of the firm. However, the same 
author also emphasizes the growing critiques towards the transaction cost 
explanation that have been advanced by, among others, economists and 
organization theorists. 
 
Some trade economists try to explain FDIs by looking at macro determinants 
(i.e. the unit of analysis is the country) such as economic growth, 
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comparatively advantaged and disadvantaged industries, and access to 
resources (Kojima, 1978; Kojima and Ozawa, 1985; Ozawa, 1979). Local 
firm in developed economies have a tendency to relocate their less 
sophisticated technology to a country at an earlier stage of development, and 
the countries gain the most if this is done through FDIs. In addition, firms in 
countries with limited natural resources (for example Japan) have a tendency 
to invest abroad by locating machinery and factories close to the site of 
resource extraction, with the intention to supply their own domestic market 
(Cantwell, 2000). 
 
While some economists have been focusing on the macro level, the resource-
based view has had a distinct focus on the firm as the unit of analysis when 
explaining, among other things, the growth of the MNC. The resource-based 
view was developed along the ideas developed by Edith Penrose in the 
1950s (Penrose, 1956; 1959), and according to this view, the MNC grows 
out of its ability to create and sustain unique advantages, such as superior 
technology. Hence the international company grows on its ability to create 
and replicate new knowledge, and the advantage towards other firms may lie 
in the MNC’s ability to transfer the knowledge across markets more 
effectively than others. General knowledge can be imitated by other firms, or 
licensed to locals, but the transfer of unique knowledge is most often 
executed through FDIs, and in that sense, it is the transfer of new knowledge 
that primarily expresses the growth of the MNC (Kogut and Zander, 1993).  
 
Without going into detail, and just mentioning a few of them, a number of 
other important contributions in understanding the multinational firm were 
developed during the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s. Hedlund 
(1986) for example, claimed that it is unlikely that all developments of and 
in MNCs can be grasped by conventional theories, some of the MNCs could 
rather be analyzed as heterarchies since the organizations are organized in a 
non-hierarchical way. From a strategic point of view, Bartlett and Ghoshal 
(1987; 1989) introduced an entirely new organizational form – the 
transnational, and according to these authors, the nature of the competitive 
game had fundamentally changed, requiring that companies simultaneously 
capture global-scale efficiency, respond to national markets, and cultivate a 
worldwide learning capability for driving continuous innovation across 
borders (i.e. efficiency – responsiveness – knowledge and competence). 
Researchers from the Uppsala School tradition were probably among the 
first to investigate firms’ expansions into foreign markets by using a network 
approach (see for example Johanson and Mattsson (1988) and Forsgren and 
Johanson (1992)). The network perspective emphasized the often lifelong 
relationships between firms in industrial markets and how these networks 
influenced companies’ foreign activities. Hence, the problem of power and 
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coordination in these networks also became of vital interest (Kogut, 2001). 
Another approach (albeit not fully developed) to the understanding of the 
MNC, is the real option perspective (Buckley and Tse, 1996; Chi, 2000; 
Kogut, 1991; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994). Real option theory is concerned 
about timing, learning and flexibility issues, and thereby adding a more 
dynamic perspective to the theory of the firm (Bowman and Hurry, 1993). 
The fundamental problem for firms, ex ante, is the decision whether to invest 
or not. However, subsequent questions of almost equal importance will 
occur simultaneously: What are the purposes of the FDI? In what sense will 
the investment open up for later flexibility or later lock-in situations? Is the 
investment capable of meeting future short-term strategic challenges and 
opportunities? The real option approach addresses several of these questions, 
and can probably deepen our understanding of what is going on ex post of 
the initial investment. 
 
Parallel with the development of these different theoretical strands, some 
researchers made serious efforts to work out a more integrated approach. 
Especially, John Dunning has made important contributions in that direction 
by putting forward his eclectic paradigm to answer both “why” and “where”, 
as well as “how” to carry out international production (Dunning, 1977; 1981; 
1988; 2001a). The so-called OLI-framework is based upon three inter-
related factors: The ownership advantages (O-factors), the locational 
advantages (L-factors), and the internalization advantages (I factors). The 
theoretical building blocks of the OLI framework in many respects comprise 
the resource-based approach (O factor), the product life cycle model and 
trade theory (L factor), economies of scale and scope (L and I factors), and 
internalization and transaction cost approaches (I factor) (Dunning, 2001b). 
And as such, this framework should be well suited for a more comprehensive 
understanding of the MNC, as well as the performance of the firm.  
  
The performance of foreign subsidiaries18 
Despite the focus on explaining FDIs, the OLI framework is probably also 
well applicable to frame a discussion about firm performance in general and 
subsidiary performance in particular. Performance issues are central in all 
the approaches that underlie the OLI framework, although in different ways, 
and taken together they provide the basic building blocks for understanding 
how international business settings work. Therefore, much of the following 
discussion about performance will be structured along the OLI framework. 
Hence, before the scope becomes narrow, the following sections will contain 
                                                     
18 Much of the text in the following chapter (pp. 16-24) is taken from Benito and 
Tomassen (2003, pp. 177-188). 
 17
a review of the main theoretical building blocks for the OLI framework in 
order to obtain a more detailed, albeit not all-embracing, depiction of the 
factors driving the performance of foreign operations.  
 
Looking at individual firms i, equation (1.1) on page 2 can generally be 
interpreted as how the specific set of advantages being used by a given firm 
in the set of operations it conducts in various locations leads to a certain 
level of performance. Of course, simply taking a snapshot of a particular 
OLI-configuration disregards that OLI advantages seldom occur 
instantaneously; they take time to develop. At any given point in time t, an 
existing OLI-configuration could be thought of as being the stock of OLI 
advantages, which again reflects the outcomes of a myriad of actions and 
events that may have gone long back in time. Consequently, performance 
differences at the firm level can to some extent be attributed to differences 
between firms with regard to their OLI-configuration, i.e. to varying stocks 
of O, L, and I advantages.  
 
While L advantages are predominantly exogenously given, stocks of O and I 
advantages are constantly under threat because they can be copied or 
surpassed by competitors. A principal reason for differences in performance 
between competing firms is therefore likely to be their ability to utilize, or 
mobilize, their OLI configurations at any point t. Such abilities, or 
capabilities, are dependent on prior OLI advantages within the firm, and 
there are obviously major differences in how the firms are capable of 
exploiting these advantages (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Madhok, 1997). 
Even if firms within the same industry have more or less equal access to 
technological and human resources, enjoy largely the same location 
advantages, and have organized their international activities in basically the 
same manner, substantial differences in performance are nevertheless 
observed. Firms’ unique abilities, which we here denote as α, to take 
advantage of their OLI stock should therefore also be taken as a crucial part 
of their OLI configurations. For given firms, we hence have the following 
general performance function: 
 
Pi = g [Oi , Li , Ii , αi ]               (2.1) 
 
The degree to which the three OLI components are effectively utilized 
probably hinges on different abilities depending on the types of OLI 
advantage: for example, mobilizing ownership factors may require a 
different set of organizational routines and processes than those required to 
deal with location and/or internalization issues. Hence, αi should be regarded 
as a set consisting of the various capabilities of a firm that are especially 
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suited for utilizing its O, L, and I advantages, {αiO, αiL, αiI}. Hence we got 
the following equation:  
 
Pi = g [Oi αiO, Li αiL, Ii αiI]            (2.2) 
 
 
Function (1.2) on page 3 can thus be re-written with the components of that 
function decomposed into the followings sets Rj = {RjO, RjL, RjI}, PCj = 
{PCjO, PCjL, PCjI}, and TCj = {TCjO, TCjL, TCjI}.  
 
Ownership advantages and performance  
According to the resource-based view (Barney, 1986; Penrose, 1959; 
Peteraf, 1993; Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984), resources are the 
fundamental determinants of a firm’s performance. The concept of resources 
is broad as it has been proposed to comprise all those assets, capabilities, 
information and knowledge, organizational processes, competencies, firm 
characteristics, reputation, etc. that are controlled or owned by the firm and 
that improve its efficiency and effectiveness (Barney, 1991; Daft, 1983). 
Hence, the ability to generate revenues depends on the nature of firms’ 
resources. When resources are difficult to imitate and trade and there are few 
substitutes, firms are in a better position to secure their revenues. In 
particular, resources of a tacit nature (such as, technology and know-how), 
and developed within the firm over a long time, are of special importance 
because they are so difficult to transfer, re-deploy, and imitate (Dierickx and 
Cool, 1989).  
 
According to Peteraf (1993), it is possible under certain circumstances for a 
firm to create persistent above-normal rents, and these rents can be of both 
Ricardian type (Ricardo, 1817) and of monopoly type (Bain, 1956). 
Ricardian rents are created when superior productive assets are limited in 
supply, which can lead to firms with lower average costs than their 
competitors, and/or firms that are better able to meet customers’ needs. Such 
resources include ownership of valuable land, patents, and copyrights. 
Monopoly rents result from restrictions of output, which lead to higher 
prices. Hence, monopoly profits are certainly created out of market power 
rather than obtained as a result of the firm’s possession of unique resources.  
 
In cross-border activities, central factors that disrupt the information 
symmetry between firms and markets are factors such as differences in 
language, culture, and political systems (Welch and Luostarinen, 1988). In a 
world where transfer of such knowledge is done at zero costs, more 
knowledge will always be better than less. However, in a world where 
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knowledge accumulation has a cost, it is far from obvious that this remains 
true. Frequently, there will be a trade-off between the costs of acquiring new 
knowledge and the benefit a firm will have by holding that specific 
knowledge. According to Kogut and Zander (1993) the multinational firm 
emerges not out of the failure of markets for the trading of knowledge, but 
out of its superior efficiency as an organizational instrument through which 
the transfer of knowledge can take place across borders. The dynamic 
processes of exploiting existing knowledge and exploring new knowledge 
are therefore a necessity in the accumulation and development of capabilities 
for firms venturing abroad. 
 
Hymer (1960) sought to explain firms’ internationalization as a function of 
their market power. Firms increased their domestic market power by mergers 
and acquisitions as well as by expansion of capacity. When few competitors 
are left in the local market, the profits earned by a high degree of monopoly 
power are invested abroad in order to develop the firm’s position in foreign 
markets (Cantwell, 2000).  
 
Industrial organization scholars have emphasized that internationalization 
not only is a consequence of market power and monopoly rents earned in a 
local market, but also a consequence of firms’ wish to strengthen their 
bargaining power towards trade unions and various local governments 
(Cowling and Sugden, 1987). First, outsourcing of activities to several and 
smaller subcontractors reduces the power of formerly large trade unions 
within the company. Second, the ability to shift between different production 
locations increases the bargaining power vis-à-vis both local government and 
trade unions regarding wages and conditions of work (Cantwell, 2000). 
Hence, both the option to shift and the outsourcing effects may have effects 
on performance by their reduction of production costs.   
 
The market power argument has been criticized for taking a one-sided and 
static view on firm behavior, especially in the case of internationally 
competitive industries. Venturing into foreign markets will almost invariably 
expose firms to a higher degree of competition. Given that at least some 
competitors exist somewhere, efficiency then becomes a prerequisite for 
survival for a firm. Ownership advantages that strengthen the efficiency of a 
firm, through for example patents, can lower unit costs and thereby increase 
the profit margin. Such advantages are hence obviously of major importance 
for future growth and survival (Cantwell, 2000). With few or no ownership 
advantages, its competitors will most likely conquer a firm in the long run. 
Monopoly rents created in one market – usually the home market – through 
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the use of market power, can seldom be sustained when the firm 
internationalizes its market activities.19  
 
As mentioned earlier, performance-driving factors based upon ownership 
advantages have first and foremost been the domain of the resource-based 
perspective, but they are of course also reflected in the early preoccupation 
of industrial organizations with issues concerning market power and 
monopolistic advantages (Hymer, 1970). Important insights can also be 
found elsewhere, especially in transaction cost theory, which points out that 
certain kinds of ownership advantages should lead to higher revenues as well 
as lower costs. For example, using the terminology of transaction cost 
theory, resources such as knowledge and reputation would be termed as 
specific assets, which in most, albeit perhaps not all, cases are roughly 
equivalent to ownership advantages.  
 
It must be emphasized that according to transaction cost theory the linkage 
between asset specificity and internalization is a symbiotic one. When the 
degree of asset specificity is low (for example when standard technology is 
used), the firm experiences a production cost penalty if it chooses to carry 
out business activities inside the firm instead of procuring them from 
external suppliers. An outside supplier can serve a larger number and a wider 
variety of customers using the same type of technology, and thereby achieve 
scale, scope, and learning economies more easily. Conversely, when assets 
are highly idiosyncratic, there are no longer any scope and/or scale 
incentives to externalize the transactions, and production can take place 
within the firm without a production cost punishment (Riordan and 
Williamson, 1985). In addition, transaction costs will be reduced due to 
better control with opportunism (Williamson, 1975; 1985). The rent potential 
created by a high degree of asset specificity can only be realized through 
internalization. Hence, to give an unambiguous answer on the real sources of 
rents in such cases is like answering, “who came first, the hen or the egg?”  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
19 The line of reasoning presented here echoes the qualifications to simple market 
power explanations provided by the product life cycle approach (Vernon, 1966; 
1971). In later stages of the product life cycle, firms preserve their competitive 
position through scale economies as opposed to superior products and/or 
technologies, which were the basis for the above normal rents created in early 
stages of the product life cycle. 
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Location advantages and performance 
Location advantages have always been at the core of economic approaches 
to internationalization; gains from trade between nations arise from 
differences across various locations with regard to cost and demand 
characteristics, which in turn reflect inter-country variation in terms of 
natural resource endowments and a wide range of socially created assets. 
Internationalization at the firm level can be explained in similar ways. For 
example, some firms move production abroad due to increased competition 
(and thereby also lower profit) in their home market. The size and growth of 
foreign markets are then important pull factors (Buckley and Casson, 1981).  
Some firms seek immobile assets such as labor, land, and infrastructure that 
particular countries can offer, being attracted by the quality, availability, 
and/or price of the resources that they depend upon.   
 
A question that intrigued the early contributors to the theory of FDI was how 
a MNC could compete in a foreign market against local based companies 
(Caves, 1971; Horst, 1972; Hymer, 1960). They proposed that the possession 
of ownership advantages is a necessary condition for neutralizing their 
(initial) competitive disadvantage. Firms’ ownership advantages, which are 
partly generated by investments in knowledge and R&D and internalized 
through the use of subsidiaries, and partly a result of large size per se (i.e. 
scale), usually reflect the market structure and resource availability in their 
home country. However, it is when they get combined with local resources 
(e.g., access to inputs, lower costs, access to distribution channels) that 
superior competitive advantage emerges. Hence, it is the combination of 
those two types of advantages that makes it possible for the MNCs to create 
rents by internationalizing. This was also noticed by Kindleberger (1969) 
who regarded the MNC as a product of monopolistic competition driving 
firms beyond the borders of their countries of origin. 
 
Based on a well-known typology of FDI motives, Rugman and Verbeke 
(2001a) work out some important location factors contributing to firm 
performance (or competitiveness). For resource seeking FDI, it is of course 
particularly important to seek out those locations that have natural resources 
at the lowest real cost, although additional factors including effective 
institutions, proper legal frameworks, and high-quality transportation 
infrastructure are also important. For a market seeking FDI, host country 
market characteristics, trade barriers, investment climate, cost factors, etc. 
are important (Dunning, 1973). The efficiency seeking MNCs are searching 
for location advantages that are complementary to their own specific 
advantages such as appropriate infrastructure, appropriate levels of 
technology development, and supporting institutions. Also, plant-level scale 
economies are more easily achieved if MNCs have a network of units where 
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the various units specialize on the basis of the best possible matches between 
the resources available in the MNC’s internal network and the specific 
advantages of the different locations (Rugman, 1990). Finally, FDIs 
motivated by strategic asset seeking would lead to searching for areas where 
research and development activities are highly developed (Dunning, 1996). 
While companies can, in principle, access global markets for a large range of 
tangible assets, the intangible assets that are critical to activities such as 
R&D, design and core manufacturing are typically embedded in local 
clusters (see for example Porter and Sölvell (1998)). Localizing in such areas 
may also provide spillover effects to the MNC through linkages with local 
innovation systems (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001b). 
 
The last point is also touched upon from a competence-based approach 
(Cantwell, 1989). Cantwell argues that when firms reach a sufficient level of 
technological strength, they get more eager to locate their production in 
those areas where their major competitors originate. Such moves offer firms 
access to alternative sources of complementary innovations. Also, locating 
production to innovative areas in the industry, Silicon Valley being the 
typical example, firms may get access to resources that give them 
opportunities in directions that they would have difficulty in developing in 
their original locations (Cantwell, 2000). Such opportunities may create 
above normal rents through unique product innovations, but also through 
more efficient production technologies. 
 
According to Hennart (2000), becoming a MNC, i.e. the extension of a 
firm’s activities across borders, is dependent both on governance and 
location considerations. The location decision (i.e. choosing the best 
location) is based on the factors just mentioned regarding location and 
production economies: relative labor cost comparisons, transportation costs, 
resource availability, tariffs and non-tariffs barriers to trade, political risk, 
and so on (i.e. those factors that may reduce production costs). The 
governance decision, on the other hand, is largely driven by the potential 
transaction costs that occur by doing business in the local market. Well 
functioning legal institutions that effectively enforce various instruments 
established to protect property rights issues related to trademarks and 
patents, financial transactions, etc. as well as competitive markets, are 
location factors that help reduce transaction costs (Hennart, 2000).  
 
Internalization advantages and performance 
Transaction cost economics deals primarily with the economizing 
consequences of aligning different types of transactions to genuinely 
different governance structures, in particular the discrete structural 
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alternatives of markets, hybrids and hierarchies. The transaction cost 
literature seldom places explicit focus on the performance of the companies, 
but implicitly performance goes as a thread trough the whole logic of the 
theory. Depending on the framework, organizational forms differ with 
respect to their ability to solve adaptation problems of an external as well as 
internal nature, in the use of incentives and control mechanisms, and with 
respect to transaction costs (Hennart, 1982; Williamson, 1985). Since a basic 
contention of the theory is that the most efficient solutions are the ones that 
minimize transaction costs in the long run, there is obviously a need for a 
detailed description of such costs, which will be developed later in this 
chapter (see pp. 32-33).  
 
Even though it is the minimization of transaction costs that is at the center of 
the stage, it must be recognized that additional elements need to be taken 
into account in order to get the proper picture of performance, i.e., revenue 
as well as production cost implications need also to be analyzed. First, there 
is the possibility that MNCs create welfare losses by maximizing profits 
through restriction of output of goods and services. Vertical integration can 
work as an instrument for creating barriers to entry, thereby creating 
monopoly profit at the expense of the customers in the final product market 
(Buckley, 1985). Second, vertical integration can make scale economies 
possible. The argument is that the cost of internalized operations will be 
easier to recover if large transactions are of a repetitive character. Hence, 
higher levels of transaction frequency provide an incentive for firms to 
employ hierarchical governance structures (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; 
Williamson, 1985).   Third, potential cross-border scope economies can be 
exploited more easily and cheaply (with regard to transaction costs) within 
the framework of an organization, i.e. an MNC (Galbraith and Kay, 1986). 
 
According to the resource-based view, organizations have some key features 
that contribute to their performance. First, organizations are able to pursue 
so-called dynamic efficiency, which means that firms can create new options 
based on their superior technology and expand the scope of activities beyond 
those activities that are efficiently coordinated by the market (Moran and 
Ghoshal, 1996). The ability to impede market forces temporarily opens up 
possibilities to pursue innovative activities. Many of the activities that are 
associated with innovations occur within the firm, and since innovations 
often are faced with a poorly functioning price mechanism, missing markets, 
and high degrees of uncertainty and ambiguity, markets are not well suited to 
take care of these activities even though they may create rents for the firm at 
later stages. Second, a feeling of shared purpose makes organizations able to 
create an atmosphere that shapes the values and goals of their members. 
That, in turn, leads to the development of trust and commitment, which is of 
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major importance in reducing opportunism and transaction costs. Further, as 
already mentioned above, it is an efficient way of transferring knowledge 
across borders (Kogut and Zander, 1993).  
 
As already touched upon above, industrial organization scholars argue that 
the use of O advantages through subsidiaries combined with the utilization 
of local resources lead both to increased revenues and reduced costs 
(production costs as well as transaction costs). The first is due to 
internalization of competition; the latter are due to less haggling (Caves, 
1971; Hymer, 1960; Kindleberger, 1969), the use of internal transfer prices 
(Hymer, 1970), and the reduced market power of suppliers, including trade 
unions (Cantwell, 2000).  
 
Preliminary conclusion 
This rather all-embracing review of general factors that may influence 
subsidiary performance cannot be developed into detail in one 
comprehensive empirical study. Hence, to make the present study feasible, a 
more detailed and necessarily narrow focus is imperative. Although much is 
left to be done within all the theoretical strands, the underlying TCE 
assumption of transaction costs effects towards performance seems to be 
particularly little developed. This is also shown in the later presentation of 
empirical performance studies within international business. Therefore, the 
main analysis will be concentrated on the possible relationship between 
transaction costs and performance, which also calls for a more detailed 
review of the TCE-approach. However, the type and number of control 
variables taken into the analysis are to a certain extent marked by the 
preceding literature review, as well as by the empirical works presented 
later. (For an overview of the included control variables, see the pages 70-71 
in chapter 4). 
 
Transaction cost economics 
FDIs have been studied profoundly in economics, strategy, and international 
business research, and there is no doubt about the influence transaction cost 
economics (TCE) (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; 1985; 1996), and 
consequently also the internalization perspective (Buckley, 1985; Buckley 
and Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982; Rugman, 1981), have had on the 
understanding of why we have firms and why firms establish hierarchies 
such as foreign subsidiaries when international markets are the object of 
attention (Dunning, 2001b). However, TCE-based research has paid less 
attention to the consequences of these choices (i.e. what happens after the 
choice has been made) irrespective of whether this relates to transaction 
costs consequences or performance effects. 
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TCE is in many ways an answer to some of the shortcomings in standard 
neoclassical theory. According to TCE, a firm is an independent legal entity, 
which enables it to seek court enforcement when there are disputes about 
contracts. However, although the legal aspect is important, it is only a 
fraction of what a firm actually is. A firm involves human and technological 
resources and information flows between these. There are organizational 
routines, knowledge transfer, organizational learning, conflicts, power, 
control, authority, and much more. A firm is a construction – created by 
human beings, which are self-seekers, sometimes also opportunists 
(Williamson, 1985), as well as "intendedly rational, but only boundedly so" 
(Simon, 1997, p. 88). Many important management decisions in firms have 
some kind of a transactional and contractual aspect and they are 
simultaneously social and economic. Economic questions about strategy, 
manufacturing, and finance are bound up with social questions about 
organizational phenomena as a combination of social and economic issues 
(Barney and Ouchi, 1986). Thus, the firm is described by Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972) as a nexus of implicit and/or explicit contracts among 
capital owners, managers, labor, and other stakeholders. 
 
According to Hart (1989, p. 1757), “any discussion of theories about the firm 
must start with the neoclassical approach”. However, neoclassical theory has 
a very simplistic image of the firm. The firm is often described as a variety 
of possible production plans, administered by a manager. The manager buys 
and sells goods in a spot market and chooses which production plans are able 
to maximize the owners’ welfare, which is usually defined as profit, or by 
expected net present value of profit, or market value, if the environment is 
uncertain (Hart, 1989). Barney & Ouchi (1986) go as far as to assert that the 
firm, in the neoclassical definition, is purely defined as a production function 
and taken for given, and the relevance of inter- and intra-organizational 
processes is assumed away. It would be no exaggeration to maintain that the 
orthodox view of the firm is an evident misrepresentation of the modern firm 
of today. The theory does not at all explain why we have firms, why markets 
can replace firms, how production is organized within firms (Penrose, 1959), 
how conflicts of interest between firms’ stakeholders are resolved, and, more 
generally, how to achieve profit maximization. The neoclassical theory of 
the firm lacks the firm, or the structure of the firm, so to say (Simon, 1997). 
Therefore, any further theoretical developments will omit the neoclassical 
approach. 
 
Williamson (1985) distinguishes between two areas of transaction cost 
economics: the governance branch and the measurement branch. The 
governance branch is mainly occupied with the most efficient organizational 
alignment of transactions, and the measurement branch is occupied with 
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productivity and reward. However, these to approaches are not independent. 
One of the underlying assumptions is that there is an implicit coherence 
between governance structures, rewards, and productivity, given transaction 
cost presence and given the assumption that firms are profit-seeking entities. 
Hence, the profit maximization axiom is an important assumption within the 
TCE perspective. In many respect, performance is synonymous with both 
external and internal efficiency in the governance branch of TCE. However, 
efficiency is poorly operationalized in the general TCE framework. Most of 
the efficiency criteria are of a more conceptual character, such as if there are 
no other feasible solutions that give expected net gains, then the extant 
solution is presumed to be the most efficient one (Williamson, 1999). 
Aligning the most efficient contractual arrangement to a specific transaction 
is the recurrent theme, and the most efficient solution is the one that 
minimizes the transaction costs in the long run.  
 
Further, according to Williamson (1975; 1985), the TCE framework relies 
on three suppositions about human behavior; opportunism, bounded 
rationality, and risk neutrality, and three dimensions of transactions; asset 
specificity, uncertainty, and transaction frequency.  
 
Given the opportunity, some decision-makers will cheat, lye, and violate 
agreements some of the time. Moreover, it is difficult and costly for the 
principal to determine who are trustworthy and who are not, ex ante. The 
problem regarding opportunism occurs when a relationship is supported with 
the transactional dimension of specific assets – assets that have substantial 
less value outside the relationship. Hence, the effect of specific assets is a 
safeguarding problem because there is not a competitive market that can 
moderate the inclination of opportunistic behavior. The consequence of the 
safeguarding problem is often a use of governance in general and vertical (or 
horizontal) integration in particular to safeguard the idiosyncratic 
investments (Masten, 1984). Hence, the classical choice of hierarchies vs. 
markets could be portrayed as in Figure 2-1. 
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external internal no business
TCe TCi
benefits
fixed costs
s1 s2
Costs
Degree of
asset specificity
 
Figure 2-1: The internalization decision 
Adapted from Meyer (1998). 
 
 
According to Meyer (1998), both external and internal transaction costs (TCi 
and TCe) rise with increased level of asset specificity. In addition to the 
transaction costs, an internal organization generates also a certain level of 
fixed costs. The fixed costs that are required in an international context are 
the costs of setting up and running a foreign subsidiary. The bold line 
describes the different mode choices dependent on the transaction costs 
generated. With low specific assets, the transaction costs of a market 
solution are lower than the transaction costs of an internal solution. 
However, when TCe exceeds TCi in s1 due to a relative high level of asset 
specificity, a FDI is preferred to a market solution. In s2, the costs exceed the 
benefits and no business will take place, which also can be illustrated by 
going back to equation (1.2) and slightly change the notations: 
 
Πj = Rj – (PCj + TCij)              (2.3) 
 
hence no business will be executed if: 
 
 TCij > (Rj – PCj)              (2.4) 
 
Additionally, Williamson (1975) puts forward three kinds of advantages that 
internal organizations enjoy over market contracting where opportunism and 
small number conditions are coupled. First, the parties to an internal 
exchange are less capable of possessing subgroup gains at the expense of the 
whole organization, and the incentives to behave opportunistically are 
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therefore reduced. In addition to lesser pre-emptive claims on their profit 
stream due to more restricted trading roles, internal divisions that trade with 
one another also have management that are more willing to cooperate. 
Second, internal organizations are more effectively monitored. Internally, the 
principal has the advantage to include both formal and informal ways of 
auditing, and often the auditor has the privilege to be seen as an insider – it is 
more acceptable to be controlled by one’s own representatives, than by an 
outsider. Third, internal organizations have advantages in solving 
disagreements. Often, internal disputes are solved by fiat, instead of by 
bringing the conflict to court, which is a very cost-effective way of bringing 
the conflict to an end.  
 
All forms of organizations are subject to risks of opportunism, but the nature 
and form are most probably different across types of organizations 
(Williamson, 1975). This also applies to the transactional dimension of 
specific assets.20 First, do we see such investments in the internal 
relationships between headquarters and subsidiary in a MNC? There are a lot 
of reasons why the MNC wants to invest in the FDI, and some of these 
investments can be of specific character. It can be product or service 
investments that are tailor made to meet requirements of the foreign country. 
Specialized educational programs for different types of workers can be 
developed. Valuable technology can be transferred, and specialized facilities 
could be needed to market the product (Aulakh and Kotabe, 1997; Klein, 
Frazier, and Roth, 1990). Second, what are the consequences of such 
investments? From TCE reasoning, there is a need of monitoring the agent 
(here the FDI), given the assumption about possible opportunistic actors. 
Likewise, there is a need of exploiting the company’s product/service 
technology in the local market, integrating the MNC's mission in the FDI, 
and often also integrating the company’s business practices (Kogut and 
Zander, 1995). However, specific investments also create lock-in effects, 
which probably make the MNC less flexible with respect to both operations 
within the foreign country and between countries. Hence, the main forms of 
opportunism that internal organizations are faced with are those of 
bureaucracy and of autonomous maladaptation, which create at least control 
costs (which also are synonymous with those costs that later in this study are 
called monitoring costs).  
 
                                                     
20 Generally, specific assets can be categorized in six different ways: (1) site 
specificity; (2) physical asset specificity; (3) human asset specificity; (4) brand 
name capital; (5) dedicated assets; (6) temporal specificity (Williamson, 1991, p. 
281). 
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According to TCE, the competencies to solve adaptation problems of both 
external and internal nature and in the use of incentives and control 
instruments are distinctive characteristics for different organizational 
solutions. The market solution in TCE is in accordance with so-called 
Hayekian adaptation (Hayek, 1945), which is in line with the neoclassical 
ideal for which prices serve as sufficient information. Any changes in supply 
and demand for a product are reflected in price changes, and producers and 
consumers adapt independently to changes in prices so as to maximize their 
utility and profit (Williamson, 1991). The analogy to hierarchical solutions 
in TCE is the Barnardian form of adaptation (Barnard, 1938), which refers to 
the efforts in crafting adaptative internal coordinating mechanisms within 
internal organizations. However, the consequence of cooperation 
requirements and the needs of low-conflict solutions to disputes in 
hierarchies is that internal incentives in organizations are less powerful than 
those within markets. Hence, changes in human effort rarely give an instant 
effect on reward, and vice versa. However, this is often balanced with added 
internal control and order – in accordance with what Williamson calls the 
“implicit contract law of forbearance” (Williamson, 1991, p. 274).  
 
The supposition of bounded rationality in TCE maintains that human agents 
in the real world are “intendedly rational, but only boundedly so” (Simon, 
1997, p. 88). Decision-makers are limited in knowledge, communication 
abilities, information processing, foresight, time, etc. These constraints 
become sticky when the environment is difficult to predict ex ante – i.e. 
environmental uncertainty, and when human performance is difficult to 
validate ex post – i.e. behavioral uncertainty. Hence, an advantage of internal 
organizations is that they permit the parties to deal with uncertainty and 
complexity in a more adaptive and sequential way. It is not so important, ex 
ante, to cover all eventualities through a complex contract. In addition, an 
internal organization promotes convergences with regard to different 
expectations about the future, while market contracts more frequently are 
marked by the expectations of a single party (Williamson, 1975).     
 
Regarding risk neutrality, Williamson (1985) has put up three reasons for 
this behavioral assumption: (1) The emphasis in TCE is on intermediate 
product markets, which mainly are about transactions between firms rather 
than among individuals, and owners of firms can diversify their financial 
assets to a large extent; (2) related to the first reason, if the punishment for 
not having the capacity to bear risk is great, participants have a strong 
impetus to build structures with superior risk-bearing properties; (3) it helps 
to reveal core efficiency features that are overlooked when suppositions 
about risk aversion are incorporated in the analysis. 
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Since the present study has "assumed away" the discussion about hierarchies 
vs. markets by just looking at hierarchies, it seems adequate not to take the 
supposition of risk neutrality into consideration. In addition, the risk neutral 
assumption is not dealt with particularly well (if at all) in later TCE-based 
studies (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997).  Others suggest that a single risk 
preference is an oversimplification and that risk preferences for a firm vary 
from risk aversion through risk neutrality to risk seeking, depending on a set 
of contextual variables (Chiles and McMackin, 1996). 
 
Transaction frequency is the third relevant dimension of the transaction. The 
argument is that the cost of internalized operations will be easier to recover 
if large transactions are of a recurrent character. Hence, “higher levels of 
transaction frequency provide an incentive for firms to employ hierarchical 
governance” (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). However, according to 
Williamson (1979), this rationale has to be connected to the characteristics 
of the investments. Consequently, if the investments are of non-specific 
character the only solution is to bring the transaction into the market. This 
dimension goes directly to the hierarchy vs. market discussion, and it seems 
adequate, therefore, not to take this dimension into further consideration. 
 
Transaction costs 21 
As already touch upon above, TCE has a strong performance implication 
build into its logic. However, limited research within the TCE framework on 
this issue makes it difficult to fully evaluate its theoretical value and 
empirical validity. Hence, it has been recommended that future studies try to 
develop reliable and valid measures of transaction costs and investigate 
performance consequences of aligning governance problems and governance 
arrangements (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Primarily, TCE is concerned 
with the economizing consequences of aligning different types of 
transactions to genuinely different governance structures and the discrete 
structural concepts of market, hybrid and hierarchy, which differ among 
other things with respect to the level of transaction costs. However, since 
less attention has been given to the internally generated transaction costs 
                                                     
21 Chiles and McMackin (1996, p. 76-77) maintain that there are two separate 
research streams within TCE: The managerial-choice approach adopted by 
Williamson (1975; 1985) and Walker and Weber (1984), and the so-called 
economic natural-selection approach represented by for example Hill (1990). The 
first views transaction costs as subjective, due to the fact that the choice of 
organizational form is based upon managers’ different perceptions and evaluation 
of such costs in a world of uncertainty. The latter relies on costs as objective. 
According to the same authors, subjective costs and objective costs (measured by 
accounting data) will only be equal in general equilibrium. 
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(Masten, Meehan, and Snyder, 1991; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997), this 
research is especially interested in the transaction costs that occur within 
hierarchical solutions after the initial entry mode choice. It is the transaction 
costs that take place after the MNC has established a start-up or an 
acquisition that are of specific concern.22 The study will emphasize ex post 
transaction costs such as: (1) bargaining costs; (2) monitoring cost; (3) 
maladaptation costs; and (4) bonding costs, i.e. costs that are generated after 
a contract has been settled between two cooperative parties (Dahlman, 1979; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1985).23 There is no reasons to 
believe that the transaction costs that are generated in hierarchical solutions 
like FDIs are qualitative completely different from those generated in market 
transactions (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). “They only manifest themselves 
somewhat differently in different contexts” (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 
29).   
 
Even though there is a much better understanding of the transaction cost 
concept today than what was the case when these costs were conceptualized 
for the first time, few studies have been concerned about the measurement of 
transaction costs. The main objective has rather been to predict contractual 
arrangements based upon the transaction costs that are generated from 
observable characteristics of the transaction. This lack of interest in the 
measurement of transaction costs has probably something to do with the 
general belief that transaction costs are difficult to observe and measure 
(Masten, Meehan, and Snyder, 1991). Likewise, the idea that the problem of 
quantifying transaction costs is somewhat mitigated due to the fact that they 
“always are assessed in a comparative institutional way [..........] by 
employing rather primitive apparatus” (Williamson, 1985, p.22), certainly 
fortifies the absence of measurement of transaction costs in empirical 
research. However, the present research will maintain that this stand is a 
major obstacle when testing the normative guidelines in the theory. It is 
actually of vital importance to understand and measure these costs (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1992). The comparison of attributes will be rather superficial if 
the understanding and the measurement of the transaction costs are vague. 
Likewise, transaction costs effects on performance will be difficult to grasp. 
                                                     
22 Demsetz (1993, pp. 161-162) prefers to use the word “transaction costs” when 
describing the costs of organizing resources across markets and “management 
costs” when organizing resources within firms. But for those that do not like this 
distinction, he suggests that the reader can substitute the two expressions with 
“governance costs”. He also prefers a rather restricted definition of transaction 
costs when he proposes that they are the costs linked to negotiating (see note 5 on 
p. 176). 
23 In contrast, we have ex ante types of transaction costs such as: “the costs of 
drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement” (Williamson, 1985, p. 20). 
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Hence, according to the literature, the following facets of ex post transaction 
costs will be considered: 
 
Bargaining costs is a general term for expenses related to negotiations 
between different parties, including costs incurred as a result of the needs to 
renegotiate due to unclear contract formulations or make changes to the 
contract. According to Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 301), such costs 
include time spent on bargaining, resources used during bargaining, and 
losses that occur as a result of failure in reaching efficient agreements.  
 
Monitoring costs occur when resources are used to secure the fulfillment of 
contractual commitments (Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Such costs can manifest themselves as time spent on 
controlling delivered services from the foreign subsidiary, time and money 
spent on accounting issues, and extra travel expenses to control working 
effort.  
 
Maladaptation costs basically arise from communication and coordination 
failures between contracting parties which in turn make them unable to react 
rapidly to changing conditions (Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999). Adaptation 
problems are the order of the day when the environment is uncertain. 
Appropriate responses to environmental changes require prompt and correct 
information, but typically much of the information received from, say, a 
foreign unit is incomplete, or too voluminous, or too poorly formulated to 
provide a proper basis for decision-making regarding adequate courses of 
action. Maladaptation costs are simply the opportunity costs of ineffective 
and inappropriate responses. 
 
Bonding costs occur due to the necessity of completing secure commitments. 
Williamson (1985) is using the word “bonding costs” as one element of ex 
post transaction costs. However, bonding costs are conceptually poorly 
developed. Williamson (1985, pp. 21 and 388), for example, defines the 
concept as costs related to “effecting secure commitments”, not more than 
that. Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) barely mention the concept in a 
discussion about type of actions an agent can incur “to guarantee that he will 
not take certain actions which would harm the principal”. Such activities 
could for example be auditing by a public accountant. This is also slightly 
amplified by Douma and Schreuder (1998, p. 107), by their linking of 
bonding costs to the bonding activity, which is defined as: “bonding means 
that the manager takes the initiative to bind himself and to be monitored”. 
This is in contrast to monitoring: which they define as an activity initiated by 
an outsider. Intuitively, there seems to be a close relationship between 
bonding and monitoring, and that bonding in one sense of the word is an 
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activity that an agent incurs. Others have a slightly different opinion. 
Bonding could be all of those positive related activities that lead to 
commitments in a relationship. It includes such actions as developing 
personal ties between parties, developing common identities, building 
incentive systems, etc. (Heide and John, 1988). The present study will follow 
the latter approach in the understanding and definition of bonding costs. 
 
This definition of ex post transaction costs is relative comprehensive. Hence, 
others have characterized transaction costs much narrower, and restrict the 
definition to the “costs of negotiating” (Demsetz, 1993, p. 176) (see also 
footnote 22 on page 31). And in line with this view, Walker and Poppo 
(1991) define transaction costs as the costs (i.e. bargaining costs measured 
by two indicators) that occur through bargaining about allocation of 
adjustment costs.24 In addition, Buvik and John (2002) established a one-
factorial definition (with four items) of ex post transaction costs based on the 
assumption that these costs were those bargaining costs and monitoring costs 
that occurred when the parties had to realign the terms of trade.  
 
On the other hand, a study by Pilling, Crosby, and Jackson, Jr. (1994) 
supports the idea that transaction costs are multi dimensional. According to 
this study, transaction costs consist of three dimensions: the costs of 
developing and setting up an exchange relationship, monitoring costs, and 
the costs of dealing with opportunistic behavior. However, the study did not 
separate ex ante and ex post costs, and the items used to establish the three 
dimensions were not reported. In addition, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) 
describe transaction costs along two dimensions: (1) coordination costs and 
(2) motivation costs. The first consists of the costs of obtaining information 
and the costs of measurements, the second consists of the costs of motivating 
specialized agents to align their interests when information is incomplete and 
asymmetrically distributed, and the costs of imperfect commitment. Hence, 
much of the Milgrom and Roberts approach seems to be consistent with the 
present research when defining transaction costs.  
 
A somewhat different method was taken by Masten, Meehan, and Snyder 
(1991, p. 13) when they proposed to measure transaction costs by measuring 
the costs of internal organization instead of the costs of market transactions. 
This due to the fact that organization costs “tend to occur in a more routine 
                                                     
24 “Adjustment costs in supply relationships represent the costs of adaptation directly 
and are a focal point of supplier-management practice because of price 
competition in the assembly division’s product market” (Walker and Poppo, 1991, 
p. 72).  These costs are measured by engineering changes and changes in the costs 
of raw material input.  
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fashion”, which will ease the burden of “measurement or formulation of 
reasonable proxies” of organizational costs. Therefore, company officials in 
a large naval shipbuilding company were asked to report number of hours 
dedicated to planning, guiding, and supervising particular processes or 
components in a make or buy program (Nmake = 43, Nbuy = 31). To calculate 
the costs of these activities, the number of hours was multiplied by the 
average wage rate of the management. Hence, by doing so, Masten, Meehan, 
and Snyder (1991) were the first who really tried to measure transaction 
costs by monetary units. However, the definition of organizational costs in 
this study is quite different from the common understanding of transaction 
costs, and very specific to one particular firm, in a highly idiosyncratic 
business, which makes it difficult to generalize across organizational forms, 
firms, and industries. On the other hand, their reasoning about internally 
generated transaction costs seems to be appropriate. 
 
Performance measures 
“It must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by 
experience” (Popper, 1959, p. 41).  Hence, falsifiability induces whether a 
theory is created so that empirical disproval is possible. Because variables 
and constructs are the building blocks of hypotheses and propositions, it is of 
critical importance for the researcher to investigate them first, before 
analyzing any relational properties of theories (Bacharach, 1989). The 
measurement of performance is therefore critical in enhancing the reliability 
and the validity of the study. However, the performance concept seems to be 
far from unambiguous, and a dependent variable that is difficult to 
understand and difficult to measure gives ambiguous and unreliable answers 
to the researcher.   
 
There seems to be many and divergent views on the definition of firm 
performance (Barney, 1997; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986). This 
divergence can obviously lead to measurement problems in the dependent 
variable. In addition, the structure of a modern multinational company seems 
to invite a more comprehensive definition, and it seems to be apt to 
introduce both financial and non-financial performance indicators, as well as 
subjective performance evaluation of the FDI.  
  
The classical micro economic definition of economic performance is the 
firms’ ability to satisfy the wants and needs of individual human beings 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 22). Consequently, it is necessary to ascribe 
preferences to individuals and thereby assume that each individual can 
measure their own utility function. Hence, the economic goal is to maximize 
each individual’s utility function. However, according to Varian (1992), it is 
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almost impossible to measure this utility since it is not directly observable. 
In what ways can performance then be measured?  
 
Generally, according to Dess and Robinson (1984), researchers studying 
organizational performance often have difficulties finding objective data. 
Assessing the performance of multi-industry firms is difficult because 
profitability will be influenced by industry-specific factors, and performance 
data must be accurately allocated across different business units. In addition, 
extra problems occur by trying to measure performance in privately held 
firms because owners are reluctant to release performance data. And if they 
do, data may not be comparable across firms because of different accounting 
procedures. In their study, Dess and Robinson (1984) suggest that when 
adequate objective performance data are not available for firms, subjective 
performance data may be used to supplement performance measurement. 
Based on a survey of chief executives and top managers from a sample of 
privately held firms in a single industry, objective data and subjective 
measures on return on assets, sales growth, and global performance were 
found to be highly correlated. 
 
According to Barney (1997), business performance can be defined as a 
three-way classification based upon the relationship between expected 
economic value and actual economic value for the firm. When the value 
produced by the firm is equal to the owners’ expectations, then the firm has 
normal performance. A below-normal performance is of course when the 
firm produces less than expected value, and vice versa with above-normal 
performance. This way of defining organizational performance is very much 
in accordance with microeconomic thinking. Still, the definition is far from 
obvious, and its fuzziness is for example evident in the way Barney (1997) 
suggests performance should be measured. He proposes four major 
approaches: (1) survival, (2) accounting measures, (3) stakeholder 
approaches, and (4) present-value approaches. All of these four approaches 
have advantages and disadvantages; hence, his advice is to apply multiple 
measures of performance. The difficulties with survival measures are for 
example that it is often difficult to decide when a firm no longer exists, and, 
in addition, the death of a firm can occur over a long period of time. Multiple 
stakeholder approaches, on the other hand, often create many definitions of 
organizational performance because each group may define performance in 
an idiosyncratic way (Barney, 1997). Further, relying only on present value 
estimation of the firm can probably create huge problems both with the 
measurement of net cash flow (what is the future cash flow for the FDI in 
highly volatile markets?) and the calculation of the discount rate (Barney, 
1997). 
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In a transaction costs study about how specific assets in exchange 
relationships are safeguarded, Heide and John (1988) measured performance 
as a ratio between the costs of selling a particular product line and the 
commission income for the agency of that specific line. A similar approach 
(although based on the evolutionary economics and population ecology 
approaches) is also used by Anderson (1988a), in a study about selling 
efficiency and the choice between integrated or independent sales forces 
among U.S.-based firms in the electronic components industry. 
 
Based on a transaction cost framework, Noordewier, John, and Nevin (1990) 
measured performance (i.e. purchasing performance) by measuring the 
transaction costs (i.e. indicators of possession costs and administrative 
costs25) that occurred in purchasing arrangements of ball and roller bearings. 
Hence, low possession costs and administrative costs indicate high 
performance (as such, transaction costs are acting as proxies for 
performance). By doing so, Noordewier, John, and Nevin (1990) will 
probably claim that performance actually is about the minimization of 
transaction costs, and it should therefore be unnecessary to use other types of 
performance measures, which also is the underlying assumption in the study 
by Masten, Meehan, and Snyder (1991) by their use of so-called 
organizational costs as a proxy for performance. The same type of reasoning 
can probably also be deduced from a study about organizational control and 
performance in franchise arrangements of a large Norwegian oil distributor 
(Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999). Channel performance is in this study 
synonymous with the minimization of transaction costs.  
 
Other kinds of measurements that the literature suggests are: growth in sales 
and market shares (Morosini, Shane, and Singh, 1998), benchmarking, 
behavioral and perceived measurements (or by satisfaction according to the 
terminology used by Osland and Çavusgil (1996)). Ezzamel (1992) suggests, 
more in line with the present-value approach, that the use of discounted cash 
flow (DCF) offers a sound proxy for income and that it can be adapted to 
reflect the performance of sub-units and their managers. In addition to this 
measurement, both qualitative and quantitative non-financial measures such 
as statistics on factory safety, employee turnover, customer satisfaction, 
quality, delivery throughput, flexibility, industrial relations, etc. are 
proposed. 
 
Intuitively, the use of financial and accounting indicators (such as, ROS, 
ROE, ROA, ROI, and parent company stock price) as measurements of 
                                                     
25 Or “acquisition costs”, as the authors call it (Noordewier, John, and Nevin, 1990, 
p. 81). 
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performance, seems appealing (Chatterjee, et al., 1992; Woo, Willard, and 
Daellenbach, 1992). Hence, many studies have tried to use this approach. 
Goethals and Ooghe (1997) included ROI when they evaluated performance 
of foreign and national take-overs in Belgium. Busija, Hugh, and Zeithaml. 
(1997) used return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on 
investment (ROI), and sales growth as measurements in their study about 
performance effects of strategy and entry mode. Their study, however, did 
not deal with international activities or operations. In addition, Gómez-Mejia 
and Palich (1997) used ROA and market-to-book value (MTB) when they 
studied cultural diversity and performance for Fortune 500 firms in the 
period 1985-1994. ROA (in addition to operational outcomes) was also used 
by Gomes and Ramaswamy (1999) when they studied the relationship 
between multinationality and performance among U.S. MNEs. In a study 
about the relationship between collaboration and performance in foreign 
markets among international new ventures, Shrader (2001) argues that since 
transaction costs have direct effects on both profitability and sales growth, it 
is highly relevant to use ROS (return on sales) and sales growth when 
measuring performance. All these studies are measuring performance at the 
corporate level. 
 
The financial indicators are influenced by many factors that make 
meaningful interpretations quite difficult (Ramaswamy, 1992). First, 
accounting practices differ from country to country. Second, benefits from 
the foreign affiliate's activities will seldom be reflected as changes in the 
financial indicators for the multinational mother company. Finally, the 
success of the foreign affiliate will often go beyond short-term financial 
calculus – often the strategic rationale of the activity should be recognized; 
i.e. access to market, global diversification, competing with international 
competitors in their home market, etc. (Hill, Hwang, and Kim, 1990). In 
addition, using measures like ROS when comparing firms across industries 
is often meaningless since industries differ along a whole set of parameters, 
such as growth rate, the dynamics of competition, and structure. 
 
In a study of channel integration in foreign markets, Aulakh and Kotabe 
(1997) use a more relative performance measure (close to a benchmarking 
approach) than the financial measurements presented above, when they 
define performance as the ability to increase sales and market share of the 
manufacturing firm's products as well as to maintain an adequate level of 
customer service support for these products. Out of this, they define two sets 
of measurement items: those relative to domestic performance (RTD) and 
those relative to competitors in the foreign country (RTFC).  
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Another approach is used by Woodcock, Beamish, and Makino (1994). By 
asking the companies how satisfied they are with the performance of the 
affiliate, they get a perceived evaluation of the performance of the FDI. This 
perception is measured on a three-level financial profitability rating scale. 
Financial data were used, but since the rating was done by the top managers 
involved in the survey, not by the researchers themselves, it would be correct 
to call this approach a perceived financial form of evaluation, in contrast to 
an objective measure of those financial indicators. 
 
Following Geringer and Herbert (1991), Glaister and Buckley (1998) used 
both objective measures (survival, duration, and stability) and subjective 
measures (satisfaction of alliance performance, assessment of the foreign 
partner’s measure of satisfaction, and assessment of the alliance 
management’s measure of satisfaction) of performance in their study of 
international alliances.  
 
An additional method to measure performance could be called the behavioral 
approach, which can be summarized as what an affiliate actually does over 
time after the entry. It could be changes in ownership shares, technology 
transfers, various forms of expansion, etc. For example, in a study of 
divestments of foreign production operations, Benito (1997) analyzed a list 
of Norwegian subsidiaries abroad and measured the survival of the affiliates 
after ten years. Li (1995) relied on the lists of entry data of FDIs in the 
U.S.A. compiled by the U.S. Department of Commerce, and thereby 
concluded exits when the affiliate was no longer listed in “Who Owns 
Whom”. Barkema et al. (1997) used the notion “longevity” to evaluate 
whether an international joint venture was successful or not, and so did  
Hennart, Kim, and Zeng (1998) when they investigated 355 Japanese stakes 
in US manufacturing affiliates. Shaver (1997) used survival as a proxy for 
performance in 354 US investments undertaken by foreign firms in 
manufacturing industries.  
 
Using survival as one proxy for business performance therefore also seems 
adequate. And the economic rationale behind this is quite simple: as long as 
the FDI is going, it generates at least normal economic value. It is also easy 
to use, and it does not require detailed information about the firms and/or the 
FDI’s economic condition. It is not a perfect performance measure, but it is 
shown in former studies that it is a good estimate of managers’ perception of 
the success (Geringer and Herbert, 1991) and it also correlates with financial 
performance (Barkema, et al., 1997) (Mitchell, Shaver, and Yeung, 1993) 
(Mitchell, Shaver, and Yeung, 1994). In that sense, the survival 
measurement can “merge” both subjective and objective measures of 
performance. 
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In a relative recently published article, Ariño (2003) evaluates the construct 
validity of different performance measures of strategic alliances in the 
perspective of one of the partners. Six different measures of   performance: 
overall performance satisfaction, strategic goals fulfillment, net spillover 
effects, longevity, contractual changes, and survival, are taken into account 
to cover two main categories of strategic alliance performance (operational 
and organizational effectiveness). The study indicates that researchers have 
to consider both outcome and process performance since strategic goal 
fulfillment on the one hand and overall performance satisfaction and 
spillover effects on the other, measured different constructs. For example, 
when partners are asked to report the satisfaction with overall performance 
of the alliances, they may evaluate not only the outcome, but also the 
process. The results also indicate that longevity could be a problematic 
indicator to use. Neither in the equity, nor in the non-equity sub-sample did 
the indicator show acceptable discriminant validity. Even though this 
research explored alliance performance, there are many points of 
resemblance with subsidiary performance; hence, this study is far from 
irrelevant for the present problem. 
 
Finally, based on Finnish manufacturing FDIs in OECD, Larimo (1993) 
provides a thorough discussion of FDI performance and various FDI 
performance measurements. The latter is also part of the focus for Glaister 
and Buckley (1999) when they studied the relationship between subjective 
and objective measures of performance and both ex ante and ex post 
independent variables among 73 joint ventures operated by UK parents. Both 
Larimo and Glaister and Buckley claim, with solid support from former 
research, that even though the measure of organizational performance has 
been a subject for serious debate for a long time, there are still much to do. 
 
Hence, since this debate is far from concluded, it has been a necessity for the 
present research to present the varieties of approaches that are observed in 
empirical works when measurement of performance is discussed. Likewise, 
it is also a necessity to present a few studies that empirically have studied 
different effects on firm performance. However, this presentation is limited 
to research within the field of international business. 
 
Effects on firm performance – empirical studies 
There are no former studies of the relationship between transaction costs and 
performance in an intra-organizational setting such as between headquarters 
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and subsidiary in a MNC.26 The effect of entry mode on the relationship 
between transaction costs and performance also remains uninvestigated. 
Even though the generic entry mode choice has been studied profoundly in 
international business research, there is less research focusing on acquisition 
vs. greenfield operations. In addition, those focusing on the latter question 
are very much concentrated on the ex ante choice, not ex post effects of the 
choice (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; 
Buckley and Casson, 1998; Hennart and Park, 1993; Zejan, 1990). Still, 
there have been a growing number of studies that have dealt with 
performance in various ways and from different theoretical perspectives.  
 
Li and Guisinger (1991), examined the relationship between foreign control 
and performance by comparing foreign owned and foreign controlled firms 
with domestically owned firms in the United States. The study used different 
theoretical perspectives (Dunning, 1988; Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan, 
1983; Hofstede, 1980), and the results indicated that foreign-controlled firms 
failed less frequently than domestically owned firms. New US subsidiaries 
owned by foreign companies had a higher failure rate than more established 
subsidiaries. They seemed to suffer the liability of newness to a greater 
extent than new US firms. Modes of entry, forms of foreign ownership, and 
national culture were found to have affect on the failures of foreign-
controlled firms in the US. 
  
Chowdhury (1992) investigated the performance of international joint 
ventures (IJV) and wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS) made by U.S.-based 
multinational companies. Six criteria were used to assess the effectiveness of 
these two ownership options: Exit rate, longevity, stability of ownership 
status, integration with the parent system, export sales, and factor usage. 
Based on data drawn from the Harvard Multinational Enterprise Project, the 
study concluded that the chosen mode of ownership was linked with the 
behavior and performance of overseas subsidiaries.  
 
                                                     
26 Arne Nygaard (1992) studied, among other things, the relationship between 
transaction costs and performance in a setting of one oil company with its sales 
managers and a number of gas stations in a national setting. The gas stations had 
three different modes of ownership: independent dealers, contract dealers, and 
company owned and company operated stations. Nygaard got support for three 
hypotheses regarding the relationship between transaction costs (TC) and 
effectiveness, but no support for the relationships between TC and efficiency. 
Nygaard used two kinds of measures on performance: (1) effectiveness (three 
perceptual measures of the degree of success with marketing activities, training 
and courses, and management and control); (2) efficiency (measured by net 
operating income on gross sales revenue). 
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Woodcock, Beamish, and Makino (1994) examined 321 Japanese 
manufacturing subsidiaries in North America and the relationship between 
ownership entry modes and performance among these firms. Using an 
eclectic theory approach, a theoretical relationship based on contingency 
characteristics (resource requirements and organizational control factors) 
was developed. The researchers assumed that different entry modes had 
different levels of performance outcomes based upon their resource and 
organizational control demands. The hypotheses, which were supported, 
suggested that new ventures outperformed joint ventures, and joint ventures 
outperformed acquisitions. However, if this conclusion were true, why do 
firms still choose entry modes that clearly are bad for performance? Their 
theoretical model also suggested that contingency factors modify the 
transaction costs that occur when appropriate resources are obtained and in 
controlling the new subsidiary.  
 
Li (1995) investigated effective strategies that could reduce the risk of 
failure in international expansion by examining the entry and survival of 
foreign subsidiaries in the US computer and pharmaceutical industries. The 
results show a higher exit rate for foreign acquisitions and joint ventures 
than for subsidiaries established through greenfield investments. The results 
also indicate a higher exit rate for subsidiaries that diversify than for those 
that stay in the parent firm's main product area. As an extension of this work, 
Mata and Portugal (2000) studied two different ways of exiting from foreign 
markets, i.e. closure and divestment. Being a greenfield entry, there is a 
higher likelihood of closure, compare to an acquisition, but a greenfield is 
less likely to be sold. Wholly owned subsidiaries are more often divested 
than majority joint ventures. Further, there is a significant negative 
relationship between the size of the firm (measured by the logarithm of the 
number of employees) and closure. Likewise, both minimum efficient scale 
and entry rate in the industry affect the survival of the firm, and, at last, 
experience27 decreases the probability of closure.  
 
From an organizational learning theory perspective, Barkema et al. (1997) 
studied the longevity of international joint ventures based upon Dutch firms’ 
prior experience with international joint ventures, domestic joint ventures, 
and international wholly owned subsidiaries. The results showed that 
experience with domestic joint ventures and with international wholly owned 
subsidiaries contributed to the longevity of international joint ventures, but 
prior experience with international joint ventures did not.  
                                                     
27 This variable is an outcome of the competing risk model that is used in the study. 
The model measures the probability of exit over time since the baseline hazard 
parameters are obtained at each time period.  
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Benito (1997) analyzed divestments among Norwegian manufacturing FDIs. 
The study shows that more than 50 percent of these FDIs were divested 
within the 10 years period from 1982 to 1992. Foreign divestments were 
inversely related to economic growth in the host country, and the propensity 
to divest was considerably higher for acquired subsidiaries than for start-ups.  
 
Shaver, Mitchell, and Yeung (1997) examined the effect of own-firm and 
other-firm experience on FDI survival to 1992 in the United States among 
354 US investments undertaken by foreign firms in manufacturing industries 
during 1987. They argue that foreign MNCs operating in a host country 
generate information spillovers that have potential value for later FDIs. They 
find support for the following hypotheses: (1) FDIs made by firm with 
former experience in the host country are more likely to survive than FDIs 
made by first entrant firms. (2) If the foreign presence in the target industry 
is great at the moment of entry, then FDIs are more likely to survive. 
However, this is true only if the firm already has former experience in the 
host country. As a contrast to the latter, a positive association between 
national cultural distance on cross-border acquisition performance for 52 
(mostly European) acquisitions was found in a study by Morosini, Shane, 
and Singh (1998).  
 
From the eclectic approach, Aulakh and Kotabe (1997) examine the 
performance consequences of channel integration among Fortune 500 firms 
and their subsidiaries in a foreign country. The results suggest that, although 
the degree of channel integration does not have a direct influence on channel 
performance, a contingency model based on the fit between the contextual 
factors and the actual channel choice is significantly related to performance 
in foreign markets.  
 
Using more or less the same data material as Shaver, Mitchell, and Yeung 
(1997), Shaver (1998) is discussing the problem of endogeneity and self-
selection in performance research. The author claims that since the choice of 
entry mode into a foreign country is endogenous because the choice is based 
on firms’ characteristics and industry circumstances, researchers that do not 
take this into account may conclude on false premises. This assertion, which 
of course can be generalized to more general strategic choices, is tested 
among 213 entries into the US.  By running three sets of regressions, with 
and without a control for endogeneity, the results show that the effect of 
acquisition entry on survival is significant and negative when not controlling 
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for self-selection.28 In contrast, when the control is included, there is no 
proof that entry mode has an effect on survival of the foreign subsidiary. The 
last result is generally in accordance with normal rational behavior – if one 
kind of entry (and any thing else equal) had been better than all other in an 
industry, firms would have chosen this consistently (Shaver, 1998). Hence, it 
gives little sense to use entry mode as a predictive variable for subsidiary 
performance. 29   
 
Performance and performance measures – a conclusion 
The many different approaches to performance and performance 
measurements imply that a study about subsidiary performance most ideally 
needs a multidimensional approach to the measurement of performance. 
Using both financial and non-financial measurements, as well as objective 
and subjective measurements strengthens the falsification criterion in the 
study. In addition, several studies have been using transaction costs as 
measurement of performance implying that there is an equality between 
transaction costs and performance, but according to the literature review, 
performance could both be “a lot of things and different things to different 
actors” (Benito and Tomassen, 2003, p. 194). Hence, one of the purposes 
with this research is actually to test the relationship between transaction 
costs and performance. Several of the performance studies have indicated 
that there are direct effects from entry mode towards performance (Li and 
Guisinger, 1991; Woodcock, Beamish, and Makino, 1994). This may be in 
conflict with rational economic behavior since the firm always would choose 
the best alternative and thereby rush towards the best performing operation 
method (Masten, 1993). Hence, this relationship may be modeled differently. 
 
 
                                                     
28 A result that is consistent with Li and Guisinger (1991), Woodcock, Beamish, and 
Makino (1994), and Li (1995), but misspecified and wrong, according to Shaver 
(1998, p. 582). 
29 The problem with endogeneity, which in many cases can lead to biased coefficient 
estimates (the error term is correlated with both left-hand and right-hand side 
variables) and thereby to wrong conclusions about hypothesized relationships, is 
discussed thoroughly in a recent published article by Hamilton and Nickerson 
(2003). 
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3 Hypotheses 
 
The following chapter contains the development of the five hypotheses for 
this research, as well as a presentation of the final research model.  
 
Transaction costs and foreign subsidiary performance 
At the outset, it seems adequate to assume that there is a negative 
relationship between transaction costs and subsidiary performance since the 
transaction costs are the costs related to the governance of a relationship, be 
it an inter- or intra organizational relationship, and the most efficient 
organizational solution is the one that minimizes the transaction costs in the 
long run (Williamson, 1985).  
 
Monitoring costs occur due to performance evaluation problems, which then 
stem from behavioral uncertainty. If the principal has a problem with the 
evaluation of the performance of the agent, then direct measurement costs 
incur. Hence, it is reasonable to expect a negative relationship between 
monitoring costs and subsidiary performance. 
 
Likewise, maladaptation costs, which stem from problems in the 
communication between headquarter and subsidiary, most probably increase 
costs at the expenses of performance. Incomplete, or poorly formulated 
information is produced in the subsidiary, which may lead to wrong 
decisions and increased costs through sub optimizations.  
 
Due to the needs of renegotiations and changes of contracts and agreements 
between headquarter and subsidiary, bargaining costs occur. With complete 
contracts and agreements, such costs should be unnecessary. Hence, a clear 
assumption about the negative effect of these costs on performance is 
reasonable to propose. 
 
However, the effects of transaction costs on performance may differ in time, 
power, and direction. For example, given a subsidiary with poor results due 
to a high degree of opportunism among the employees, a higher level of 
monitoring costs incurred by the principal (here the MNC headquarter) may 
improve the subsidiary performance substantially in the long run (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Likewise, since bonding costs are those costs associated 
with the rather essential organizational apparatus needed to establish a 
subsidiary, one may anticipate that these costs also have a positive effect on 
performance in some situations. Nevertheless, in an ideal world, neither 
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monitoring nor bonding should be necessary. Zero costs linked to bonding 
activities are therefore usually better than positive costs, but at certain points 
in time positive costs could be better than no costs since incurred bonding 
costs my be necessary to improve the value and wealth of a firm (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  
 
It is also likely that bargaining costs “behave” in a similar manner in some 
situations. However, since bargaining costs are generated from negotiations 
between parties in a relationship when contracts and agreements have to be 
realigned to former agreements, increased bargaining costs in the long run 
most probably have a negative relationship with the performance of the 
subsidiary.  
 
Saying so, it must also be admitted that trade-offs between different types of 
transaction costs may be present, but also difficult to anticipate (Nygaard, 
1992). Bonding activities, for example may produce lower bargaining costs 
due to the fact that the subsidiary most probably is more in line with the 
parent company. It is also possible that proactive bonding activities 
necessitate increased monitoring activities to ensure that the bonding 
activities have effects.  It is also reasonable to presume that increased 
maladaptation costs create both a higher level of monitoring costs and 
bargaining costs. When there are problems with the information flow from 
parent company to subsidiary, and vice versa, common meetings become 
inefficient, and mutual trust declines, many companies will routinely 
increase the monitoring mechanisms. However, intensive monitoring may 
produce unintended behavior, such as increased opportunism, in the 
subsidiary, which creates an even higher level of transaction costs in the next 
phase (Moran and Ghoshal, 1996).  
 
Despite the above reflections, in general a TCE based explanation of the 
relationship between transaction costs and performance will most probably 
conclude that, ceteris paribus, the relationship will be negative in the long 
run.  Hence, the following hypotheses are stated: 
 
 
H1:  The higher the level of bargaining costs that occur in the 
relationship between the MNC headquarters and the foreign 
subsidiary, the lower the level of subsidiary performance. 
 
H2:  The higher the level of monitoring costs that occur in the 
relationship between the MNC headquarters and the foreign 
subsidiary, the lower the level of subsidiary performance. 
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H3:  The higher the level of maladaptation costs that occur in the 
relationship between the MNC headquarters and the foreign 
subsidiary, the lower the level of subsidiary performance. 
 
H4:  The higher the level of bonding costs that occur in the relationship 
between the MNC headquarters and the foreign subsidiary, the 
lower the level of subsidiary performance. 
 
The moderator effect of entry modes 
According to Masten (1993), ceteris paribus, different operation methods 
cannot differ with regard to performance, but create differences in 
transaction costs and transaction costs effects towards performance. If this 
were not so, every rational manager would always have chosen the one that 
outperformed all the other forms of foreign operation methods. Therefore, 
the generic choice of foreign operation method could in many respects be 
explained by economizing on ex ante transaction costs and anticipated ex 
post transaction costs. However, this choice is not solely affected by 
transaction cost rationales, it is also affected by the overall international 
strategy of the MNC (Hill, Hwang, and Kim, 1990), which then also affects 
the management of the subsidiary. It is therefore also likely that the 
headquarters–subsidiary relationship differs between entry modes in general 
and between greenfields and acquisitions in special (Harzing, 2002). In some 
respects, the headquarters-subsidiary relationship can be seen as a typical 
control problem much like a principal-agent relationship (Bergen, Dutta, and 
Walker, 1992; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Since the 
principal (i.e. the headquarters) cannot take all decisions on behalf of the 
subsidiary due to limited resources or knowledge about local conditions, 
they must ensure in different ways that the agent (i.e. the subsidiary) is in 
line with the overall goals and standards set by the MNC. To ensure this, the 
MNC has many different options. It can use expatriates at various levels in 
the subsidiary. Strategic decision-making can be centralized at headquarters, 
and direct supervision on behalf of the subsidiary is possible in many cases. 
Standardized operational procedures can be formalized and implemented, 
and continuous evaluation of the results in the subsidiary are perhaps 
necessary, as well as implementation of detailed planning, goal setting, and 
budgeting systems. Building strong corporate cultures by sharing some 
important values may also be important. Likewise, a high degree of formal 
(through common project groups, committees, and task forces) and informal 
communication may help the MNC to ensure that the subsidiary is “on the 
 48
right track” (Harzing, 2002, pp. 226-227).30 Do we then expect differences 
between greenfields and acquisitions regarding the relationship between 
control costs and subsidiary performance?  
 
According to a transaction cost reasoning, different operation methods create 
differences in transaction costs.31 Firms that invest abroad combine firm-
specific advantages, developed at home and exploited in a foreign country at 
low marginal costs, with assets available abroad. It is the level of specific 
assets the MNC is exploiting abroad that determines whether greenfields are 
preferred to acquisitions or vice versa (Hennart and Park, 1993). When firm 
specific advantages such as superior organizational abilities and/or technical 
skills are easy to separate from the organization, an acquisition may be 
preferred. On the other hand, if the advantages are so deeply embedded in 
the organization that it is difficult to combine them with a takeover 
candidate, the foreign investment will most probably be a greenfield 
operation. Hence, greenfields make it easier for the MNC to leverage its 
resources into the entered market because the greenfield most often is more 
compatible with the parent with respect to culture, systems, and routines. 
This may on the one hand reduce some of the efforts of binding the 
subsidiary to the headquarters, but probably increase some of the control 
precautions because of the type of specific assets that is exploited in the 
greenfield. On the contrary, an acquired firm has its own history, knowledge, 
reputation, and workforce (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986), which very often 
could lead to ex post information asymmetry and thereby also to “moral 
hazard” (Knight, 1921 p. 249; Williamson, 1985), especially if the take-over 
is a hostile one, which also requires substantial monitoring costs.  
 
A subject that may distort this picture is a possible mismatch between the 
intended mode of operation and the realized entry mode, which of course is 
highly possible. In many cases, a firm that goes abroad has limited 
alternative ways of establishing a subsidiary unit. Perhaps no potentially 
buy-ups are available, host governance restrictions on either acquisitions or 
greenfields can be present, and financial resources for acquiring a local firm 
can be constrained. In such situations, one may anticipate that increased 
resources will be used to bring an acquired firm closer to the initial 
intentions with the foreign expansion. This may increase the headquarters’ 
control over the subsidiary, and lead to a decrease in local responsiveness 
                                                     
30 As such, this description of control precautions can also supplement the former 
interpretation of monitoring costs. See also Martinez and Jarillo (1991). 
31 However, it is also likely that these differences become less visible over time. 
Comparing acquisitions with greenfields that were established several decades 
ago, and are still operating, could be of little value. 
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(Harzing, 2002). Therefore, increased control in a non-intended entry 
structure may blur the overall assumption of relationship differences 
between transaction costs and performance across foreign operation method. 
 
In addition to the possible differences in control precautions, the companies 
very often use more resources in a greenfield than in an acquisition before 
the subsidiary is fully operative. The workforce has to be recruited and 
supervised, and some of these recruitments fail. Organizational procedures 
and routines are to be developed and implemented.  Agreements with sub-
contractors have to be negotiated and renegotiated due to mismatches and 
failures, and cultural differences may increase the propensity to fail. Hence, 
the management has to use substantial resources in learning about and 
acquainting himself with the local business environment. On the other hand, 
cultural differences may also create severe problems in acquired firms, and 
several studies have found that cultural differences increase the propensity to 
fail (Barkema, Bell, and Pennings, 1996; Chatterjee, et al., 1992; Hofstede, 
1980; 1983). In all, one should expect that the relationship between 
maladaptation costs and performance as well as the relationship between 
bargaining costs and performance would differ between the two types of 
operation mode.  
 
Whatever motives lie behind the choice of operation mode, when the 
subsidiary becomes operative, this choice will have its own consequences on 
the daily management of the subsidiary. Hence, differences in the 
relationship between ex post transaction costs and subsidiary performance 
are likely across different modes. The following hypothesis is therefore 
stated: 
 
H5:  The relationship between ex post transaction costs and foreign 
subsidiary performance depend on whether the subsidiary is 
established as a greenfield or as an acquisition.  
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Research model 
The research model, which is a more detailed version of the conceptual 
model presented in chapter one, is showed in Figure 3-1. The research model 
suggests four negative direct effects between the independent variables (i.e. 
bargaining costs, monitoring costs, maladaptation costs, and bonding costs) 
and the dependent variable “performance” (i.e. subsidiary performance). In 
addition, the model also proposes that the entry mode will have no direct 
effect on performance, per se. Instead, entry mode moderates the relationship 
between the four types of transaction costs and subsidiary performance. 
 
 
 
Maladaptation
costs
Bargaining
costs
Monitoring
costs
Bonding
costs
Performance
H1: ()
H3: ()
H2: ()
H4: ()
Entry Mode
H5: Moderator effects
 
 
Figure 3-1: Research model with hypotheses 
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4 Methodology 
 
This chapter includes both a theoretical discussion about research design as 
well as an empirical testing of a measurement model. At the beginning, the 
concept of causation is discussed, followed by a presentation of the 
statistical tools and the estimation method chosen for this research. All 
constructs and variables, as well as empirical context and data collection 
strategy are presented in separate sections. Reliability and validity issues are 
also discussed.  
 
Research design 
Research design can be classified in three broad categories: exploratory, 
descriptive, and causal, and which of these is most suitable depends very 
much on the research problem. The overall research model and the 
hypothesis in this study indicate relationships between independent and 
dependent variables that are of a causal nature (i.e. there are arrows 
indicating causes and effects), but choosing a true casual design imply some 
methodological challenges that are unattainable in an empirical context and 
with hypotheses like in this study. Yet, causality and the nature of causation 
are rather indistinct (Bollen, 1989b), which clearly becomes visible in the 
different views on the phenomenon.32 Hence, the view of causality in this 
research, which to a great extent follows the approach in Bollen (1989b), 
does not cover more than a fraction of all the issues that are raised in former 
literature regarding causation. There is nevertheless, reason to believe that 
the most important issues are covered in the following chapter since the 
presentation is based on three general concepts of causation. 
 
The nature of causation  
In general, the connotation of true causality is build upon the presence of 
three indispensable components: the variables must be non-spurious (i.e. the 
effect on one variable cannot be explained by another variable outside the 
causal relationship), the variables have to be correlated, and the cause must 
take place before the effect. Bollen (1989b, p. 41) characterizes these three 
components respectively as (1) isolation, (2) association, and (3) the 
                                                     
32  See for example Cook and Campbell (1979, pp. 9-36) for an overview and a short 
discussion about the epistemology of causation. For particularly interested readers, 
a book edited by Myles Brand (1976) provides a more detailed presentation of the 
phenomenon. 
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direction of influence. In addition, there must also be a theoretical 
foundation for the relationship (Hair, et al., 1998). 
 
Isolation requires that all other influences except from one variable’s 
influence on another are isolated. Unless the variables exist in a vacuum, it is 
impossible to fulfill this requirement in such an empirical context that this 
study focuses on. For example, firms’ performance in a foreign marketplace 
are based on exceedingly complex relationships depending on both past and 
present causal connections, as well as human predictions about future 
circumstances, which certainly violate the requirement about isolation. 
Therefore, perfect isolation must be replaced by some kind of pseudo-
isolation. Technically, this can be done by adding a disturbance term into the 
relationship (equations) between the variables. This disturbance term is a 
composite of all omitted determinants and is in addition assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the independent variable. Though, since the disturbance 
term is unobserved, it is reasonable to assume that the independent variable 
has an expected influence on the dependent variable and that the values of 
the dependent variable are distributed around a prediction of the variable. In 
addition to a disturbance term, other predictive variables have to be included 
in the equation, which also requires a rather homogenous population and a 
thorough literature review. 
  
Still, without going into detail, the violations of pseudo-isolation can be 
numerous. Serious threats are for example present when intervening 
variables and/or common causes of the explanatory and the dependent 
variables are left out, and likewise, when true relationships between 
variables are omitted.  Hazards occur as well when the presumed dependent 
variable also affects an assumed exogenous variable (i.e. “feedback” or 
“reciprocal causation”). In addition, a wrong specification of the functional 
form between two variables (for example when a linear form is specified 
while it is a curvilinear relationship that exists) leads to serious problems if 
the variables are not transformed so that the relationship between the 
transformed variables becomes linear. Non-random samples and correlated 
errors (e.g. autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity) also undermine the 
assumption of pseudo-isolation. Some of these problems can be solved 
through technical procedures, but the only way to really deal with many of 
these obstacles is trough a proper design. However, it must be recognized 
that even the most proper design cannot conclusively claim true isolation 
between variables (Bollen, 1989b).  
 
A bivariate association is not a sufficient condition for a causal relationship, 
neither a necessity, which at first sight seems a bit strange. Certainly, given a 
simple relationship with one explanatory variable and an uncorrelated 
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disturbance term, and all other influential variables isolated, then two 
associated variables are enough to establish the causal relationship. 
However, an observed variable can be driven by different underlying latent 
variables and in such cases a bivariate correlation is not a necessary 
condition. On the other hand, the partial correlation coefficient 
corresponding to the relationship between indicator and latent variable and 
the bundle of other latent variables, must be nonzero if causality is to be 
observed (Bollen, 1989b, p. 57-58).  
 
What problems can occur and violate the association requirement? 
Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, as well as multicollinearity are 
problematic conditions, and it is therefore important to test for, and correct 
such conditions.33 Ideally, replication should also be conducted to check 
whether an association between variables (be it observed or latent variable) 
is only a coincidence or a more durable relationship. In addition, a sufficient 
variance in the independent variables has to be established through the 
choice of empirical setting. 
 
Direction of influence is established when effect follows the cause in time 
(Hume, 1969 (1739-1740)). Establishing this requirement can be done 
through an appropriate research design (for example an experimental 
design), but even in the simplest relationship, crucial questions like when to 
measure the effect, and how long should the time lag between cause and 
effect be, must be addressed. The solutions to these puzzles are often not that 
simple. In complex social settings, the effect on one variable will be affected 
through a compound set of mechanisms, which complicates the detection of 
temporal precedence since the time lag between cause and effect could be 
either unknown or relatively extensive, which also opens up the possibilities 
of intervening variables. In addition, it is also possible that the relationship 
between to variables is of a reciprocal nature, especially if the observation 
period exceeds the causal lag.34 The determination of causal relationship 
between latent variables and observable indicators in confirmatory factor 
analysis is also problematic. It is far from obvious whether the indicator 
causes the latent variable or vice versa. 
 
                                                     
33 Corrections for heteroscedasticity or autocorrelated disturbances are not well 
developed in models with latent variables (Bollen, 1989b, p. 58).  
34 During a long time, through several causal lags, the relationship between   
transaction costs and performance will certainly be of a reciprocal character, as 
many other relationships.  
 54
These problems can probably not be solved just by choosing an adequate 
design; therefore, the directionality has to be established by logic and by 
prior theoretical and empirical works (Bollen, 1989b; Hoyle, 1995). 
 
Choice of design 
There is no design that can solve all the above problems in one simple 
fashion; there will always be trade-offs between research dilemmas such as 
precision versus generalizability, and reliability versus validity (McGrath, 
1982). Since the strong requirements of causality cannot be met, the most 
proper design will be a correlation design, but since reliability and validity 
issues in general are highly associated with the three requirements of true 
causality, it is also necessary to deal with these issues in a correlation study. 
Hence, to strengthen the isolation requirement in the present study, a 
thorough theory review has been conducted. This was done mainly for two 
reasons: first, to reveal possible control variables, and second, to establish a 
sound theoretical foundation of the relationship between transaction costs 
and performance. To meet the assumption about association, a rather 
heterogeneous population has been chosen, even though it must be admitted 
that the need for variance in the population has been weighted against 
homogeneity, which is reflected in the choice of research setting that is a 
least common multiple between these two requirements. This choice is 
certainly also limited by resource constrains (i.e. time and money).  
 
A cross-sectional study has been conducted, which of course makes it 
unfeasible to meet the condition of time order occurrence. However, since 
the chosen design does not meet the strict requirements of directionality, the 
theory review was also essential in establishing temporal precedence 
between independent latent variables (i.e. transaction costs) and the 
dependent latent variable (i.e. performance). Hence, it is still possible to test 
the structural models in a rigorous manner even though the study does not 
meet the strict assumptions of causality. 
 
A more detailed description of validity and reliability problems, and how 
this particular study has coped with these and additional methodological 
pitfalls, will be presented in the following sections.  
 
Statistical tools 
Since all of the latent variables in this study are reflected by observed 
indicators, and since the research model indicates some correlation 
relationships, it seems plausible to use structural equation modeling (SEM) 
as the main statistical approach to the research problem. SEM examines a 
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series of dependence relationships simultaneously, and, according to Hair et 
al. (1998), it is very useful when one or more dependent variables become 
independent variables in subsequent dependence relationships. By explicitly 
modeling measurement error, researchers seek to derive unbiased estimates 
for the relations between latent constructs.  
 
According to Hughes et al. (1986), there are two major strengths in the latent 
variable method of analysis – one technical and one conceptual. Regarding 
the first, they are methods of estimating structural relationships among 
unobservable constructs and a help in judging whether these constructs 
really are measured or not. With respect to the latter, “the use of these 
models entails a mode of thinking about theory construction, measurement 
problems, and data analysis that is helpful in stating theory more exactly, 
testing theory more precisely and yielding a more thorough understanding of 
the data.” (Hughes, Price, and Marrs, 1986, p. 128). Among the models 
developed in order to manage such problems is LISREL (Jöreskog, 1973; 
Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993a).  
 
Path analysis is a very common method to analyze systems of structural 
equations. The path diagram is a picture of the whole system of simultaneous 
equation connected to the relationships that are presumed to be true. A SEM 
model implies a structure of the correlation matrix or the covariance matrix 
of the measures. Once the parameters of the model have been estimated, the 
resulting model-implied covariance or correlation matrix can be compared to 
an empirical or data based matrix. If the two matrices are consistent with one 
another, then the structural equation model can be considered a plausible 
explanation for relations between the measures. In addition, three types of 
effects are distinguished in the path analysis: direct, indirect, and total 
effects. The first is the influence of one variable on another with no other 
mediator (i.e. other variables in the model). The indirect effects are effects 
that are mediated by at least one intervening variable, and the total effect 
will be the sum of the two (Bollen, 1989b). See Figure 4-1 for an example of 
a path diagram. 
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x1 x2 y1 y2

1 2 3 4
1 2 1 2


11
 
Figure 4-1: An example of a path diagram 
From Bollen (1989b, p. 33) 
 
 
The latent exogenous variable () and the endogenous latent variable () are 
described as circles, and the boxes represent measurable, or observed, 
variables (the x and the y). Arrows illustrate the relationships ( and  are 
measurement parameters) between the variables. The disturbance terms are 
characterized as unenclosed variables (here the , the , and the ), Thus, the 
path diagram is equal to the following simultaneous system of equations: 
 
η = γ11 ξ + ζ
x1 = λ1 ξ + δ1
x2 = λ2 ξ + δ2
y1 = λ3 η + ε1
y2 = λ4 η + ε2
structural model
measurement
model
 
Estimation of the measurement model is often the first step of a two-step 
process35 in SEM, and is equal to a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The 
major interests are to clearly define the theoretical construct, provide 
operational definitions of them, and linking the observed variables to the 
unobserved theoretical construct. According to Hughes et al. (1986), this 
                                                     
35 This procedure is not always necessary because researchers are also faced with 
models that possess a strong theoretical rationale and highly reliable measures. In 
these situations a single-step procedure with simultaneous estimation of both 
models is preferred (Hair, et al., 1998). 
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involves an assessment of the dimensionality of the constructs, and an 
estimation of the reliabilities of the observed indicator variables. The main 
point by estimation of the measurement model is that the multiple indicators 
of each latent variable should converge to measure one single construct. 
Therefore, testing for convergent and discriminant validity is one of the 
major tasks when evaluating the measurement model. The LISREL 
algorithm provides several statistics that can be used in this first stage. 
Hence, the measurement model is finally tested by using LISREL 8.53 
(Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993b) (see also the chapter: “Validation of 
measurements” from page 87 for a further elaboration). 
 
In the second stage, when the model is fixed, the structural model is tested 
due to possible interaction between the measurement model and the 
structural model (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). This can be done in many 
ways, but using a LISREL approach is often to be preferred due to the fact 
that the variables in the structural equation are unobservable variables (i.e. 
variables with measurement errors) (Goldberger, 1973). However, it is also 
possible to execute an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, a two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) approach, or a number of other solutions depending on 
variable relations, the measurement level of the variables, the sample size, 
and whether there are any interaction effects, or hypothesized moderators in 
the study.   
 
Because the present study executes a formal test of moderator effects, which 
leads to relative small sample sizes in the respective sub-groups, this 
research relies primarily on OLS-regressions when testing the structural 
model (i.e. testing the hypotheses).36 Different OLS-regressions with latent 
variable scores are conducted when the direct effects, the control variables 
and the moderator effects are tested. However, in addition to the above 
deductive model testing, a more exploratory model without moderator 
effects is presented and tested by using a LISREL approach.  
 
Estimation method  
The general hypothesis in SEM is that the population covariance matrix (Σ) 
is equal to the covariance matrix estimated from the parameters in the model 
Σ(θ). In covariance-based SEM, (as well as in correlation-based SEM) a 
maximum likelihood (ML) function is normally used in the effort to 
minimize the difference between the sample covariances, and those 
                                                     
36 See page 105 in the chapter “Test of hypotheses” for additional explanations of 
this choice.      
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predicted by the theoretical model (i.e. Σ - Σ(θ)). 37 Cudeck (1989) assesses 
that ML probably estimates standard error and χ2 goodness-of-fit incorrectly 
when covariance structure models are applied to correlation matrices (i.e. if 
you input a correlation matrix as if it were a covariance matrix, and “fool” 
the software, you will almost certainly get wrong standard errors). However, 
according to Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991), ML estimation procedure has 
many desirable statistical properties: First, the parameters are consistent and 
efficient asymptotically38 so that among consistent estimators, none has a 
smaller asymptotic variance. Second, all parameter estimators are 
asymptotically normally distributed as sample size increase so that the 
analog of the t-test can be applied. In addition, the estimator is quite robust 
against non-normality and variation in sample sizes (Olsson, et al., 2000). 
Comparing ML with WLS and unweighted least squares (ULS), Ogasawara 
(2003) concludes that when the variances of observed variables are equal, 
the estimation methods give almost identical parameter estimates. However, 
according to the same author, it is not recommended to use ULS estimation 
when the difference of the variances increases. In comparison with 
generalized least squares (GLS) and weighted least squares (WLS), on non-
normal data, the same authors concluded that: “ML tends in general not only 
to be more stable, but also demonstrates higher accuracy in terms of 
empirical and theoretical fit compared to the other estimators” (Olsson, et 
al., 2000, p. 578). Hence, for the structural equation modeling (i.e. the 
measurement model and the alternative exploratory structural model), ML 
estimation has been chosen. 39  
 
                                                     
37       qpSStrFML   loglog 1   
S is the sample covariance matrix, tr is the trace (or the sum of the elements on the 
main diagonal in a square matrix), p and q are the observed number of indicators 
(xs and ys) of the latent variables (η and ξ). See Bollen (1989b, pp. 107-111) for a 
detailed description. 
38 Asymptotic means “when n is large,” or more precisely: “An asymptotic 
distribution is a distribution that is used to approximate the true finite sample 
distribution of a random variable” (Greene, 2003, p. 914) 
39 If the model is well specified, there should be relative small differences with 
respect to parameter estimates when using GLS and ML (no differences are 
expected in correct specified models with multinormal observations and large 
sample sizes (Browne, 1984)). Due to triangulation reasons, the measurement 
model was therefore also estimated by GLS (Olsson, et al., 2000). Rather small 
differences between estimates are observed, which indicates that the model is well 
specified (see Table 4-10 on page 99). Unfortunately, there are no formal tests 
available that can verify whether these parameter estimates deviate too much, or 
whether the differences are within acceptable limits. 
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On the other hand, the OLS estimation method is chosen for the test of the 
hypotheses. This is due to a simple logic, when the assumptions for linear 
regression are satisfied (i.e. normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity), the 
OLS method is both unbiased and consistent so there is no gain in switching 
to other methods (Norušis and SPSS, 1999). 
 
Development of measures 
The measures were developed more or less in accordance with the 
procedures for unidimensional multi-item measures recommended by 
Gerbing and Anderson (1988) and Churchill (1979, pp. 66-69). To specify 
the domain of the constructs and to generate a sample of items, an extensive 
review of both conceptual and empirical literature covering the phenomenon 
under investigation was conducted. To strengthen the understanding of how 
the concepts were manifest in the empirical setting and to further generate 
possible items, three managing directors, who were responsible for their 
firm’s foreign operations, were interviewed. On the basis of the literature 
review and the interviews, a preliminary questionnaire was developed. The 
scales that measure the items are partly taken from existing literature and 
adapted to the empirical setting, and partly self-developed.  
 
The preliminary instrument was then tested on six key informants who were 
all responsible for one or more foreign subsidiaries (both acquisitions and 
greenfields). The test was executed with the author present so it was possible 
to observe how the informant went through the questionnaire. Afterwards, 
problems regarding terminology, instructions, relevance of questions and 
scales, and volume, were discussed. Likewise, the same procedure was 
conducted among three research experts. In addition, a research committee 
went through the preliminary number of items on each variable. Overall, 
these procedures led to some minor corrections in the questionnaire, such as 
strengthening the initial instruction, adding a few new items on some of the 
constructs, and adding some more control variables. This last and final 
questionnaire was tested on four representative persons. No further problems 
turned up regarding the scales. The test group used approximately 30 
minutes (26-31 minutes) to complete the questionnaire. 
 
Ninety-seven questions were developed, but only 28 of them were directly 
linked to the theoretical model. The remaining questions concern underlying 
assumptions (such as opportunism and uncertainty), possible control and 
classification issues, demographic variables, and accounting and financial 
matters. The questions and the initial introduction to the respondents were 
distributed on four pages (A-4 pamphlet), and printed in two colors (see 
appendix 9 for a detailed presentation of the questionnaire).  
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To reduce possible consistency effects,40 the ordering of the questions 
followed the recommendations given by Salancik and Pfeffer (1977 p. 448-
449); the questions representing the dependent variable were presented after 
the independent variables in the questionnaire and with different other 
questions in between. In addition, to take care of potential common method 
variance problems the anchors for some of the scales varied (i.e. between 
independent variables and dependent variable, and some of the underlying 
variables). Some items were also reversed (Aulakh and Kotabe, 1997).  
  
Since the survey was conducted in Norway, with Norwegian-speaking 
informants, the whole questionnaire was written in Norwegian. However, 
since many of the indicators are taken from existing literature written in 
English, all indicators were translated into Norwegian, and then back into 
English. A person, fluent in English and with Norwegian as mother tongue, 
went through the translations. Minor flaws were addressed and corrected.   
 
Operationalization of the scales  
An underlying assumption in structural equation modeling (SEM) as well as 
in ordinary confirmatory factor analysis is that the indicators measuring the 
latent variables are reflective, not formative in their nature (Blalock, 1964; 
Bollen and Lennox, 1991). For all constructs in the theoretical model, the 
study has used reflective multi-item scales (see also Figure 4-2), which 
generally imply that the latent variable (η1) affect the observable indicators 
(yi) in the following manner (on a general form): 
 
   iiiy   11   
    
where εi is the measurement error for the ith indicator (i = 1, 2, ..., n) and λi1 
is the coefficient for the expected effect of η1 on yi. It is important to 
underscore that the latent variable determines its indicators. Hence, changes 
in the latent variable are reflected in changes in the observable variables. 
Relative high correlation is therefore expected between the observable 
indicators.  
 
                                                     
40 Consistency effects refer to the phenomenon that individuals have a tendency to 
respond to the present questions in accordance with the answers given on the past 
questions (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977).    
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Figure 4-2: Reflective and formative scales 
(From Bollen and Lennox (1991, p. 306) and slightly adjusted) 
 
 
Contrary, formative scales are measured in the following way (on a general 
form): 
 
112121111 .........   qq xxx  
 
where ζ1 is a disturbance term and γi is the expected effect of xi on ξ1. 
Changes in the observable indicators determine changes in the latent 
variable, and the latent construct is thereby a total score of rather 
independent observable indicators. Since a possible correlation between the 
indicators are explained by factors outside the model, positive, negative, or 
zero correlation can be observed (Bollen and Lennox, 1991). Hence, an 
inclusion of formative measures in SEM can lead to major problems because 
the underlying assumption about covariance among measurements may be 
violated. This can lead to identification problems, implied covariances of 
zero among several indicators, and/or the existence of corresponding models. 
All these troubles can probably be managed, but according to MacCallum 
and Browne (1993), this would also include a possible change in the original 
model in terms of both meaning and simplicity, which is undesirable since 
there is a strong theoretical foundation for the model presented in this study. 
None of the indicators used in this study are of a formative nature.  
 
Level of measurement and input matrix 
Seven-point Likert-scales (Likert, 1932) with anchors like “very bad 
description” (1) and “very good description” (7) and “very dissatisfied” (1) 
and “very satisfied” (7) have been used to measure the items. Such scales 
η1
y1
y2
y3
ξ1
x1
x2
x3
REFLECTIVE INDICATORS FORMATIVE INDICATORS
γ13λ13
γ12
γ11
λ12
λ11ε1
ζ1
ε2
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have no real constant unit of measurements, nor any arbitrary or absolute 
zero point, and are therefore of an ordinal nature.41 Measuring an item in this 
fashion gives rise to some comments about the assumption of normality and 
about the estimation methods used in the study. 
 
Ordinal scales are commonly used in well accepted studies within the field 
of international business, as well as in marketing and strategy (Aulakh and 
Kotabe, 1997; Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Klein, Frazier, and Roth, 
1990; Luo, 2002). However, a possible consequence of using ordinal 
variables is the violation of a covariance structure among the variables in the 
model, which may lead to inconsistent parameter estimators (the 
standardized coefficient estimates) of the true parameter vector. In addition, 
the measurement model for a set of normally distributed, unobserved and 
continuous indicators cannot be applied to the observed ordinal indicators of 
the same variables. This is particularly true if the number of categories is 
small (two or three), with seven or more categories, this problem becomes 
less severe (Bollen, 1989b). At last, the variance of ordinal variables may 
differ substantially from the variance in a continuous variable. Often, ordinal 
variables are both heavily skewed and peaked, which for example, affects 
the chi-square and z-statistics from maximum likelihood (ML) estimation 
negatively.  
 
Generally, when the scales are measured on a metric level and the variables 
are normally distributed, LISREL uses either a variance-covariance matrix 
or a Pearson product–moment correlation matrix (produced by PRELIS) as 
input. Normally, a covariance matrix is most suitable and also the preferred 
matrix input in LISREL. Covariances have an advantage when different 
samples or populations are compared, and when it is important to explain 
total variance of a construct (as in theory testing). On the other hand, it is 
more difficult to interpret the results because the units of measure of the 
constructs differ, which favors a correlation matrix since the coefficients 
obtained from correlations are standardized.  
 
In this study, there is no need for standardization since all the indicators are 
measured on the same type of scale, but since the variables do not have an 
origin or unit of measurement, the only meaningful moment matrices are 
correlation matrices (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1996b). Furthermore, ordinal 
data with three or more categories may require a so-called polychoric42 
                                                     
41 Even though Bagozzi (1994, p. 14) describes Likert-scales as   “approximately 
interval in character”, strictly speaking, such scales are of an ordinal nature. 
42 If the variables are dichotomous, then tetrachoric correlation is used (Bollen, 
1989b, p. 441).  
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correlation matrix (Olsson, 1979). This means that; for each ordinal variable 
that is observed (x or y) it is assumed that there is an underlying unobserved 
continuous variable (x* or y*) that has a range from -∞ to +∞. Hence, the 
polychoric correlation is the correlation between the unobserved continuous 
variables, not the ordinal observed variables (Bollen, 1989b). The polychoric 
correlation compensates for possible skewness and kurtosis in the data, but 
require the weighted least square (WLS) estimation technique to compute 
the parameter estimates. Unfortunately, this procedure requires very large 
samples. Some simulation studies claim sample sizes as large as several 
thousand before the WLS estimation performs well (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 
1996a; Olsson, et al., 2000). With a sample size of 160 in this study, a 
polychoric correlation matrix is inadequate. Hence, given that the variables 
in the data material are relative normally distributed, they can be treated as if 
they were continuous, and thereby a Pearson product-moment correlation 
(PPMC) matrix can be applied as an input matrix (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 
1996b). As later analysis shows, the level of skewness and kurtosis are well 
within the limits given by Hair et al. (1998) and by Olsson et al. (2000) (see 
for example Table 4-3 on page 81 in their study). Therefore, a PPMC matrix 
is used as input.43 
 
Operationalization of constructs in the model 
The measurements of the overall research model are presented in the 
following section. In addition, the measurements representing underlying 
assumptions and control variables are also introduced. 
 
Performance 
The development of the items used to capture the notion of performance was 
inspired by different studies. Most of all by Geringer and Herbert (1991), but 
ideas have also been taken from Ezzamel (1992), Ramaswamy (1992), 
Woodcock, Beamish, and Makino (1994), and Aulakh and Kotabe (1997). 
According to Ariño (2003, p. 69), this way of measuring performance is in 
accordance with so-called “organizational effectiveness measures”.  
 
                                                     
43 To check whether there were any dissimilarities between using a correlation 
matrix or a covariance matrix as input, the analysis was also conducted with a 
covariance matrix. No differences regarding fit and parameter estimates were 
observed. This result is also in line with what Dillon, Kumar, and Mulani (1987, p. 
131) claim: “parameter estimates obtained using correlation input are consistent 
with those obtained using covariance input because maximum likelihood 
estimation is ‘scale free’, that is, parameter estimates for the covariance matrix can 
be obtained from the corresponding estimates for the correlation matrix by 
appropriate scale transformation”. See also Bollen (1989b, p. 267). 
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Seven items were developed to represent the latent variable – performance 
(i.e. the satisfaction with the performance). They are all measured on a 7-
point scale, anchored by “very dissatisfied” and “very satisfied”. A “*” 
indicates items that are removed. 
 
1. How satisfied are you with your market share in the specific market. 
2. * How satisfied are you with your sales growth in the specific market. 
3. How satisfied are you with your profitability in the specific market. 
4. How satisfied are you with your current distribution arrangement in the 
specific market.  
5. * How satisfied are you with your cost level in the specific market.  
6. How satisfied are you with your access to the specific market. 
7. * How satisfied are you with the customers’ satisfaction for the local 
subsidiary. 
 
Additional performance measures 
Due to the recommendation of measuring performance in multiple ways, 
both self-reported financial figures, and self-reported information about 
some other key performance variables, such as growth/decline in employees 
in the foreign subsidiary, are collected. In detail, the following information 
was reported through the questionnaire: 
 
1. Sales and profit for the year 2000 (Return on sales (ROS) can then be 
calculated) 
2. Sales growth/decline as a mean for the years 1998-2000 (three years).  
3. Profit growth/decline as a mean for the years 1998-2000 (three years) 
4. Number of employees for year 2000 and growth/decline in employees as a 
mean for the period 1998-2000. 
 
All these figures were also checked trough archival data, most often through 
the Amadeus database, but also by calling the firms. 
 
Bargaining costs 
Bargaining costs are expenses related to negotiations between or among 
different parties. According to Milgrom and Roberts (1992), these costs are 
such as: time spent on bargaining, resources used during bargaining, and 
losses that occur as a result of failure in reaching efficient agreements. The 
first two items on bargaining costs are self-developed, but the idea is taken 
from Rindfleisch and Heide (1997). The reason for taking these into the 
definition of bargaining costs is the need of describing both “quality and 
quantity” of the construct. These items describe the “quantity”. The next 
three items describe the “quality”. Item 3 and 4 are taken from Dahlstrom 
and Nygaard (1999) and slightly changed to fit the research setting. Item 5 is 
taken from Buvik and John (2000) and adapted to the research setting. The 
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items are measured on a 7-point scale, anchored by “very bad description” 
and “very good description”. A “*” indicates items that are removed.   
 
1. * We spend a lot of time in renegotiating agreements made with our foreign 
subsidiary.  
2. * We spend a lot of time in coordinating activities with our foreign 
subsidiary.  
3. Our meetings with employees from our foreign subsidiary are very 
effective and systematic (reversed). 
4. Both parties are always well prepared in the meetings so that decisions can 
be made (reversed). 
5. * The coordination of the relation with our foreign subsidiary is too costly 
compared to the outcome of these interactions. 
 
Monitoring costs  
Monitoring costs are expenditures that occur when the principal needs to 
control whether the contractual agreements between parties are fulfilled. The 
first three items are taken from Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999) and slightly 
changed to fit the research setting. The next three are self-developed, but 
somewhat inspired by Martinez and Jarillo (1991). The items are measured 
on a 7-point scale, anchored by “very bad description” and “very good 
description”. A “*” indicates items that are removed.   
 
1. We use a lot of time to control the delivered services from the foreign 
subsidiary. 
2. We spend a lot of time on accounting issues related to the foreign 
subsidiary. 
3. We spend a lot of time to control deliveries of important input resources to 
the foreign subsidiary.  
4. * We spend considerable resources to control the working effort in the 
foreign subsidiary.  
5. * We visit the foreign subsidiary very often to ensure that the general 
development of the company is in line with our expectations.  
6. * Employees from the foreign subsidiary have to visit headquarters very 
often to ensure that they are in line with our strategic goals. 
 
 
Maladaptation costs 
The opportunity costs of maladaptation have their origin in the 
communication and coordination failures between parties in a relationship 
(Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999). When the environment is uncertain, and 
when the information needed from the foreign subsidiary is incomplete, too 
voluminous, or poorly formulated, then there are great risks for adaptation 
problems. The opportunity costs of not being able to respond effectively to 
changes in the environment are what we can define as the maladaptation 
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costs. The items representing this construct are taken from Dahlstrom and 
Nygaard (1999), but the original item with incompleteness and 
voluminousness is divided into two separate items because incompleteness 
and voluminousness are most probably two different aspects of the construct. 
The items are measured on a 7-point scale, anchored by “very bad 
description” and “very good description”. A “*” indicates items that are 
removed. 
 
1. Information from the foreign subsidiary is often incomplete and therefore 
difficult to understand. 
2. Information from the foreign subsidiary is often too voluminous and 
therefore difficult to understand. 
3. * Information from the foreign subsidiary is often poorly formulated and 
difficult to understand. 
4. Important information from the foreign subsidiary seldom comes at the 
right time. 
 
Bonding costs 
Bonding costs occur due to the necessity of completing secure commitments. 
Bonding includes a variety of activities that are believed to contribute 
positively to increased commitments in a relationship: for example, 
developing personal ties between parties, developing common company 
cultures, building incentive systems, time spent together to solve third party 
problems, and developing of career possibilities within the MNC (Heide and 
John, 1988). Bonding costs have not been operationalized in former studies 
before as far as we can understand. All items on bonding costs are therefore 
self-developed. The items are measured on a 7-point scale, anchored by 
“very bad description” and “very good description”. A “*” indicates items 
that are removed. 
 
1. We spend a lot of time in communicating with our foreign subsidiary. 
2. We spend a lot of time in developing personal ties between headquarter and 
the foreign subsidiary. 
3. We spend a lot of time in developing a common company culture 
4. We spend a lot of time together with our foreign subsidiary in order to 
solve conflicts with third parties. 
5. * We spend a lot of time in designing and developing career possibilities 
within our company for employees in the foreign subsidiary. 
6. * We have developed a lot of incentive systems (like bonuses and stock 
options) for our employees in the foreign subsidiary.  
 
Operation mode 
The dichotomous variable of operation mode is represented by two 
categories –  “acquisition” and “greenfield”. 
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Underlying assumptions 
The underlying assumptions presented in the following section are not part 
of the research model, but to legitimate the theoretical foundation of the 
research model, there must be at least some variation in these variables, and 
also a positive (or negative) relationship between the underlying assumption 
and the respective transaction costs. 
 
Behavioral uncertainty 
Behavioral uncertainty occurs from the problems related to the monitoring of 
relational parties' performance (Williamson, 1985). When operationalizing 
the construct, many former TCE studies have leaned on the study of 
Anderson (1985), which considers behavioral uncertainty as synonymous 
with the difficulties of evaluating performance (in her study, it was sales 
force performance). The four items representing the construct are taken from 
Stump and Heide (1996)(see appendix p. 440). However, the scales are 
anchored differently since we ask about the informant's perception of the 
problem. All items are slightly changed and adapted to the present research 
setting (measured on a 7-point scale, anchored by “very bad description” and 
“very good description”). 
 
1. Precise standards by which a foreign company’s performance can be 
assessed are not readily available. 
2. Evaluating our foreign company’s performance is a highly subjective 
process. 
3. The foreign company is performing so many different tasks that it is 
difficult to ascertain whether a good job is being done. 
4. It is difficult to determine whether our foreign company adheres to quality 
standards and specifications that we are agreed upon. 
 
 
Opportunism  
Opportunism is an underlying assumption about human nature in this study, 
but as explained in the literature review, opportunism is not always present. 
However, a MNC has to take into consideration the possible problems this 
type of behavior can create. Likewise, this type of behavior can generate 
substantial transaction costs for the MNC in the relationship with the foreign 
subsidiary. The first two items are taken from Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999) 
and slightly changed for the purpose of this study. The next two are taken 
from Gulbrandsen (1998), and slightly changed to fit the empirical setting. 
The four items that define the construct are measured on a 7-point scale, 
anchored by “very bad description” and “very good description”):  
 
1. We have reason to believe that employees in the foreign subsidiary hide 
important information from us. 
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2. Local management in the foreign subsidiary has not kept the promises 
made when the subsidiary was established. 
3. Occasionally, local management in the foreign subsidiary alters information 
in order to carry out things their own way.  
4. Sometimes the local management in the foreign subsidiary promises to do 
things without actually doing them later. 
 
 
Environmental uncertainty 
Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990) argue that environmental uncertainty is a 
multiple-dimensional construct, which also Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) 
seem to agree upon because they argue that using a multi-dimensional 
construct is perhaps wise if the research has its focus in an international 
context (in contrast to domestic). “Volatility refers to the extent to which the 
environment changes rapidly and allows a firm to be caught by surprise” (p. 
200). See also Leblebici and Salancik (1981). “Diversity reflects the extent 
to which there are multiple sources of uncertainty in the environment” (p. 
200). See also Aldrich (1979). Perceived country risk, among the 
management, will probably also be part of the environmental uncertainty 
construct. The items on country risk are taken from Aulakh and Kotabe 
(1997), but item 2 is slightly changed to export regulations instead of 
tariff/non-tariff barriers. The volatility and diversity items are measured on a 
7-point scale, anchored by “very good description” and “very bad 
description”. The five items that describe country risk are measured on a 7-
point scale, anchored by “very small extent” and “very great extent”. 
 
Volatility: 
1. We are often surprised by the actions of suppliers and distributors in the 
foreign market. 
2. We are often surprised by the actions of our competitors in the foreign 
market. 
3. We are often surprised by customer reaction in the foreign market. 
 
Diversity: 
1. There are many end users of this product in this market. 
2. There are many competitors for this product/service in this market. 
3. We have only a few immediate customers for this product/service in this 
market (reversed). 
 
 
Country risk: 
1. Changes in import regulations in this foreign country are very 
unpredictable. 
2. Changes in export regulations in this foreign country are very 
unpredictable.  
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3. Changes in foreign exchange control in this foreign country are very 
unpredictable.  
4. Changes in foreign business tax laws in this foreign country are very 
unpredictable. 
5. Changes in remittances and repatriation regulations in this foreign country 
are very unpredictable.  
 
 
Asset specificity 
This construct refers to what extent the supported assets in the relation are 
transferable across other relationships. Such assets can be described as sunk 
costs due to its substantial lesser value outside the relationship. In the 
literature, six asset specificity distinctions have been recognized 
(Williamson, 1991). However, mainly three of these are adequate for this 
study: site specificity, physical asset specificity, and human asset specificity. 
Site specificity refers to the needs of investments related to the specific 
localization of the foreign subsidiary. Physical asset specificity refers to the 
investments in specialized facilities, and human asset specificity reflects how 
much a salesperson has to learn about the product in order to do a good job. 
Item 1 and 2 are taken from Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990). Item 3 and 4 
are from Aulakh and Kotabe (1997). The rest is self-developed, but item 6 is 
inspired by Altenborg (1997). The last five items are taken into the construct 
definition because they have a specific international focus and a focus on the 
relationship between MNC and the foreign subsidiary. The items are 
measured on a 7-point scale, anchored by “very bad description” and “very 
good description”. A “*” indicates items that are removed. 
  
1. * It takes a lot of time for our salespersons to learn about this 
product/service thoroughly. 
2. Specialized facilities are needed to market this product/service. 
3. Our firm has made significant investments that are specific to the needs of 
this foreign country. 
4. * Our product/services are tailored to meet the requirements of this foreign 
country. 
5. * Our most valuable technology/know-how is transferred to the foreign 
subsidiary. 
6. * Many of the operations in our foreign subsidiary demand close 
supervision and coordination. 
7. Our firm has made significant investments that are specific to the needs of 
the foreign subsidiary. 
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Control variables 
The literature review revealed a whole set of factors and variables that could 
influence the performance of a company, but since the intention of this study 
is limited to the relative narrow scope of inspecting transaction cost effects, 
many of the variables will be omitted in the further analysis. The included 
variables have been chosen due to mainly two reasons: (1) the variables can 
strengthen the isolation requirement; (2) variables that may have a 
substantial effect on subsidiary performance and thereby outshine the 
transaction costs effects.  
 
Firm size 
In line with prior studies, firm size has probably an effect on subsidiary 
performance. The size of the firm often reflects its ability to absorb costs for 
the entry (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992). Firm size may also influence the 
resources available for the foreign subsidiary, and the strategy they follow 
(Shrader and Simon, 1997). Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan (1983) showed 
that firm size had an effect (negative) on exit rate. The same result is shown 
in a study by Mitchell (1994). Firm size is measured by:  
 
1. Annual sales. 
2. Annual profit. 
3. Number of employees. 
 
 
Former experience 
Prior studies also indicate that former international experience and 
experience with the host country increase the probability for survival 
(Barkema, Bell, and Pennings, 1996; Li, 1995).  
 
To capture the MNCs former experience with the host country, the following 
statement is made in the questionnaire (measured on a 7-point scale, 
anchored by “very bad description” and “very good description”): 
 
1. Our firm had substantial experience in the host country before we 
established this foreign subsidiary. 
  
In addition, a question is also asked about how much international sales the 
MNC has, compared to total sales. This is done to capture the overall 
international experience of the MNCs. 
 
Industry growth 
Li (1995) showed that industry growth had a positive effect on the survival 
of the company, which may also indicate that this will have a positive effect 
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on subsidiary performance. Hence, perceived growth rate in the industry is 
taken into the study as a control variable (measured on a 7-point scale 
anchored by “very low” and “very high”). 
 
Cultural distance  
Cultural distance may have an effect on both performance and transaction 
costs, both directly and indirectly, and as such it may also mask the effect of 
transaction costs on subsidiary performance. To capture perceived cultural 
distance the following statement is made (measured on a 7-point scale, 
anchored by “very bad description” and “very good description”)  
 
1. There are considerable cultural differences (i.e. with regard to norms, 
values, customs,, and relationships with people) between Norway and the 
host country of our foreign company.  
 
This control variable is inspired by the study of Bell (1996), but slightly 
adapted to the present study.  
 
Age of subsidiary 
Since all of the subsidiaries are alive in year 2000, it is reasonable to infer 
that while the subsidiaries become older and more efficiently fitted to the 
environment and to the MNC, their performance will be better, and as such, 
age can disturb the effect of transaction costs. The age of the subsidiary is 
measured by year since start-up (i.e. 1990-1997). Hence, all subsidiaries are 
at least three years old. 
 
Empirical context and data collection strategy 
The empirical context for this study is Norwegian owned multinational 
companies with majority owned (>50 percent of equity) foreign affiliates. 
This population was chosen due to the need for variance in the independent 
variables (ref. the association requirement), and due to the wish of external 
generalization. However, the need for external validity must very often be 
traded against the isolation requirement, which implies high internal validity. 
A strict homogenous setting would most certainly have increased the 
possibility of identifying significant relationships between cause and effect 
since homogeneity in the empirical context decreases the number of possible 
other explanatory variables. Thus, a more homogenous research setting 
should probably have been chosen to better fulfill the requirement of internal 
validity. On the other hand, the generalizability of the study would then have 
been reduced since replication studies within different settings have not been 
accomplished due to constraints of time and money.  
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To solve some of the possible problems that come with a heterogeneous 
setting, the focal population was narrowed quite a lot. First, FDIs were only 
greenfields and acquisitions established during the period 1990-1997 and 
still active at the end of 2000.44 However, due to the size of the population, 
no geographically restriction was introduced regarding place of 
establishment. The foreign subsidiaries are therefore at the outset spread all 
over the world. There is no restriction regarding industry, either. 
Manufacturing firms, as well as service and retailing firms are represented in 
the population. Second, the foreign affiliates were restricted to ongoing 
businesses with the most important business activities (such as marketing, 
finance, and sales) well established. Third, control variables that may 
correlate with both the independent and dependent variables as well as those 
probably correlated with the dependent variable alone were included in the 
second step of the analysis (Cook and Campbell, 1979).  
 
To avert problems regarding generalizability, only one foreign subsidiary per 
each multinational was chosen in order to reduce parent company biases. 
Hence, the number of MNCs and the number of foreign subsidiaries is equal. 
Further, to make it possible to observe any differences in transaction costs 
between acquisitions and greenfields, it would be inappropriate having a too 
long period between the measurement of those variables and the time the 
company established the foreign subsidiary. Therefore, the population was 
limited to those MNCs that had established foreign subsidiaries after the end 
of 1989. On the other hand, a very short time span between the set-up of the 
foreign affiliate and the measurement of transaction costs and especially 
performance will probably lead to too much measurement disturbance 
caused by the time factor, and not caused by the generic differences between 
the two modes of operation. Therefore, transaction costs and performance 
are measured three years after the latest subsidiary formation (i.e. at the end 
of 2000).45  
 
                                                     
44 To achieve more variance, it would have been desirable with both survived and 
wound-up affiliates in the database. Unfortunately, this design was very difficult 
to accomplish due to the lack of information about the annual establishment of 
foreign subsidiaries in official Norwegian statistics. This study had to take as its 
point of departure a database of Norwegian firms with still active majority-owned 
foreign subsidiaries registered in the year 1999. 
45 As discussed above, measuring cause and effect at the same time ruins the 
assumption of directionality. Hence, this relationship is based on theoretical 
grounds. 
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Data collection strategy 
Information about the variables was collected through a structured 
questionnaire, which was mailed to one key informant in the MNC. In 
addition, the information about financial and accounting issues, as well as 
demographic information, was double checked through archival sources, 
mainly the Amadeus database46 (Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing), but 
also from annual reports and other informants in the companies.  
 
Even though the data collecting strategy chosen in this research is quite 
common in the social sciences, especially in business studies (Ghauri and 
Grønhaug, 2002), the strategy of relying on a mailed survey with one single 
individual as an information source needs some more amplification. First, let 
us consider the survey technique.  
 
Structured surveys are quite appropriate for large-scaled studies. All 
informants are replying to the same question, it is quite simple to administer, 
and it is relative easy to tabulate and analyze (Churchill, 1999). However, 
major weaknesses are also recognized: problems concerning interpretation of 
the questions, terms used in the instrument could be misunderstood by the 
informants, wrong persons are answering the questionnaire, and the response 
rate is often rather low (Ghauri and Grønhaug, 2002). Although these are 
important weaknesses, it is possible to reduce these problems by executing a 
proper design, especially upfront of the study. In addition, the alternatives to 
a mailed questionnaire were few and with major limitations. The reason for 
not using archival data was simple; they did not contain the information 
needed for measuring subsidiary performance and transaction costs. In 
addition, very little information about the underlying variables was available. 
On the other hand, interviewing would have been too time-consuming and 
too expensive to carry out.    
 
Generally, the key informant approach is a technique of collecting data about 
a social setting through interviewing or asking a selection of people that are 
in favor of special competencies about a certain research problem (Seidler, 
1974). Hence, the informants are not randomly chosen. Further, these 
individuals are asked to answer on behalf of an aggregated unit, often an 
organization or a relationship between organizations. However, relying on a 
single key informant in an organization can be problematic in different ways. 
First, asking key informants to assess highly complex issues on behalf of an 
organization may increase the random measurement errors just because of 
                                                     
46 The Amadeus database contains detailed financial, ownership, and descriptive 
information, on 4.6 million European companies. An additional 0.9 million 
European companies are summarized. 
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the difficulties of answering such questions (Phillips, 1981). Second, 
systematic error may occur due to reasons such as inadequate knowledge, 
ignorance, and/or lack of interest in the survey topic attributed to the key 
informants (Phillips, 1981). Third, it is impossible to detect whether the error 
variance in measurements is due to systematic sources of error, or whether it 
is generated due to random errors (Bagozzi, 1980). Fourth, it excludes a 
rigorous evaluation of discriminant and convergent validity because 
variation in measurements due to method factors cannot be modeled (see 
also footnote 48 for a short elaboration) (Campbell and Fiske, 1959; Phillips, 
1981). Fifth, the problem of common method variance can be extensive 
(Campbell and Fiske, 1959; Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). Because the 
measures of two or more hypothesized correlated variables (i.e. “traits” in 
Campbell and Fiske’s terminology) come from the same single source (i.e. 
“method”), any defect in this source may ruin the measures on all variables. 
Likewise, an observed correlation between some variables (e.g. A and B) 
and no observed correlation between others (e.g. A and C) can be caused by 
the fact that A and B are measured by the same method and that C is 
measured by another.  
 
In order to improve the quality of the collected data, care needs to be taken 
both before and after the data collection. Especially, precautions regarding 
the selection of key informants are important upfront (as well as the design 
of the questionnaire. Therefore, collecting information from both sides of the 
dyad (i.e. through one key informant in the headquarters and one key 
informant in the foreign subsidiary) could probably solve some of the above 
problems (Bagozzi, Yi, and Phillips, 1991; Phillips, 1981). However, this 
research is occupied with the principal’s view of the transaction costs that 
occur in the transactions between the headquarters and the affiliates, and 
likewise, the principal’s assessment of the performance of the affiliate. 
Hence, collecting equivalent data from an informant in the foreign subsidiary 
would have been illogical and irrelevant and certainly not increase the 
possibility of validating the data. Moreover, if it had been necessary to 
collect dyadic data in this way, only one single key informant is still 
representing each part of the organization. One represents the principal and 
one the agent, who in many cases may also have divergent, and/or 
conflicting interests, even though they per definition belong to the same 
organization. Instead, choosing a sample of multiple informants from all 
possible informants47 in the headquarters of each MNC may increase the 
validity of the study (Seidler, 1974). However, such a design is extremely 
                                                     
47 Such a sample should not be a representative sample of a universe of informants 
in the MNC. It should rather be a convenient sample of “perceptions and 
expertise” about the problem under investigation (Seidler, 1974, p. 817). 
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resource demanding and increases the possibility of getting non-response 
biases, and biases related to ignorance and knowledge differences among the 
informants (Golden, 1992; Kumar, Stern, and Anderson, 1993).  
 
A multiple informant approach also raises questions regarding statistical 
procedures. If each individual report was to included in the research model 
(for example as reflective indicators in a multitrait-multimethod matrix 
(MTMM)48 (Campbell and Fiske, 1959; Jöreskog, 1974)), the number of 
parameters to estimate would have increased substantially, which then often 
has a consequence regarding the number of observations needed in the study. 
The lower the relative proportion is between number of observations and 
number of parameters estimated in the model, the more likely it is to reach 
an improper solution. Remember that researchers often recommend a 
minimum relative proportion of 5:1 between number of observations and 
number of estimated parameters in the model (Hair, et al., 1998). Some 
researchers have tried to solve this problem by constructing an averaged 
organizational response scale. However, this is not as straightforward as it 
seems to be. By doing so, individual reports that are highly skewed from the 
mean will be moderated, and thereby hide possible reliability problems and 
increase the possibilities of achieving convergent validity due to a technical 
procedure (Phillips, 1981).  
 
In accordance with the logic in a multiple informant approach, and before 
the decision about a single key informant strategy was taken, the present 
study tried to identify several persons in each MNC that could be targeted 
with the same questionnaire. The typical response from the MNCs was that 
they did not want to use so much resources on one single study, and that in 
many cases it was only one person (often the managing director) that really 
had the expertise to answer such questions.49 Consequently, this study chose 
                                                     
48 A MTMM matrix is a correlation matrix that makes it possible for the researcher 
to evaluate convergent and discriminant validity at the same time by having at 
least two methods (forms of measurement) to measure two or more constructs 
(traits). Correlations between scores that reflect the same trait and the same 
method represent the reliability coefficients. Correlations between scores that 
reflect the same trait measured by different methods are convergent validity 
coefficients, and correlations between different traits measured by the same 
method are discriminant validity coefficients. In addition, there is a so-called 
nonsense coefficient that reflects the correlation between different traits measured 
by different methods (Hoyle, Judd, and Harris, 2002). Coefficients should be high 
for reliability and convergent validity, and low for discriminant validity and 
nonsense. 
49 This description was especially predominant within small companies, which also 
is in line with other studies (see for example John and Reve (1982, p. 519)). 
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a single key informant technique when collecting the data, and each single 
informant answered a structured questionnaire, which was sent to him or her 
by post – a strategy in line with what has been done in other studies where 
performance and/or transaction costs in various dimensions have been 
investigated. See for example Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992), Aulakh and 
Kotabe (1997), Davis et al. (1992), and Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990). 
 
Given the focus of this study, the key informants were those persons in the 
MNC that had appropriate knowledge about the research issue and were 
willing and able to “talk” about it by answering the questionnaire (Campbell, 
1955, p. 340). In most cases, this person was the managing director, but 
division managers, finance directors, marketing directors, and owners of the 
MNCs were also among the key informants.  The procedure to identify these 
persons was the following. First, all companies were called by phone with 
the intention to: a) detect whether the company with a respective foreign 
subsidiary met the criteria (see above for a detailed description of the 
criteria) for inclusion in the study, and b) identify a key informant in the 
company. The database from Dun & Bradstreet, contained names on both 
managing director and director of the board, hence these persons (or if these 
persons were difficult to come in contact with, it was asked for other 
responsible persons for the foreign operations in the MNC) were first 
contacted by telephone and asked some simple screening questions. If the 
company met the criteria, and when the key informant was identified, he or 
she was asked to participate in the survey. Based on the result of the 
telephone conversation, a package that contained a cover letter, a 
questionnaire, and a prepaid envelope was sent within a week to the key 
informants (see appendix 7 and 9). To improve the response rate, every 
informant that responded to the survey was promised to receive a report of 
the study. After approximately three weeks, a follow-up telephone call, and 
the one and only postal reminder (see appendix 8) was sent to the non-
respondents. 
 
Data screening  
This chapter contains some basic data screening such as a further description 
of the sample, response rate, non-response biases, and normality tests. In 
addition, a presentation of the underlying variables’ relationships to the 
independent variables in the model is included with the intention to justify a 
further empirical analysis of the relationships between transaction costs and 
performance. A short elaboration regarding sample size, and a brief 
presentation and discussion of the performance measurements in this 
research, close the chapter.  
 
 77
Sample description and response rate 
The sampling frame was extracted from the Dun & Bradstreet database of 
Norwegian companies. No other database was available (except data stored 
in the Bank of Norway, which was impossible to get hold of). The original 
file contained 3082 Norwegian foreign subsidiaries established by 
approximately 1300 Norwegian MNCs. Going through the whole database, 
contacting (by telephone and e-mail) all the MNCs, and updating the 
information, the database was at the outset further reduced to 1652 foreign 
subsidiaries and 564 MNCs with one or more foreign subsidiaries 
established during the period 1990-1997. A second screening was conducted, 
where type of activities and ownership circumstances were focused on. After 
this screening, the sample frame was reduced to 370 MNCs, of which 346 
MNCs were willing to participate. As far as what is known, this sample 
frame contains all the Norwegian MNCs that established one or more foreign 
subsidiaries between the beginning of 1990 and the end of 1997. 
Questionnaires were sent by mail to all these companies (i.e. 346).  
 
A total of 171 questionnaires were returned, which is a response rate of 49.4 
percent (the response rate is reduced to 46.2 percent if the non-willing 
companies are included, which probably is most correct). However, seven of 
these questionnaires had to be excluded due to foreign ownership of the 
MNC. A further four questionnaires were taken out due to insufficient 
completion and thereby lack of important information. Hence, the total 
number of complete questionnaires was 160.50 This results in a usable 
response rate of 43.2 percent, which is in the upper part of what other 
comparable studies have reported (Aulakh and Kotabe, 1997: 30.7 percent; 
Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner, 1999: 20.9 percent; Buvik and John, 
2000: 26.6 percent; Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999: 50.0 percent). Table 4-1 
gives an overview of key figures regarding sampling, sample frame and 
response rate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
50 No missing data on any key variables, neither no outliers (see Appendix 1). 
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Table 4-1: Sample frame and response rate 
 Multinational 
companies 
Number of 
subsidiaries 
Dun and Bradstreet 1300 3082 
First screening 
    still active MNC with respective foreign affiliate 
    year of establishment 
564 1652 
Second screening 
    type of activities in the foreign unit 
    foreign ownership of MNC 
    real owner of the MNC (companies on the list?)  
370* 1107 
Not interested 24 56 
Final agreements to participate  346  
Returned questionnaires 171  
Excluded questionnaires (foreign ownership)  7  
Unusable questionnaires 4  
Complete questionnaires  160  
Early respondents 117 (73.1%)  
Late respondents 43 (26.9%)  
Response rate  49.4%  
Response rate (not interested included) 46.2%  
Usable response rate (not interested excluded) 46.2%  
Usable response rate (not interested included) 43.2%  
* Not interested participants are included 
 
 
Going further into the sample, it is observed that the majority of the foreign 
subsidiaries reported in the study are established within Europe (81.9 
percent). They have less than 100 employees (87.5 percent), and almost 50 
percent of them have sales as their main activity. The MNCs that are 
represented in the sample are most often manufacturing companies (55 
percent). Both very small and very large companies (ranging from 10 to 
27,500) are represented, but the majority has less than 500 employees (76.3 
percent), which seems to be more or less in line with the structure of the total 
sample of companies (i.e. those 370 that are in the sample frame). However, 
no stringent test, except of the non-respondent test in the next section (which 
actually is a proxy test of non-response bias), has been conducted to compare 
non-respondents with respondents. Nevertheless, a manual screening of 
demographic variables was conducted with (maybe) one interesting 
observation; very few large oil companies were present in the usable sample, 
which is due to the presence of foreign MNCs in that particular sector. 
Otherwise, no other major deviations were observed (see appendix 1 for a 
more detailed description of the sample).     
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Non-response bias 
Non-response occurs due to many circumstances, of which the most obvious 
are refusals, and “not-at-homes”51 (Churchill, 1999). In any survey where 
non-response comes about, the question whether those who did respond are 
significantly different from those who did not respond, must be answered.  If 
not, serious doubts can be raised as to whether it is possible to generalize the 
results to the whole sample, or to a larger population. 
 
When little information is available about the non-respondents, especially 
regarding key variables in the study, the researcher is often left with an 
approximation of non-response bias through a comparison of first and late 
respondents on key variables (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). The idea is 
that persons who respond in later waves (i.e. after extra stimulus) are 
expected to be similar to those who did not respond.  
 
As much as 73.1 percent of the respondents in the present study did not need 
a second wave (see Table 4-1). The mean score on key variables (some 
demographics and all variables in the main research model) in this group 
was therefore tested against the respective means in the late response group 
(26.9 percent). This test was a simple t-test of the null hypothesis of no mean 
differences across the two groups. As shown in Table 4-2, no significant 
differences were present between the two groups (although the scores on 
performance are close by), which indicates that non-response bias is non-
significant in this study.  
 
These results were also confirmed when running a binomial logistic 
regression52 with the same variables regressed on the response variable, 
which is a dichotomous variable with zero and one as the only outcomes. 
The log-likelihood statistics (-2 Log Likelihood) across the eight models did 
change just marginally, going from 184.982 (the base model with only the 
intercept included) to 173.513 (i.e. the model χ2 when seven variables53 
entered the equation was 11.469 (7 df)). The model χ2 did not show any 
significant changes across the models. Hence, no significant improvement of 
the base model was recognized by entering the seven variables. The Roa’s 
efficient score statistics (1 df) for each variable were ranging from .064 for 
“monitoring costs” to 3.471 for “performance”, none were significant at p < 
                                                     
51 Includes circumstance such as: absence from office, lost in mail (both ways), 
wrong address and wrong key informant. 
52 Both ordinary entry and block-by-block entry methods were used.  
53 “Turnover MNC” was taken out of the overall model due to high correlation with 
“number of employees”. A separate analysis with only MNC turnover as predictor 
was conducted with the same indication as in the t-test. 
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.05. Likewise, the Wald statistics (1 df) indicated non-significance at p < .05 
for all variables. Therefore, no other variables but the constant were included 
in the model. 
 
Table 4-2: Test of non-response bias 
Variables Mean early 
respondents 
(N=117) 
Mean late 
respondents 
(N=43) 
 
 
t-value 
 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Bargaining costs 3.35 2.95 1.835 .068 
Monitoring costs 2.84 2.79 .265 .791 
Bonding costs 4.15 4.51 −1.698 .091 
Maladaptation costs 2.41 2.10 1.421 .157 
Performance 4.16 4.59 −1.949 .053 
     
Number of employees 
MNC 
966 570 .750 .454 
Turnover MNC 1,327,934 864,925 1.150 .252 
International sales 46.85 55.09 −1.766 .079 
 
 
Normality  
The statistical assumption of multivariate analysis is that the variables are 
multinormally distributed, and if so, univariate normality can also be 
inferred. Highly skewed (skewness) and peaked (kurtosis) data may ruin 
resulting statistical tests because F and t statistics require a normal 
distribution of the variables in the model (Hair, et al., 1998). Even though it 
is multivariate normality that is of interest, it is quite common (and 
instructive) to report the univariate statistics in a multivariate analysis.  The 
characteristics of each variable are by this isolated and thrown into relief. 
Hence, univariate normality was checked for each single item.  
 
With a normal distribution, skewness and kurtosis should equal zero (it is 
common to subtract three from the original kurtosis value). Positive values 
on skewness indicate skewed data towards the left of the scale, and contrary 
with negative values. A peaked distribution gives positive kurtosis, and a flat 
distribution, negative kurtosis. Looking at the descriptive statistics, 
especially “item 1” (on bargaining cost) seems to deviate from a normal 
distribution quite much with a skewness of 2.034 and a kurtosis of 4.672 (see 
appendix 2-a which gives descriptive statistics for all 28 initial items).   
Following the rule of thumb that values above one should be treated with 
caution (Kaplan, 1990), this item was excluded in the further analysis 
because of relative high skewness and excessive kurtosis. Table 4-3 presents 
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the descriptive statistics for the items used in the research model (the final 
number of items after the later reliability and unidimensionality analysis). 
 
Table 4-3: Skewness and kurtosis – item level54 
Items Mean Std. dev. N Skewness Kurtosis 
Barg1 3.212   1.371   160 .351   −.335   
Barg2 3.275 1.341   160 .435   −.322   
Mon1 2.350   1.337   160 1.173   .943 
Mon2 3.581   1.544   160 .022   −.821 
Mon3 2.556   1.268   160 .754   .127   
Bond1 4.362   1.646   160 −.263  −.856   
Bond2 4.537   1.475   160 −.295   −.602  
Bond3 4.244 1.729   160      −.110   −1.038  
Bond4 3.837   1.617   160 −.103   −1.031 
Mal1 2.356   1.460   160 1.020   .122   
Mal2 2.006   1.179   160 1.410   1.594   
Mal3 2.625   1.545   160 .897   −.203   
Perf1 4.194   1.482   160 −.268   −.489   
Perf2 3.756   1.862   160 .077   −1.125   
Perf3 4.306   1.392   160     −.351   −.498 
Perf4 4.831   1.323   160 −.608   .039   
 
 
In addition to an inspection of the numerical values of skewness and 
kurtosis, normal probability plots were executed in SPSS55 (SPSS, 1999), 
and more formal tests of univariate and multivariate normality were 
executed in PRELIS 2 (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1996b). In general, the formal 
tests of normality are quite sensitive to sample sizes, hence PRELIS 2 uses 
the set of tests recommended by D’Augostino (1986) (see Bollen (1989b, pp. 
420-422 for a summary) to test for univariate normality. These tests try to 
take care of the problem that the standard error of both skewness and 
kurtosis decreases with larger N, and that the null hypothesis of normality 
                                                     
54 Standard errors for skewness (Ss) and kurtosis (Sk) respectively are approx.: 
 
N
S s
6 , and 
N
Sk
24 , where N is the number of cases.  
The obtained value for skewness (S) and kurtosis (K) are then compared with 0 
using the z distribution: 
sS
Sz 0 , and 
kS
Kz 0  (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996, pp. 73-74).  
55 Two kinds of plots were executed in SPSS: (1) Plots of the normal quantiles 
against the quantiles of the variables, and (2) a detrended normal Q-Q plot for 
each variable. 
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will be rejected with medium to large sample sizes even if there are only 
minor deviations from normality. The test regarding multivariate normality 
is based on a procedure that addresses a problem that variables can be 
univariate normal, but not multinormally distributed (Bollen, 1989b). Still, 
precaution must be taken, when concluding on the basis of these tests.  
 
Table 4-4: Test statistics for univariate and multivariate normality – item level 
 Skewness Kurtosis Skewness and 
Kurtosis 
Items Z-Score P-Value Z-Score P-Value χ2 P-Value 
Barg1a 1.826 .068 −.912 .362 4.166 .125 
Barg2a 2.236 .025* −.865 .387 5.748 .056 
Mon1 5.156 .000* 2.013 .044* 30.636 .000* 
Mon2 .118 .906 −3.499 .000* 12.255 .002* 
Mon3 3.644 .000* .489 .625 13.516 .001* 
Bond1 −1.383 .167 −3.771 .000* 16.128 .000* 
Bond2 −1.544 .123 −2.107 .035* 6.820 .033* 
Bond3 −.583 .560 −5.587 .000* 31.560 .000* 
Bond4 −.550 .582 −5.508 .000* 30.643 .000* 
Mal1 4.644 .000* .478 .633 21.796 .000* 
Mal2 5.870 .000* 2.813 .005* 42.372 .000* 
Mal3 4.201 .000* −.447 .655 17.850 .000* 
Perf1 −1.410 .159 −1.555 .120 4.405 .111 
Perf2 .413 .680 −6.808 .000* 46.521 .000* 
Perf3 −1.825 .068 −1.596 .111 5.878 .053 
Perf4 −3.029 .002* .266 .790 9.243 .010* 
 
Multivariate 
normality 
 
 
8.342 
 
 
.000* 
 
 
5.402 
 
 
.000* 
 
 
98.762 
 
 
.000* 
* non-normal for p < .05 (two-tailed test) 
a reversed items 
 
Table 4-4 summarizes the test statistics for the univariate and the 
multivariate normality test. Since Olsson et al. (2000) conclude that the ML 
estimation method is quite robust even with very high values of kurtosis,56 
and that former studies have indicated that tests of variances are more 
affected by kurtosis than of skewness, neither skewness nor kurtosis are that 
critical in the present study (see p. 566). Just minor deviation from normality 
was observed at the item level.  
 
                                                     
56 Even with kurtosis in the interval of 2.0-6.35, the ML method was considerably 
insensitive (see Olsson et al. (2000) table 5, p. 578).   
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Aggregating the data to the construct level (i.e. latent variable scores, and 
summated scales, both executed in PRELIS 2. See Table 4-5 and appendix 
2-b) give even better results. On the basis of both the visual tests and the 
formal tests, no other items were excluded because of non-normality, 
although some of them were excluded due to cross loadings (see later 
analysis in this chapter).  
 
Table 4-5: Skewness and kurtosis – construct level 
Variables Skewness Kurtosis 
Latent variable scores:   
  Bargaining cost (2 items)  .385   −.129   
  Monitoring cost (3 items) .819   .568   
  Bonding cost (4 items) −.168   −.493   
  Maladaptation cost (3 items) .944   .210   
  Performance (4 items) −.320   −.197   
 
Summated scales: 
  
  Bargaining cost (2 items) .312 −.319   
  Monitoring cost (3 items) .664   .294   
  Bonding cost (4 items) −.176  −.370 
  Maladaptation cost (3 items) .938   .152 
  Performance (4 items) −.269   −.290   
 
Underlying assumptions  
A sound logic of the theory in this research is that there must be some 
variances in the underlying variables if a transaction costs approach is to be 
applied. Hence, a descriptive presentation of each underlying variable and a 
correlation matrix between these variables and the transaction costs are 
presented. 
 
If zero variance were present, the standard deviation would also be zero. 
However, all underlying variables have a standard deviation of more than 
one (i.e. from 1.165 on “behavioral uncertainty”, to 1.525 on “country risk”). 
Table 4-6 presents the descriptive statistics. 
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Table 4-6: Descriptive statistics – underlying variables 
Variables Mean Standard deviation 
Behavioral uncertainty 2.663 1.165 
Volatility 2.769 1.214 
Diversity 4.758 1.441 
Country risk 3.055 1.525 
Asset specificity 3.364 1.207 
Opportunism 2.816 1.338 
 
 
Without going into details, nor going into any discussion, significant 
correlations are recognized between many of the variables; especially 
“opportunism” and “behavioral uncertainty” have distinct correlations 
between several transaction costs. It is also recognized that “asset 
specificity”, and especially “diversity” are not definite in their relationships. 
Table 4-7 presents the correlations after a refining of the underlying 
variables’ scales through a confirmatory factor analysis with varimax 
rotation (accomplished in SPSS). All correlations are based on summated 
scales. 
 
Table 4-7: Correlation matrix – underlying variables and transaction costs 
 Behavioral 
uncertainty 
Volatility Diversity Country 
risk 
Asset 
specificity 
Opportunism 
MalCost 
  sign. 
.444*** 
.000 
.466***
.000 
−.003 
.485 
.094 
.120 
.035 
.331 
.665*** 
.000 
MonCost 
  sign. 
.199** 
.006 
.399***
.000 
.018 
.410 
.193**
.007 
.036 
.325 
.459*** 
.000 
BargCost 
  sign. 
.338*** 
.000 
.427***
.000 
.009 
.454 
.069 
.195 
−.162*
.020 
.489*** 
.000 
BondCost 
  sign. 
−.273***   
.000 
.001 
.494 
.030 
.353 
.144*
.035 
.174*
.014 
.060 
.225 
* p < .05 (two-tailed test) 
** p < .01 (two-tailed test) 
*** p < .001 (two-tailed test) 
 
Based on these relative shallow analyses, it is concluded that there is 
empirical support for continuing with the analysis of what roles the 
transaction costs play regarding performance.  
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Sample size 
How large does the sample have to be to get proper solutions and meaningful 
parameter estimates? No exact answer can be given to this question. It 
depends on type of analysis, number of variables in the analysis, number of 
parameters to estimate, model misspecification, departure from normality, 
and estimation procedure (Hair, et al., 1998). However, some rules of thumb 
are given in the literature.  
 
If there are concerns about the impact of specification errors, sample size 
should be increased compared to what otherwise would be required. As far 
as what is knowable, the most relevant items regarding the definition of 
transaction costs are included in the model. The performance items are 
developed from theory and represent the construct in a relative proper way. 
On the other hand, many other variables than those that are included in the 
model are relevant in explaining total performance. However, this research is 
occupied with what impact transaction costs have on performance, hence in 
that sense, the most relevant items and constructs are included in the model. 
 
In general, there is an agreement of “more is better than less” in terms of 
both N and number of indicators per factor (Anderson and Gerbing, 1984; 
Gerbing and Anderson, 1987). A sample size as low as 50, is possible with 
ML estimation,57 but the recommended sample size is N>100. With a sample 
size of 150 and with three or more indicators per factor, a converged and 
proper solution is usually achieved. Likewise, parameter estimates with 
standard errors small enough to be of practical use will also be obtained 
(Anderson and Gerbing, 1984; Gerbing and Anderson, 1985). In addition, 
there must be at least as many observations as free parameters in the model 
(N/p = 1/1), but a recommended minimum ratio of N/p has been 5/1 for 
relatively normally distributed data (Bentler and Chou, 1987). However, in 
small sample sizes, the probability of getting nonconvergence and improper 
solutions increases dramatically when the number of indicators increases. 
Hence, in many cases, this will either limit the number of items per factor 
(p/f), or limit the number of constructs measured in the model. Nevertheless, 
it is also recognized that in CFA with very small N (i.e. N = 50) it is 
recommended to have more than four items per factor to avoid improper 
solutions (Marsh and Hau, 1999, p. 61). 
 
Therefore, having a sample size of 160 and a total of 16 indicators that 
measure five latent variables in the final model, it is concluded that the 
                                                     
57 See also under “Estimation method” on page 57, for a further description of the 
ML characteristics. 
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sample size and model complexity are within the limits recommended in the 
literature.  
Measurements of performance 
Some studies recommend that performance has to be measured in different 
ways – using both subjective and objective measures (Geringer and Herbert, 
1991; Glaister and Buckley, 1998). In the present study, performance was at 
the outset, measured by seven subjective indicators (PerfAll), one objective 
measure – return on sales (ROS), two semi objective – self reported mean 
growth in sales (SalesGrowth) and return (RetGrowth), and one behavioral 
measure – mean growth in number of employees (EmplGrowth). However, 
due to the need for simplicity, it is only the subjective measures that are used 
in the LISREL analysis. Knowing that this may weaken the conclusions of 
the whole research, a correlation analysis between most of these 
performance variables was executed to see whether there is a strong 
correlation between these measures. If so, to use only subjective measures as 
a good proxy for performance can probably be justified. Table 4-8 shows the 
results. 
 
Table 4-8: Correlation matrix – miscellaneous performance measures 
 PerfAll PerfRed SalesGrowth RetGrowth ROS EmplGrowth 
PerfAll 
sign 
1.00 
 
     
PerfRed 
sign. 
.971*** 
.000 
1.00     
SalesGrowth 
sign. 
.393*** 
.000 
.358***
.000 
1.00    
RetGrowth 
sign. 
.422*** 
.000 
.384***
.000 
.531***
.000 
1.00   
ROS 
sign. 
.263** 
.001 
.252**
.002 
.122 
.137 
.137 
.095 
1.00  
EmplGrowth 
sign. 
.261** 
.001 
.239** 
.003 
.678***
.000 
.385***
.000 
.058 
.483 
1.00 
* p < .05 (two-tailed test) 
** p < .01 (two-tailed test) 
*** p < .001 (two-tailed test) 
 
Most of the correlations are significant at p < .001. One extremely high 
coefficient of .971 is recognized, but this is between the initial seven 
subjective performance items (PerfAll – summated scales) and the actually 
four items (PerfRed – summated scales) used in the model. The correlations 
between PerfRed and the other measures are in the range of .384-.239, all are 
significant at p < .01 or p < .001.  
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To justify a single type of measure, or to merge measures, no exact lower 
limit of the correlation coefficient between constructs is defined. However, 
Cohen (1977) recommends in general a correlation coefficient of .50 before 
it can be called large. On the other hand, seeing the correlation analysis as an 
analogy of a factor analysis where inter-item correlation above .30 is 
considered important (Hair, et al., 1998; Robinson, Shaver, and Wrightsman, 
1991), it can be justified that the subjective measures are relatively adequate 
proxies for at least the mean growth/decline in sales and return. The 
correlation between return on sales (ROS), where the calculation is based on 
sales and return for the foreign unit in the year 2000, is perhaps more 
problematic. However, notice the insignificant correlations between ROS 
and SalesGrowth and RetGrowth58. If the level of fixed costs is constant 
across time, firms and industries (which is highly unrealistic), a clear 
correlation between these variables would have been recognized. But 
relatively young firms, which are growing rather fast, will probably have a 
different level of fixed costs than more mature firms. The same applies to 
manufacturing subsidiaries compared to subsidiaries with sales as their main 
activity. Hence, if this is the situation, using ROS as a measure for 
performance will be rather dubious. There is no clear evidence of these 
problems in the material, but the fact that the firms are coming from 
different industries, are represented in different countries, and that the mean 
sales growth has been approximately 10-20 percent with even larger growth 
in employees (15-25 percent), strongly indicate that ROS cannot be used as a 
performance measure in this setting. With this reasoning as a backdrop, 
mainly subjective measures of performance will be used in the further 
analysis.  
 
Validation of measurements 
The measures used in this study have to be evaluated in regard to both 
reliability and validity. The first refers to the consistency of the measures 
over time or across observations, and the latter refers to whether a variable 
really measures what it is assumed to do (Bollen, 1989b). However, primary 
to the reliability and validity evaluation, unidimensionality has to be 
assessed (Hair, et al., 1998).  
 
Unidimensionality 
When a particular set of observable measures (items or indicators) fit a 
specific common latent variable (trait or construct), then unidimensionality 
                                                     
58 An even weaker tendency was registered between ROS and sales/profit for the 
year 2000. The correlation were: ROS-sales: .041, ROS-profit: .139. 
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is present (Hattie, 1985; McDonald, 1981). Contrarily, measurement models 
with correlated measurement errors or with indicators that load on several 
traits do not represent unidimensionality in the measurement of constructs. 
Hence, such constructs can be very difficult to interpret in a one-way 
fashion. Assessing unidimensionality is therefore a critical element in the 
procedures of testing the measurement model (Anderson and Gerbing, 
1988). The following procedures were conducted to evaluate the 
unidimensionality of the scales: (1) an unrotated principal component 
analysis (PCA) with a following (2) promax rotated PCA were conducted. 
Thereinafter, (3) inter-item correlation and (4) item-to-total correlation were 
assessed, and at last, (5) a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted 
in LISREL 8.53. The reason for not relying solely on an exploratory PCA is 
mainly that this type of analysis does not provide a rigorous test of 
unidimensionality. Each set of factors, even if they are orthogonal, is a 
weighted sum of all observable items in the study. This is in contrast to a 
CFA in which each factor represents a unique latent factor for a set of 
equally exclusive items (Gerbing and Anderson, 1988).    
 
 First, an unrotated exploratory principal component analysis (PCA) with all 
items (except item 1 on “bargaining costs”) was conducted in SPSS. With an 
eigenvalue set to one, seven factors were extracted with a variance of 26.96 
percent explained by the first factor. This confirms that more than one factor 
are needed when counting for total variance in the sample.  
 
Second, an oblique (promax) rotated exploratory PCA was conducted to see 
whether some items had high loadings on unexpected factors or cross-loaded 
on some of the other factors in the analysis.59 Following the rule of thumb 
that loadings above .30 are the absolute minimum, and loadings above .40 
are considered more important (Hair, et al., 1998, p. 111), the lower limit of 
factor loadings was set to .40.  Seven items were deleted due to major cross 
loadings and unsatisfactory factor loadings – three on “monitoring costs”, 
two on “bargaining costs”, and two on “bonding costs”. The deleted items on 
“monitoring costs” were the self-developed ones; they loaded on different 
factors with just marginal loadings on the factor that the three remaining 
items loaded on (i.e. those items taken from Dahlstrom and Nygaard  (1999). 
Still, the original conceptual definition of the construct was not significantly 
                                                     
59 An oblique rotation was used at this stage because it allows correlated factors 
instead of an assumption of independence among the factors as is maintained in an 
orthogonal rotation (Hair, et al., 1998).  However, a varimax rotation was also 
conducted to see any differences. No major dissimilarities were observed (see also 
Gerbing and Anderson (1988, p. 189)).  
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changed by this deletion, although the definition may be somewhat limited 
in covering the whole range of monitoring costs.  
 
It is notified that by removing “item 2” on “bargaining costs”, the intention 
of also capturing the “quantity” of the construct through two self-developed 
items fell apart since the first item was removed due to high skewness and 
kurtosis. By removing the items on “bargaining costs”, no significant change 
of the original conceptual meaning of the construct was observed. 
 
Third, an inter-item correlation matrix was inspected to see whether the 
items within each construct had some low correlations (see appendix 3 for 
the correlation matrix). It is recognized, that especially “item 4” on “bonding 
costs” had some rather low values (i.e. in the range of .268 to .322). Hair et 
al. (1998) recommend a lower limit of inter-item correlation of .30.60 Still, 
the item remained in the analysis due to the exploratory nature of the 
“bonding cost” construct, and due to the fact that it did not cross-load too 
much on the other constructs. Later analyses in LISREL confirmed this and 
the correlation was significant, though with a high error term. At the 
opposite end of the scale, very high inter-item correlation is recognized 
between “item 1” and “item 2” on “performance”(i.e. correlation = .745), 
which may indicate that one of the items has to be deleted. The same 
problem may also be present between “item 1” and “item 3” on 
“maladaptation costs” (i.e. correlation = .748). However, no items were 
deleted due to the inspection of the correlation matrix. 
 
Fourth, an item-to-total correlation was conducted to verify the preliminary 
results from the exploratory CFA (Nunnally, 1978; Nunnally and Bernstein, 
1994). The rationale for this kind of analysis is that items that are used to 
describe a common latent variable have to be highly correlated with the total 
scores of this latent variable. If not, there is a great chance that the item does 
not represent a proper measure of the construct. The item-to-total correlation 
for the preliminary model is shown in appendix 4. All correlations exceed 
the recommended lower limit of .50 (Hair, et al., 1998). The correlations 
were ranging from .64 to .90, all significant at p < .001.  No items were 
deleted as a result of this analysis, either. However, general flaws with the 
item-to-total correlation are also recognized (Gerbing and Anderson, 1988). 
If the set of items actually represents two constructs, a composite score can 
result in rather high correlations between the items and the total scale, 
especially if the underlying constructs are correlated. All the items-to-total 
correlations may satisfy the lower limit of .50, even though a distinct two-
factor solution was obvious when looking at the inter-item correlations. 
                                                     
60 See also Robinson, Shaver, and Wrightsman (1991). 
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Hence, as a consequence of failing in discriminating between the constructs, 
it also becomes rather problematic to decide upon which items should 
remain in which set of constructs (Gerbing and Anderson, 1988).  
 
Fifth, thereto-subsequent analyses in LISREL 8.53 (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 
1993b) with all pairs of constructs and four complete and semi-complete 
measurement models with all construct simultaneously compared, were 
conducted. In Model 1, all initial items (except “item 1” on “bargaining 
costs”), and five latent variables were included (i.e. ξ1=BargCost, 
ξ2=MonCost, ξ3=BondCost, ξ4=MalCost, ξ5=Perf). Model 2 represents the 
preliminary model after stage four in the above procedure. Model 3 has five 
performance measures and three measures on “maladaptation costs”, 
otherwise equal to Model 2, and Model 4 has four measures on performance, 
otherwise equal to Model 3. Every model contained all five latent constructs. 
 
All latent constructs were allowed to correlate freely, but the items were set 
to correlate only with their own construct. This procedure ensures in better 
ways the two necessary conditions of unidimensionality, namely internal and 
external consistency61 (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). This will be tested 
later (see the reliability sections).  
 
Different fit statistics are produced when testing the overall measurement 
model in LISREL, but since no single fit measure is agreed upon to be 
superior, the most important fit statistics are reported and evaluated. In 
general, these fit statistics are often organized into three different groups: (1) 
absolute fit indices, (2) incremental fit indices, and (3) parsimonious fit 
indices. In addition, a χ2 test, which is the conventional overall test of fit in 
SEM is reported. 
  
The χ2 statistic is the only statistically based measure that determines the 
degree to which the overall model predicts the observed correlation (or 
covariance) matrix (Hair, et al., 1998). It measures the distance between the 
sample correlation (or covariance) matrix and the fitted correlation 
(covariance) matrix, and the larger this distance is, the larger the χ2 will be. 
In this sense, this statistic is a badness-of-fit statistic – small numbers (in 
relation to the degrees of freedom) that result in p-values greater than .05 
correspond to acceptable fit (Jöreskog, 1993). Yet, it is recommended that 
                                                     
61Given two indicators a and b, which correlate (ρ) on a common construct ξ. The 
two measures are internally consistent if: ρab = ρaξ ρbξ. Similarly, given an indicator 
a of construct ξ, and another indicator d of construct ξ*. External consistency is 
then given by the following equation: ρad = ρaξ ρξξ* ρξ*d (Anderson and Gerbing, 
1982, p. 454).  
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the p-value must exceed the level of .1 or .2 before nonsignificance can be 
concluded (Hair, et al., 1998, p. 654). However, the χ2 test is rather sensitive 
when the sample contains more than 200 observations. Even small 
discrepancies between the true model and estimated models will then be 
assessed as significant, hence with sample sizes above this level, it is 
recommended to rely on other fit measures. Likewise, with sample sizes 
around 100 and below, the test becomes rather insensitive (Schumacker and 
Lomax, 1996, p. 125). Therefore, the χ2 test is most appropriate when the 
sample size is between 100 and 200, a requirement that this research fulfills. 
Even though the χ2 approximation assumes no kurtosis,62 and that a 
covariance matrix is analyzed, research has shown that the test is quite 
robust under non-normality (non-centrality) and that the same χ2 estimates 
are generated whether it is a covariance matrix or a correlation matrix that is 
analyzed (Bollen, 1989b).63  
 
Another widely used measure of absolute fit is the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) (Steiger, 1990), which is the discrepancy between 
the true model and the estimated model per degree of freedom. This measure 
is quite useful since it seems to be more robust than the χ2 concerning 
sample size, and that the value represents the goodness-of-fit expected if the 
model were estimated in the population and not only in the sample (Hair, et 
al., 1998). However, Olsson et al. (2000) underscore that the RMSEA cannot 
be easily compared across estimation methods because these methods (i.e. 
WLS, GLS, and ML) have a tendency to produce rather different values with 
non-normal and misspecified models. Especially, GLS and WLS produce 
rather over-optimistic RMSEA values. Hence, even though values below .05 
are deemed as a good fit, and values between .05 and .08 are acceptable, 
these values have to be compared with other fit measures.  
 
Other absolute fit indices are the goodness-of-fit index (GFI) and the 
adjusted goodness-of-fit index (AGFI)64 (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1981; 
Tanaka and Huba, 1985). The GFI measures the amount of variance and 
covariance in the original correlation/covariance matrix that is predicted by 
the estimated correlation/covariance matrix. In opposite to the AGFI index, 
the GFI does not adjust for degrees of freedom. Otherwise, they are quite 
                                                     
62 Even if all the assumptions of the χ2 test hold, it may not be realistic to assume 
that the model holds exactly in the population. In this case, χ2 should be compared 
with a non-central rather than a central χ2 distribution. 
63 See also footnote 43.on page 63. 
64 In some books, the AGFI measure is also described as a parsimonious fit measure 
(see for example Hair et al. (1998) on page 623).   
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equal. Neither of them explicitly depends on sample size,65 they are 
relatively robust against non-normality, and they usually range between zero 
and one. Even though no exact threshold has been defined, values above .90 
have been defined as good fit (Hair, et al., 1998).   
 
The last three absolute fit indices that are reported in this study, are the 
noncentrality parameter (NCP), the critical N (CN), and the root mean 
squared residual (RMR). The NCP tries to reduce the influence of sample 
size by subtracting the degrees of freedom from the noncentrality χ2 statistic. 
There is no threshold value, but the objective is to minimize the parameter 
value. The CN attempts to estimate a sufficient sample size for accepting the 
fit of a given model for a χ2 test. Hoelter (1983) proposes a cutoff value of 
200 or larger. It may be a problem that under dependence among common 
and unique latent variables, the CN index seems to be inconsistent across 
sample sizes and estimation methods, and has a tendency to underestimate 
its asymptotic value, which leads to rejection of the true model too often (Hu 
and Bentler, 1995). The RMR describes the average residual correlation 
between observed and estimated input matrices. No threshold level is 
established, but the index can be used to compare the fit of two different 
models for similar data (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1996a).    
  
An incremental fit index that has been quite common is the normed fit index 
(NFI), which assesses the adequacy of a target model in relation to a null 
model (with all observed variables uncorrelated) (Bentler and Bonnet, 1980). 
NFI has a zero-one range where values close to 1.0 (i.e. >.90) are 
recommended (Hu and Bentler, 1995). According to several studies, the NFI 
index substantially underestimates its asymptotic value in small samples 
(Bollen, 1989a) and it also has a tendency of rejecting models too much even 
at moderate sample sizes when using for example GLS (Tanaka and Huba, 
1985). Hence, the NFI is evaluated as a rather poor indicator when N is 
small.  Other fit indices belonging to the same group is the comparative fit 
index (CFI) (Bentler, 1990) and the nonnormed fit index (NNFI) (Bentler 
and Bonnet, 1980; Tucker and Lewis, 1973). The first is based on the 
noncentrality parameter of the χ2 of the goodness-of-fit test statistic. The 
latter quantifies the degree to which a particularly model is an improvement 
over a baseline model by combining a measure of parsimony (takes the 
degrees of freedom into account) into a comparative index. Both indices 
varies between zero and one, but recommended values for good fit are .90 or 
                                                     
65 A number of goodness-of-fit measures have been proposed to eliminate or reduce 
its dependence on sample size. According to Jöreskog (1993), this is a hopeless 
task because even though a measure does not depend on sample size explicitly in 
its calculation, its sampling distribution will depend on N. 
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greater. A third index that belongs to the same group is the incremental fit 
index (IFI), which is a modification of the NFI index in the way that it is less 
dependent on N while simultaneously controlling for the degrees of freedom 
available. For a correct maintained model it should be close to one, values 
greater than one indicate overfitted models (Bollen, 1989a; 1990).  
 
A χ2 related so-called parsimonious fit measure is the normed χ2, which is 
the ratio of the χ2 divided by the degrees of freedom. The basic objective 
with this measure is to check whether the model is “overfitted”(i.e. too many 
parameters are included in the model, and thereby capitalizing on chance) or 
not (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993b). When values below 1.0 are observed, 
“overfitting” is probably present. A value above 2.0 indicates that there is 
room for improvements. Hence, a proper solution should have values 
between 1.0 and 2.0 (Hair, et al., 1998). This measure is not explicitly 
reported, but given the χ2 and the degrees of freedom, a simple calculation 
shows that all models except Model 1 pass this test.  
 
The fit of each different model (Models 1-4) is reported in Table 4-9.  
 
Table 4-9: Fit indices for four measurement models 
Fit statistics Model 1 
all initial 
items included 
Model 2 
perf: 7 items 
malcost: 4 items  
Model 3 
perf: 5 items  
malcost: 3 items 
Model 4 
perf: 4 items 
malcost: 3 items 
χ2 
  (df) 
  p-value 
889.37 
 (340) 
.0000 
235.89 
(160) 
.0000 
121.48 
(109) 
.1949 
97.00 
(94) 
.3956 
RMSEA 
  p-value close fit 
.101 
.00 
.055 
.30 
.027 
.95 
.014 
.98 
NCP 549.37 75.89 12.48 3.00 
GFI .71 .87 .92 .93 
AGFI .66 .83 .88 .90 
RMR .10 .069 .065 .064 
NFI .84 .92 .94 .94 
NNFI .88 .96 .99 .99 
CFI .89 .97 .99 .99 
IFI .89 .97 .99 .99 
CN 69 (69.67) 130 (130.20) 179 (179.20) 200 (200.04) 
 
 
The initial model (Model 1) received rather poor fit, and none of the fit 
indices met the minimum level of good fit. Cross-loadings and some low 
loadings on the underlying constructs were observed. This was also in line 
with the exploratory analysis executed in stage two above. Hence, there were 
potentials for major improvements. Before any refining of the model, Model 
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2 with seven items on “performance” and four items on “maladaptation 
costs” was tested, and received reasonable fit on many of the fit indices. 
However, the χ2 test, the RMSEA, the GFI and the AGFI, and CN indicate 
that the model is not optimal. In addition, the LISREL program indicated 
better fit if several cross-loadings between constructs had been solved. This 
can be done by removing constructs, adding paths (i.e. relate indicators to 
multiple constructs), allowing for correlated measurement errors, or relating 
the indicators to a different construct if it is theoretical justifiable (Anderson 
and Gerbing, 1988). To preserve unidimensionality, removing constructs or 
changing relationships are preferred. There is no theoretical foundation for 
changing the relationships in this research, so the only remedy to improve fit 
was to remove items as long as it did not change the meaning of the 
underlying construct. 
 
After refining the initial model comparing the result with Model 2, some 
more items were removed. Model 3, with five “performance” items and three 
measures on “maladaptation costs” shows very good fit. Compared with 
Model 2, “item 3” on “maladaptation cost” was removed due to major 
correlation with “item 2” on “monitoring costs” (a decrease in χ2 of 34.05 
was observed). Likewise “item 5” and “item 7” on “performance” were 
deleted due to serious cross-loadings and correlations across constructs. A 
decrease in the χ2 of 44.41 while only removing “item 7”, and a decrease of 
43.24 if only “item 5” was removed, would occur. Even though Model 3 has 
a very good fit indicated by almost all the fit statistics (except of CN and 
AGFI), this model was slightly changed by removing “item 2” on 
performance. As indicated earlier, and by inspection of the correlation 
matrix, “item 1” and “item 2” were highly correlated; however, this was not 
the most important problem, “item 2” loaded also so much on “bargaining 
costs”, that it was decided to remove this item also. Hence, Model 4 with a 
total of 16 items and 5 constructs is chosen as the final measurement model. 
It shows excellent fit by all fit statistics, and still contains quite reasonablly 
the theoretical dimensions this research attempts to model (except a rather 
one-dimensional “bargaining cost”).  Figure 4-3 presents the final 
measurement model. 
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Figure 4-3: Final measurement model 
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In addition to the test of the final measurement model, a test of the four-
dimensional characteristics of transaction costs was also conducted. This is 
critical with respect to the theoretical understanding of what transaction 
costs are, but also critical with respect to the four hypotheses stated in this 
research. Indications of a four-dimensional solution are observed through the 
development of the measurement model, but a formal test needed to be 
executed. This test was also carried out in LISREL, but now without the 
performance indicators. Excellent fit indices are reported (χ2 (48) = 53, p = 
.287, RMSEA = .026, GFI = .95, AGFI = .91, IFI = .99, CFI = .99). See 
appendix 5 for a complete set of fit indices. Hence, this strengthens the 
indications that transaction costs are to be treated as four separate constructs. 
The following tests of reliability and validity of the measurement model will 
probably fortify this impression. 
 
Reliability 
According to Hair (1998) reliability is an assessment of the consistency 
between measurements that have one latent construct in common. Actually, 
reliability can be assessed across methods, time, and subjects. However, 
since this research is a cross sectional study with one single informant, the 
only reliability that can be assessed is the consistency across subjects. The 
idea is that items that measure the same construct should be highly 
correlated. Four measures are recommended for assessing reliability: the 
Cronbach’s alpha, individual item reliability, composite reliability (or latent 
variable reliability), and variance extracted (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988; Gerbing 
and Anderson, 1988).     
 
The Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951) is composed by the number of test 
items (k) and the average inter-correlation among the items ( r ):  
 
rk
rk


 )1(1  
 
and ranges in value from zero to one. It can be used to describe the reliability 
of factors extracted from dichotomous as well as for multi-item scales. The 
higher the score, the more reliable the generated scale is. Nunnally and 
Bernstein (1994, pp. 264-265) have indicated .70 to be an acceptable 
reliability coefficient, but lower thresholds are sometimes used in the 
literature, especially for exploratory measures. All scales in the present 
research were above the .70 threshold; ranging from .71 on “bonding costs” 
to .84 on “performance”.  
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Item reliability is defined as the “magnitude of the direct relations that all 
variables have on x” (Bollen, 1989b, p. 221). The stronger this relationship 
is, the larger the reliability of the item. The item reliability can be written as 
follows: 
 
ii
i
i 
  2
2
 
 
Hence, assuming that the variance of an item equals one and that each item 
is loading on only one latent variable, the reliability equals the square of the 
loading (λi) on the construct. LISREL (by using the SIMPLIS language) 
prints this directly as a R2 value. No lower limit is recommended in the 
literature, but values closer to one are indicating higher reliability. Hair et al. 
(1998, p. 111) indicate the following values for factor loadings:  .30 
(minimum level),  .40 (more important), and  .50 (significant). Squaring 
these values to get the variance explained, the minimum level is .09, more 
important will be .16, and a lower limit of a significant value will be .25. 
Looking at Table 4-10, especially two items on “bonding costs”, “item 1” 
and “item 4” seem to capture a small portion of the variance of the “bonding 
cost” construct. All other items are well within significant limits. 
 
Composite reliability (Jöreskog, 1971) is defined as the square of the sum of 
the standardized loadings (λi) on each construct, divided by the same plus the 
sum of the errors (εi or δi), can be displayed as follows: 
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As a measure of the internal consistency of the latent variable items, the 
construct reliability measure is close to Cronbach’s alpha in practice 
(Gerbing and Anderson, 1988), which also can be observed in Table 4-10. A 
recommended threshold value of acceptable reliability is .70, although lower 
values are acceptable in exploratory scale measures. All scales are above the 
.70 threshold value. 
 
Even though ρcom indicates the reliability of the scales, it says nothing about 
how much of the variance is explained by the construct and how much is 
explained by measurement error (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). When the 
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items are truly representative of the latent variable, a value above .50 (i.e. 
more than 50 percent of the variance is captured by the construct) is 
observed. The average variance extracted (ρvar) is: 
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The only difference between this measure and ρcom is that the standardized 
loadings are squared before added up. See Table 4-10 for a detailed 
description. It is observed that two of the scales are slightly below the .50 
level. “Bonding costs” have variance explained by the construct of .42 and 
“monitoring costs” by .47. However, this measurement is substantially more 
conservative than the composite reliability; thus highly reliable measures can 
have an unacceptable average variance extracted. Thus omitting “unreliable” 
measures to improve ρvar will always be a trade-off between 
unidimensionality, composite reliability and average variance extracted. In 
this way, average variance extracted could also indicate the validity of the 
measurements, which is the last subject that must be assessed.  
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Table 4-10: Measurement model – pattern coefficients and reliability measures 
Parameter Scale Estimates 
ML 
(std. error) 
Estimates 
GLS66 
t-values Error term 
(δ, ε) 
Item reliability 
(R2) 
Average 
variance  
extracted 
Composite 
reliability 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
λ1 BargCost .75 (.077) .72 9.67 .45 .56    λ2 BargCost .84 (.077) .81 10.92 .30 .70 .63 .77 .77 
λ3 MonCost .76 (.080) .72 9.49 .42 .58    λ4 MonCost .60 (.082) .59 7.32 .64 .36    λ5 MonCost .68 (.081) .68 8.44 .53 .47 .47 .72 .72 
λ6 BondCost .49 (.083) .47 5.89 .76 .24    
λ7 BondCost .82 (.079) .81 10.41 .33 .67    λ8 BondCost .79 (.079) .78 10.00 .38 .62    λ9 BondCost .39 (.085) .36 4.56 .85 .15 .42 .73 .71 
λ10 MalCost .85 (.069) .78 12.22 .28 .72    λ11 MalCost .68 (.075) .67 9.17 .53 .47    λ12 MalCost .79 (.071) .73 11.06 .38 .62 .60 .82 .81 
λ13 Perf .82 (.069) .75 11.91 .32 .68    λ14 Perf .68 (.074) .61 9.19 .54 .46    λ15 Perf .79 (.070) .74 11.28 .37 .63    
λ16 Perf .76 (.072) .78 10.56 .43 .57 .59 .84 .84 
                                                     
66 These GLS-estimates are only provided of comparison reasons; large relative differences between ML-estimates and GLS-estimates 
may indicate that the measurement model is misspecified (Olsson, et al., 2000). As noted before (see footnote 39 on page 58), the 
differences are so small that one can assume that the model is well specified. The largest relative difference is approximately 8.5 % 
(for λ13). 
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Validity 
In SEM, unobserved constructs are measured by observed variables and the 
purpose of a measurement model is to describe how well the observed 
variables serve as a measurement instrument for the unobserved constructs. 
Validity is about how well these observed measures reflect their underlying 
constructs (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993b). Hence, establishing valid 
measures is of major importance, especially because of the relationships 
between these unobservable variables that are hypothesized in the structural 
model. In this context, especially construct validity, which can be divided 
into convergent and discriminant validity (Campbell and Fiske, 1959), is of 
interest (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988).  
 
In its original form, convergent validity is about the measurement of 
multiple traits using multiple, and maximally different, methods. Convergent 
measures are highly correlated across different methods. However, traits are 
often measured by only one method (and so also in this research); thus, 
establishing a rigorous evaluation of convergent validity is difficult. 
Nevertheless, a recommended indication of convergent validity is the 
significance of the factor loadings (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). As shown 
in Table 4-10, all t-values for the λ’s are significant at p < .001, indicating 
that convergent validity is attained. 
 
Discriminant validity is about the correspondence between constructs. 
Discriminant measures are more correspondent with internal measures than 
they are correspondent with measures of other concepts (Campbell and 
Fiske, 1959). Hence, scales that measure different constructs cannot 
correlate too much. The CFA procedure of removing items that correlate too 
much across constructs is perhaps the most important procedure to ensure 
discriminant validity. Following the recommendations given by Anderson 
and Gerbing (1988) and Fornell and Larker (1981), three tests of 
discriminant validity were conducted. In addition, to confirm the results 
from the CFA, an orthogonal67 (varimax) rotated factor matrix is presented 
(see Buvik and John (2000, pp. 56-58)). 
 
The first and perhaps easiest test is to see whether the confidence interval 
(  two standard errors) around the correlation coefficients between two 
latent constructs include 1.0. As Table 4-11 shows, this is not the case.  
 
                                                     
67 Now, in opposition to the exploratory PCA conducted above, it is more natural to 
assume that the factors are orthogonal since all significant cross-loadings are 
removed. 
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Table 4-11: Discriminant validity – correlations among latent constructs 
 BargCost MonCost BondCost MalCost Perf 
BargCost 
 
1.00     
MonCost 
(std. error) 
.43 
(.09) 
1.00    
BondCost 
(std. error) 
−.28 
(.09) 
.18 
(.10)
1.00   
MalCost 
(std. error) 
.69 
(.06) 
.59 
(.08) 
−.07 
(.10) 
1.00  
Perf 
(std. error) 
−.52 
(.08) 
−.36 
(.09) 
.28 
(.09) 
−.51 
(.07)
1.00 
 
 
The second test is a χ2 difference test (with one degrees of freedom), where 
each pair of constructs is compared across two models. In the first and 
restricted model, the correlation between the constructs is fixed to one. In the 
unrestricted model, the constructs are allowed to correlate freely. A 
significant lower χ2 value in the unrestricted model indicates discriminant 
validity. According to Table 4-12, all constructs were highly significantly 
different from each other. 
 
Table 4-12: Discriminant validity – a χ2 difference test 
Scales Restricted 
model 
Unrestricted 
model 
 
Δdf 
 
Δχ2 
BargCost and MonCost 58.29 3.03 1 55.76 
BargCost and BondCost 78.30 12.66 1 65.64 
BargCost and MalCost 36.31 3.15 1 33.16 
BargCost and Perf 53.38 5.54 1 47.84 
MonCost and BondCost 125.59 18.59 1 107.00 
MonCost and MalCost 68.35 7.04 1 61.31 
MonCost and Perf 101.93 10.95 1 90.98 
BondCost and MalCost 193.01 18.90 1 174.11 
BondCost and Perf 154.46 15.42 1 139.04 
MalCost and Perf 140.78 19.38 1 121.40 
χ2- cutoff for different significance levels with one degree of freedom: 
.05  χ2 = 3.84 
.01  χ2 = 6.63 
.001 χ2 = 10.83 
 
In the third test, the average variance extracted for each construct is 
compared with the shared variance (the square of the correlation coefficient) 
among each pair of constructs (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). To pass the test, 
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average variance extracted must be greater than shared variance for the same 
pair of constructs. All pairs of constructs passed the test (see Table 4-13). 
 
Table 4-13: Discriminant validity – shared variance and average variance extracted 
 Shared variance 
 
ρvar 
 
 
BargCost 
(ρvar=.63) 
MonCost 
(ρvar=.47) 
BondCost 
(ρvar=.42) 
MalCost 
(ρvar=.60) 
Perf 
(ρvar=.59) 
.63 BargCost 1.00     
.47 MonCost .19 1.00    
.42 BondCost .08 .03 1.00   
.60 MalCost .48 .35 .01 1.00  
.59 Perf .27 .13 .08 .26 1.00 
 
 
To confirm the results from the CFA, a PCA with orthogonal rotation was 
conducted in SPSS (Buvik and John, 2000). All 16 items loaded properly on 
the theoretically correct factor (see Table 4-14). 
 
Table 4-14: Discriminant validity – principal component analysis 
 
 
Items 
Factor 1 
Loading: 
BargCost 
Factor 2 
Loading: 
MonCost 
Factor 3 
Loading: 
BondCost 
Factor 4 
Loading: 
MalCost 
Factor 5 
Loading: 
Perf 
BAR1 .800 .209 −.023 .207 −.202 
BAR2 .735 .120 −.146 .338 −.218 
MON1 .139 .728 .035 .277 −.136 
MON2 .158 .748 .152 .091 −.065 
MON3 −.003 .799 .086 .142 −.104 
BON1 .014 .237 .689 −.001 −.143 
BON2 −.185 .026 .800 .019 .184 
BON3 −.292 .157 .733 −.041 .172 
BON4 .322 −.085 .664 .033 .055 
MAL1 .290 .198 .035 .786 −.177 
MAL2 .020 .249 −.061 .751 −.252 
MAL3 .247 .119 .054 .803 −.200 
PER1 −.171 −.068 .054 −.098 .850 
PER2 −.058 −.094 −.046 −.206 .754 
PER3 −.045 −.056 .132 −.207 .816 
PER4 −.185 −.149 .106 −.117 .756 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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Summary 
The data in this research seem to be of good quality. The thorough 
administration of the data collection seems to secure that key information 
about the problem under investigation is revealed. Non-response biases do 
not appear as a problem, and a relative rigorous testing procedure secures 
that both validity and reliability problems seem to be of moderate character. 
Excellent fit indices also indicate that unidimensionality is secured in a 
satisfactory manner.  
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5 Test of hypotheses 
 
Initially, a brief account of the estimation method used to test the hypotheses 
is presented. Then, the results from the OLS-regressions are reported. 
However, as a reflection on the results of the hypothesis tests, a more 
exploratory structural model, estimated in LISREL, is proposed and tested at 
the end of the chapter. 
 
Choice of statistical method 
As already touched upon in the previous chapter,68 the main statistical 
method for the hypothesis tests is an OLS-regression. The main reason for 
this is linked to the need for a relative large sample size when running 
moderator or interaction analysis in SEM. Yang Jonsson (1997) suggests that 
a sample size of at least 400 cases is required when one or more interaction 
effects is included. In samples with fewer cases, an increasing number of 
non-convergence solutions are observed. However, the problem of non-
convergence is more typical in simulation studies than in studies with real 
empirical data (Yang Jonsson, 1997, p. 27). Since Yang Jonsson’s study was 
a simulation study,69 lower sample sizes than 400 may be possible, which, 
among others, Jaccard and Wan (1996) point out. They assert that when 
doing interaction analysis by splitting the sample into subgroups, a minimum 
sample size of approximately 100 per group is to be preferred, but sample 
sizes as small as 75 can be used in some cases when the model is very 
simple, the parameter estimates (the λs) are highly saturated (i.e. .83 in their 
study), and a moderately sized interaction effect is present. Further, Jaccard 
and Wan (1996, p. 73) state that “sample sizes of less than 50 per group 
typically will yield unacceptable low levels of power for detecting group 
differences in slopes”. Looking at group sizes across entry modes in this 
study, the total number of subsidiaries in the greenfield category is 105, and 
the total number of acquisitions is 55. Hence, it seems to be relatively 
inappropriate to opt for a SEM approach when testing the structural model 
with hypothesized moderator effects present (i.e. sub-group analysis). 
 
When doing moderator analysis, generally there are three different 
categories of moderators, which all require different statistical approaches 
(Sharma, Durand, and Gur-Arie, 1981). A homologizer influences the 
strength of the relationship between y, the criterion variable, and x, the 
                                                     
68 See pp. 54-57 in the methodology chapter. 
69 Yang Jonsson did a simulation study of a non-linear structural equation model 
formulated by Kenny and Judd (1984). 
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predictor variable, and relates neither to the predictor nor the criterion 
variable. Hence, it is the error term that is affected by the moderating 
variable, which lead to different predictive validity (R2) between groups 
when splitting the whole sample into subgroups across the moderating 
variable. A pure moderator, on the other hand, does not moderate the 
strength, but the form of the relationship between y and x, and accordingly, it 
only interacts with the predictor to modify the form of the relationship – this 
in contrast to a quasi-moderator, which also serves as a predictor. The 
theoretical discussion of the moderator effects in this study deals with entry 
mode as a pure moderator, i.e. it is hypothesized that entry mode (EM), 
operationalized by two levels: greenfield and acquisition, modifies the 
relationships between the predictors (the ex post transaction costs (TC)) and 
the criterion variable performance (Perf). Hence, the relationship can 
generally be written as: 
 
          Perfj = aj + bij(TC  EM)  + εj            (5.1) 
  
where aj denotes the intersection, bij the regression coefficients, and εj 
represents the errors.  
 
One proper way of analyzing a relationship with a pure moderator is by 
dichotomizing the sample on the moderator variable, and then computing the 
slopes for the relationship for each of the two resulting groups (Jaccard, 
Wan, and Turrisi, 1990). In general, a criticism of this method has been that 
a dichotomizing of the moderator reduce precision and thereby power70 (in 
opposition to a product term approach) (Aiken and West, 1991, p. 168; 
Cohen, et al., 2003). However, in this case, the moderator is dichotomous in 
its nature; i.e. it has only two distinct outcomes – greenfield or acquisition, 
and thus, the critique is not relevant in this case. Hence, when testing the 
interaction effect, the sample is divided into two sub-groups across the 
moderator variable, and then tested for any significant slope differences.  
 
Since there are major constraints regarding a SEM approach to small sub-
samples, different OLS-regressions will constitute the main part of the 
                                                     
70 Statistical power is the probability that the test will detect an effect in the sample 
when a true effect is present in the population. A common standard for the 
minimum power necessary for conducting an investigation in the social sciences 
has been .80 (Cohen, 1988). The power depends, among other things, on the 
specific statistical test, the level of significance chosen, the magnitude of the true 
effect in the population, sample size, and measurement error (Cohen, 1988). 
Regarding measurement error, Aiken and West (1991, pp. 163-164) show that by 
reducing reliability from 1.00 to .80, power will be reduced by almost 50 percent, 
and up to two thirds when reliabilities drop to .70. 
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analysis, but a more complex (and highly exploratory) model without 
moderator effects (i.e. an analysis on the whole sample) will be introduced 
and tested in LISREL at the end of the chapter. 
 
Testing for the general assumptions in linear regression 
The three general assumptions in regression analysis: normality, 
homoscedasticity, and linearity, were tested for. In addition, 
multicollinearity was also tested for.  
 
According to former analyses, non-normality is not a critical problem in this 
study – both skewness and kurtosis are below ± 1.0 (see also appendix 2-b) 
and an inspection of a normal probability plot confirms the conclusion see 
appendix 6-g). To test for the assumption of homoscedasticity (or constant 
variance of the error term), the data was first analyzed in SPSS 11.0 by 
inspecting a graphical plot of standardized residuals (ZRESID) against 
standardized predicted values (ZPRED). No pattern of increasing or 
decreasing residuals was observed. This result was further confirmed by an 
analysis of a graphical plot of Studentized residuals (SRESID) against 
ZPRED.71 See appendix 6:a-b for a graphical presentation. When splitting 
the sample across entry mode, the more formal Levene test can be used to 
test for possible heteroscedasticity (Hair, et al., 1998). The Levene statistics 
are all insignificant with values ranging from .049 (sign. .825) to 2.689 (sign. 
.106).72 Hence, the assumption of homoscedasticity is most probably met. To 
identify possible non-linear relationships, partial regression plots were 
produced and inspected. No nonlinear relationships were identified (see 
appendix 6:c-f for the main variables in the model).  
 
Multicollinearity is often detected by using a two-step procedure. First, by 
inspecting the variance proportion matrix, and second, by comparing the 
results with the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance values 
(generated by SPSS in this analysis). A collinearity problem is present when 
the same dimension accounts for more than 90 percent of the variance for 
two or more variables (Hair, et al., 1998). There is no indication of this 
problem in the data set, which also is confirmed by a maximum VIF value of 
2.362 with a respective tolerance value of .423. The average VIF value is 
1.870. According to Hair et al. (1998, p. 193), a common cutoff threshold is 
                                                     
71 According to Field (2000, p. 139) the SRESID against ZPRED method is almost 
identical with the method of plotting ZRESID against ZPRED, but the former is 
more sensitive on a case-by-case basis.  
72 The test was also conducted in ANCOVA with F = 1.151 (p < .285). 
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a tolerance value of .1, and thereby a VIF value of 10.0 (since VIF = 
1/tolerance).73  
 
Endogeneity  
Some researchers maintain that endogeneity in a research model can lead to 
biased estimates and thereby unreliable conclusions (Hamilton and 
Nickerson, 2003; Shaver, 1998). OLS-regression models assume that the 
error in the dependent variable is uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables. This may not be true in many circumstances. In strategy and 
international business research, one of the aims is to predict superior 
performance based on a set of firm strategies. But managers choose these 
strategies based on their best knowledge about firm characteristics and 
industry conditions (Shaver, 1998). Hence, firm performance also explains 
strategy, and the model becomes non-recursive. 
 
Theoretically, this may also be the situation in this research, although it is 
not detected empirically.74 The transaction costs that occur in the 
relationship may be dependent on former performance in the subsidiary. 
Likewise, they are also dependent on the chosen entry mode. The latter is 
partially taken care of through the modeling of the operation method 
variable. The choice was made several years ago, and this study sets out to 
investigate whether this choice moderates the relationship between 
transaction costs and performance today. Hence, the measurement of 
transaction costs and performance are based on already revealed 
information, not an ex ante assumption of these values. The first could be 
solved through a two-stage least squares  (2SLS) procedure if the problem is 
present in the dataset, if not, an OLS-regression is the preferred estimation 
technique (Norušis and SPSS, 1999).  
 
The first step in a 2SLS analysis is to run different reduced form regressions, 
where the possible endogenous variables are regressed on a set of exogenous 
variables (i.e. instrumental variables that could be the whole set of controls 
in the system and/or additional variables that are collected, and that explain 
the endogenous explanatory variables, but do not correlate with the error 
term in the final dependent variable). The second step is to use the predicted 
values calculated from the first step (i.e. variables that are sound proxies for 
the transaction costs and uncorrelated with the error terms in subsidiary 
                                                     
73 This result is also confirmed in previous tests of the measurement model. 
74 No covariance between the error term (εj) for the dependent variable (Perf) and 
the transaction cost variables were detected in this study (i.e. Cov(tc, εj) = 0). 
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performance) together with the control variables in an ordinary OLS-
regression to estimate performance. The crucial point when following this 
procedure is that 2SLS depends heavily on the quality of the instrument. 
Hence, high R2-values are needed for the reduced form equations. This was 
not obtained during the first step when using only the control variables in the 
system. All R2-values were in the interval between .02-.07 (sign F from .06-
.46). By using other variables outside the system, but variables that the 
theory assesses as predictors for transaction costs (such as opportunism, 
volatility, and behavioral uncertainty), significantly higher R2-values were 
obtained (.18-.57, sign. F = 000).75 Unfortunately, some of these variables 
correlate, although to a modest degree (correlation coefficients of  .18 and 
−.19 for two of the variables), also with the error term in subsidiary 
performance, and are therefore difficult to use. The whole idea is that the 
researcher needs instrumental variables that to a high degree explain the 
endogenous variables on the right-hand side of the equation and do not 
correlate with the errors on the left-hand side at the same time.  
 
It seems difficult, then, to deal with a possible endogeneity problem 
statistically with the obtainable variables from both inside and outside the 
measurement system. However, it is not certain that this phenomenon 
constitutes a serious problem. In a recent article, Schugan (2002) maintains 
that this problem is much more prevalent in naturally occurring data than in 
data from questionnaires or telephone interviews. Hence, despite the 
possibility that endogeneity problems are not detected, OLS-regressions are 
chosen when testing the hypotheses. The endogeneity topic will be followed 
up in a later section (see “Limitations and future studies” on page 147). 
 
Results 
Initially, four OLS regression models were estimated. Model A and Model B 
are estimated with only direct effects present (i.e. the transaction costs are 
regressed on subsidiary performance). In addition, Model A, the most basic 
one, has no control variables included. Model C and Model D are both 
models with the moderator included, the first one without controls and the 
last with the controls. Hence, we have the following formal models where cj, 
dj, ej, fj, and gij denote coefficients; BargCost (bargaining costs), MonCost 
(monitoring costs), BondCost (bonding costs), and MalCost (maladaptation 
                                                     
75 If the R2 is too low and not significant at a high level (i.e., if the F-statistics are 
insignificant), the regression results become unreliable. The lower the R2 in the 
first stage of the 2SLS regression, the more likely there will be bias in the second 
stage regression. In addition, a low R2 reduces the likelihood that the endogenous 
variables will be significant in the second-stage OLS regression. 
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costs) are the transaction costs involved; Perf denotes subsidiary 
performance; EM (the entry mode) is the moderator variable; CONT denotes 
a vector of control variables taken into the model; and bij denotes 
coefficients for the transaction costs when the moderator effect is taken into 
consideration: 
 
Model A: 
Perfj = aj + cjBargCost + djMonCost + ejBondCost + fjMalCost + εj        (5.2) 
 
Model B: 
Perfj = aj + cjBargCost + djMonCost + ejBondCost + fjMalCost 
            + gijCONT + εj                              (5.3) 
 
Model C: 
Perfj = aj + bij[(BargCost + MonCost + BondCost + MalCost)  EM]  
            + εj                   (5.4) 
 
Model D: 
Perfj = aj + bij[(BargCost + MonCost + BondCost + MalCost)  EM] 
            + gijCONT + εj                            (5.5) 
 
Direct effects (H1-H4) 
The results without the interaction term included are reported in Table 5-1. 
Both models are highly significant with F-values of 22.018 (Sig. F < .001) 
for Model A, and F = 16.286 (Sig. F < .001) for Model B where the control 
variables are included. The direct effects of all four ex post transaction costs 
on subsidiary performance are also significant. Looking at Model A, it is 
observed that “bargaining costs” and “monitoring costs” have a significant 
negative effect on subsidiary performance (βBargCost = −.219, t = −2.320, p < 
.05; βMonCost = −.154, t = −1.839, p < .05). In addition, an even stronger 
negative significance is observed with regard to “maladaptation costs” 
(βMalCost = −.253, t = −2.566, p < .01). Thus, hypotheses H1-H3 are supported. 
On the other hand, H4 is not supported. Even though the effect is highly 
significant (βBondCost = .229, t = 3.200, p < .01), the upshot of “bonding costs” 
on subsidiary performance is positive, not negative as was hypothesized. 
Explained variance in Model A is .346 (adjusted R2 = .346). 
 
The overall pattern from Model A is not changed when the control variables 
are included (see Model B, Table 5-1), which indicates that there are no 
spurious or intervening effects in the model. The same levels of significance 
are observed for the main variables in the two models, and the signs of the 
relationships are still the same (i.e. BargCost, MonCost, and MalCost), all 
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have a negative effect on subsidiary performance, and BondCost has a 
positive effect). Just minor deviations from the β-values and the t-values in 
Model A are observed in Model B for the main variables.  
 
Table 5-1: Regression results – direct effects on subsidiary performance (Perf) 
Variables Model A      Model B 
 β a t-value b, c β a t-value b, c 
BargCost −.219 −2.320** −.159 −1.738** 
MonCost −.154 −1.839** −.184 −2.290** 
BondCost .229  3.200*** .248  3.555*** 
MalCost −.253 −2.566*** −.284 −3.021*** 
Industry growth (IndGrow)   .177  2.765*** 
International sales (IntSales)   .149  2.398*** 
Age of subsidiary (SubAge)   .167  2.649*** 
Host country experience (HostEx)   .018   .271 
Number of employees (NumEmp)   −.004 −.068 
Cultural differences (CultDif)   .074  1.091 
Model statistics: 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F 
N 
 
.362 
.346 
22.018**** 
160 
 
.430 
.404 
16.286**** 
159 
a Standardized coefficients   b One-tailed test  c Two-tailed test for BondCost 
 *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001 
 
 
Three of the six control variables have significant positive effects on 
subsidiary performance, namely “industry growth” (IndGrow), “international 
sales ratio” (IntSales) for the company, and “age of subsidiary” (SubAge) 
(βIndGrow = .177, t = 2.765, p < .01; βIntSales = .149, t = 2.398, p < .01, βSubAge = 
.167, t = 2.649, p < .01). On the other hand, the size of the whole company 
measured by number of employees (NumEmp),76 former host country 
experience (HostEx), and perceived cultural distance (CultDif) have no 
effect on performance. By including the control variables in the model, 
explained variance increased from .346 to .404 (adjusted R2).  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
76 The same non-significant pattern was observed when using “sales in the whole 
company” and “revenue” as control variables instead of number of employees 
(revenue is probably not an ideal proxy for company size). 
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Effects with alternative performance measures 
This research has argued strongly for a multi-item (perceptual) definition of 
subsidiary performance, but it has also been pointed out that it may be 
necessary to use other, and more “objective” measures of performance. 
Therefore, different regression models have been applied with three other 
measurements of performance; mean growth in sales, mean growth in 
revenue, and mean growth in number of employees for the subsidiary. The 
results are presented in Table 5-2 (in the table, the findings from the 
hypothesis tests are also included). 
 
Much weaker relationships were found, and the explained variances are 
substantially lower in all the three regression models (adjusted R2 ranging 
from .109 to .058), but many of the same patterns observed in Model B are 
also recognized in the regressions with the three other performance 
measures. The variable that really has a significant (positive) effect across all 
the performance measures is “industry growth” (t-values ranging from 2.196 
to 3.751). In addition, “bonding costs” has significant positive effects on 
“sales growth” (βBondCost = .137, t = 1.761, p < .10) and “employment 
growth”  (βBondCost = .169, t = 2.107, p < .05), and the effect of “monitoring 
costs” on “revenue growth” is significantly negative (βMonCost = −.155, t = 
−1.904, p < .05). Likewise, “maladaptation costs” has a significant negative 
effect on “sales growth” (βMalCost = −.116, t = −1.516, p < .10). Finally, 
“cultural difference” has a negative effect on “revenue growth” (βCultDif = 
−.175, t = −2.175, p < .05). With respect to the signs of these relationships, 
all are in line with the results from Model B. However, the effects are 
somewhat weaker. All other effects are insignificant, but the signs are still 
very much the same as in Model B. 
 
Even though several coefficients in these regressions show the same pattern 
as in the analysis with Perf as dependent variable, there are also some 
deviant results that are worth mentioning. First, the lack of effects from 
BargCost and MonCost on “employment growth” is recognized. In addition, 
MonCost and MalCost have no effects on “sales growth” and there is no 
effect of MalCost on “revenue growth”. Second, explained variance for all 
three models is rather low. Hence a further elaboration along these two 
themes will be developed in a later section (see the discussion chapter pp. 
131-133). 
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Table 5-2: Regressions with alternative performance measures 
            Sales growth    Revenue growth    Employment growth Perf 
Variables  
β a 
 
t-valueb, c 
 
β a 
 
t-valueb, c 
 
β a 
 
t-valueb, c 
Findings from the 
hypothesis tests 
 
BargCost −.133 −1.205 −.014 −.157 .009 .106 −
− 
+ 
− 
+ 
+ 
+ 
ns 
ns 
ns 
MonCost −.030 −.305 −.155 −1.904** −.028 −.345 
BondCost .137 1.761* .097 1.220 .169 2.107**
MalCost −.116 −1.516* −.049 −.508 −.081 −1.021 
IndGrow .284 3.662**** .292 3.751**** .176 2.196**
SubAge .027 .330 −.013 −.162 −.026 −.310 
IntSales .038 .491 −.006 −.081 −.023 −.289 
HostEx .014 .177 −.026 −.330 .052 .652 
NumEmp −.047 −.603 .058 .741 −.082 −1.043 
CultDif .015 .182 −.175 −2.175** −.045 −.555 
Model statistics:        
R2 .127 .116 .070  
Adj. R2 .109 .098 .058  
F 7.253*** 6.551*** 5.665***  
N 159 159 159  
a Standardized coefficients   b One-tailed test  c Two-tailed test for BondCost 
 *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001 
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Moderator analysis (H5) 
The EM-variable has already been defined as a pure moderator, which also 
seems to hold when testing the relationship. Entry mode is insignificant in 
explaining performance when running a regression with EM also taken into 
the model (correlation: −.090, βEM = .016, t = .024, p < .811). This is 
according to the theoretical assumptions. When the variable does not act as a 
predictor, it could be defined as a pure moderator since one of the important 
prerequisites that separate a true moderator from a quasi moderator is 
fulfilled.  
 
Further, and as already mentioned, since the moderator in this study is 
dichotomous in its nature, sub-group analysis and slope difference tests are 
proper methods of detecting moderator effects in the sample. The whole 
sample is divided across entry mode, and the following two groups are 
established: (0) acquisitions with 55 (54)77 cases, and (1) greenfields with 
105 cases. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5-3 
 
 
Table 5-3: Moderator analysis – descriptive statistics 
 N* Mean Std dev. Std. error mean 
BargCost 0 = 55 
1 = 105 
2.991 
3.376 
1.196 
1.220 
.161 
.119 
MonCost 0 = 55 
1 = 105 
2.552 
2.975 
1.980 
1.150 
.132 
.112 
BondCost 0 = 55 
1 = 105 
4,286 
4,224 
1.086 
1.236 
.146 
.121 
MalCost 0 = 55 
1 = 105 
2,164 
2,416 
1.162 
1.218 
.157 
.118 
Perf 0 = 55 
1 = 105 
4,400 
4,205 
1.218 
1.270 
.164 
.124 
* 0 = acquisition, 1 = greenfield 
 
 
Different regressions are then applied to each group to detect any significant 
effects of the independent variables on subsidiary performance. The results, 
which reveal some interesting patters, are presented in Table 5-4. 
 
 
                                                     
77 One acquired firm was excluded due to lack of information on some of the control 
variables. 
 115
Table 5-4: Moderator effects – sub-group analysis with OLS-regression 
Dependent variable: Perf  Model C      Model D 
Variables βa t-value b, c βa t-value b, c 
Group 0: Acquisitions 
 
BargCost  
 
 
−.175 
 
 
−1.230 
 
 
−.141 
 
 
−1.028 
MonCost −.513 −4.697**** −.545 −4.879**** 
BondCost .512   4.694**** .484 4.484**** 
MalCost −.113 −.778 −.130 −.941 
IndGrow   .247 2.224** 
IntSales   .122 1.162 
SubAge   .189 1.803** 
HostEx   .005  −.048 
NumEmp   −.012  −.109 
CultDif   −.005  −.048 
Model statistics: 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F 
N 
 
.410 
.388 
18.090**** 
55 
 
.468 
.424 
10.762**** 
54 
Group 1: Greenfields 
 
BargCost 
 
 
−.313 
 
 
−2.863*** 
 
 
−.265 
 
 
−2.401*** 
MonCost −.045 −.458 −.108 −1.097 
BondCost .140  1.612 .116 1.364 
MalCost −.319 −2.916*** −.346 −3.221**** 
IndGrow   .138 1.687** 
IntSales   .177 2.257** 
SubAge   .090 1.122 
HostEx   .000  −.003 
NumEmp   −.029  −.364 
CultDif   .101  1.194 
Model statistics: 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F 
N 
 
.336 
.322 
25.751**** 
105 
 
.386 
.361 
15.690**** 
105 
a Standardized coefficients   b One-tailed test  c Two-tailed test for BondCost 
 *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, ****p < .001 
 
 
First, in the group of acquired firms, two out of the four transaction costs 
variables have significant effects on subsidiary performance. The 
relationship between “monitoring costs” and “performance” is significant at 
p < .001 in both models (βMonCost = −.513, t = −4.697 (Model C); βMonCost = 
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−.545, t = −4.879 (Model D). The same level of significance is observed 
with the effect of “bonding costs” (βBondCost = .512, t = 4.484 (Model C); 
βBondCost = .484, t = 4.484 (Model D)).  
 
Second, in the group of greenfields, an almost opposite pattern is observed: 
“bargaining costs” and  “maladaptation costs” have significant effects at p < 
.05 (βBargCost = −.313, t = −2.863 (Model C); βBargCost = −.265, t = −2.401 
(Model D); βMalCost = −.319, t = −2.916 (Model C), or at p < .001 (βMalCost = 
−.346, t = −3.221 (Model D)), while the two others are more or less 
insignificant. 
 
Third, only “industry growth”, “international sales ratio”, and “age of 
subsidiary” have to a certain degree significant effects among the control 
variables, which also was the pattern when testing the direct effects in Model 
B. However, it is worth mentioning that the age of the subsidiary does not 
matter in the group of greenfields. 
 
Fourth, explained variance (adjusted R2) in Model C ranges from .336 in the 
group of greenfields to .388 in the group of acquisitions, while Model D 
explain .361 of the variance in performance in the group of greenfields and 
.424 in the group of acquired firms. Hence, both Model C and Model D are 
highly significant at p < .001. 
 
Even though significant different effects are registered, there is no formal 
proof of moderator effects (i.e. that the β-coefficients of each type of 
transaction costs are significant different from each other). Hence, to 
examine these observations further, parameters for the transaction costs were 
also estimated by running GLM factorial ANCOVA due to the advantages 
this type of analysis has when examining interaction and moderator 
variables.78 Since there is an important assumption about homogeneity of 
regression slopes between groups when running factorial ANCOVA, a 
special procedure is available to test whether the slopes are equal or not. If 
the slopes are significantly different, there are clear indications of moderator 
or interaction effects in the model. To test this, the model must include only 
the interactions, and by doing so, the test of between-subjects effects will 
report significant or insignificant values. Significant F-values are reported if 
the β-coefficients are really different in the two groups, and if so, a separate 
                                                     
78 The GLM ANCOVA analysis (the analysis of covariances) provides analysis for 
one dependent variable by one or more factors (categorical) and or continuous 
variables. The procedure is especially useful when investigating interaction or 
moderator effects. The factor variables (here: entry mode) divide the sample into 
groups.  
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slope design (by splitting the sample across the factor, i.e. across EM) is 
necessary to test for the effects of the predictors in each group.  
 
Table 5-5 shows significant F-values (FBargCost: p < .10; FMonCost: p < .10; 
FBondCost: p < .001; FMalCost: p < .05) for all four types of transaction costs. 
Hence, the β-coefficients for each type of transaction costs are significantly 
different from each other in the two groups, and a split sample procedure 
was therefore conducted in estimating the parameters. 
 
Table 5-5: Test of slope differences 
Variables F-value Significance 
EM  BargCost 2.451 .090 
EM  MonCost 2.984 .054 
EM  BondCost 7.429 .001 
EM  MalCost 3.509 .032 
 
 
Table 5-6 presents the complete parameter estimates. Although the β-values 
and the respective t-values are slightly different, the results are very much in 
line with the OLS regressions presented in Table 5-4, and since the results 
from Table 5-5 show significant slope differences between the two groups 
on all four transaction costs, hypothesis 5 is then be supported. There are 
moderator effects present. Among the MNCs with acquired foreign 
subsidiaries, it is mainly monitoring costs and bonding costs that have 
significant effects on subsidiary performance. Likewise, bargaining costs 
and maladaptation costs have highly significant effects on performance 
among the MNCs with greenfield subsidiaries. These rather interesting 
results will be discussed further in the next chapter (see pp. 136-138). 
 
Table 5-6: ANCOVA analysis with split sample design - parameter estimates 
Variables β a t-value Significance b 
(EM=0)  BargCost −.165 −.901 .369 
(EM=1)  BargCost −.256 −2.022 .045 
(EM=0)  MonCost −.436 −2.256 .026 
(EM=1)  MonCost −.094 −.911 .364 
(EM=0)  BondCost .432 3.383 .001 
(EM=1)  BondCost .144 1.834 .069 
(EM=0)  MalCost −.047 −.265 .791 
(EM=1)  MalCost −.330 −2.636 .009 
a Standardized coefficients   b Two-tailed test 
0 = acquisitions, 1 = greenfields 
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Summary 
Above, four different hypotheses were presented with proposed transaction 
cost effects on subsidiary performance (H1 – H4), and one hypothesis that 
formulated a moderation effect on the relationship between transaction costs 
and subsidiary performance. Table 5-7 summarizes the findings. 
 
Table 5-7: Test of hypotheses – a summary 
Hypotheses Proposed  
effects 
Findings Significance 
level a, b 
Conclusion 
H1: 
Bargaining costs → 
subsidiary performance 
 
− 
 
− 
 
p < .05 
 
supported 
H2: 
Monitoring costs → 
subsidiary performance 
 
− 
 
− 
 
p < .05 
 
supported 
H3: 
Maladaptation costs → 
subsidiary performance 
 
− 
 
− 
 
p < .01 
 
supported 
H4: 
Bonding costs → subsidiary 
performance 
 
− 
 
+ 
 
p < .01  
 
not 
supported  
H5:  
EM moderates the 
relationship between TC 
and performance  
bargaining costs 
monitoring costs 
bonding costs 
maladaptation costs 
 
 
 
 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
 
 
 
 
yes 
yes 
yes 
yes 
 
 
 
 
p < .090 c 
p < .054 c  
p < .001 c 
p < .032 c 
 
 
 
supported 
a One-tailed t-test  b Two-tailed test for “Bonding cost”  c F-test 
 
 
The results of the regressions show that while four out of five hypotheses 
were supported, the hypothesis of negative effect of bonding costs on 
subsidiary performance was not supported. Measuring subsidiary 
performance by more “objective” measures revealed much of the same 
patterns, but the effects of several of the transaction costs were rather weak, 
and explained variance decreased substantially in the three alternative 
models. The control variable “growth rate in the industry” was highly 
significant across the models where control variables were included. 
 
According to this study, bonding costs have a strong positive effect on 
subsidiary performance (measured by four different perceived items). 
However, splitting the sample across entry modes, the effect is more distinct 
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in the group of acquired firms than in the group of greenfields. “Bargaining 
costs” and “maladaptation costs” have significant effects towards 
“subsidiary performance” in the group of greenfields, while “monitoring 
costs” is significant in the group of acquired firms and not significant among 
the greenfields. Explained variance was approx. 35 percent with only main 
variables included, and increased to approx. 38 percent with control 
variables incorporated. The explained variance in the two sub-groups is 
roughly at the same level.  
 
Testing the main effects: A SEM approach  
As already indicated in the section of hypothesis development, there may be 
trade-offs and interconnections between the transaction costs (Nygaard, 
1992). It is far from certain that only direct effects towards subsidiary 
performance should be expected to be observed. Also indirect effects where 
one type of transaction costs influences performance through another type of 
transaction costs are probable. For example, since maladaptation costs occur 
due to communication failure between parties, these costs may generate both 
increased bargaining costs and increased monitoring costs (i.e. 
maladaptation costs also affect subsidiary performance through those two 
directly observable transaction costs). Likewise, it may also be so that 
increased efforts in bonding activities decrease bargaining costs since the 
two parties most probably get more in line with each other. In addition, 
bonding activities such as education programs (building common company 
culture), conflict solving with third parties etc. may lead to more control due 
to the necessity of evaluating the effect of putting additional resources into 
bonding activities.79 Finally, taking the observed positive relationship 
between bonding costs and performance into account, the exploratory model 
displayed in Figure 5-1 can be proposed: 
 
                                                     
79 However, it is conceivable that due to increased communication and time together 
with the subsidiary, a built-in control effect in bonding activities reduces the needs 
for monitoring. That is, there is a negative effect, rather than a positive effect, 
between bonding costs and monitoring costs. 
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Figure 5-1: Alternative research model – a LISREL approach 
 
Since there are virtually no prior studies of the relationship between 
transaction costs and subsidiary performance, the main intention by 
presenting and testing this alternative model is to open up for reflections and 
deliberations upon a subject that may play an important role in firms’ 
international activities. Due to sample size limitation, the moderator effects 
are omitted. Likewise, since the focus in this study is on the relationship 
between perceived transaction costs and subsidiary performance, and not to 
explain subsidiary performance per se, control variables are omitted.80  
 
So far, it has been asserted that OLS-regressions would be the most 
appropriate tools when testing the hypotheses in this research. However, as 
indicated in Figure 5-1, and by looking at the correlation coefficients 
between the latent constructs (see Table 4-11 on page 101), there may be 
some interdependences among the latent variables, which is a condition that 
SEM solves better than OLS regression analysis (Goldberger, 1973; 
Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1982).81 The structural model in Figure 5-1 contains 
three latent endogenous variables – “bargaining costs” (η1), “monitoring 
                                                     
80 This can also be justified by the fact that no spurious and intervening effects were 
present in the study (see text and Table 5-1 on page 111). 
81 Goldberger presents (1973, pp. 2-6) three cases in which least-squares regression 
is a relative inappropriate estimation procedure compared to structural equation 
modeling. These three cases occur when unobservable variables are involved, 
reciprocal causation is present, and omitted variables (inadequate control) are 
present. 
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costs” (η2), and “performance” (η3), and two latent exogenous variables – 
“maladaptation costs” (ξ1) and “bonding costs” (ξ2). In addition to testing the 
proposed effects, the LISREL approach also analyzes the whole model. As 
in the analysis of the measurement model, fit indices will also be produced 
for the structural model, and to assess the overall fit, the same fit statistics 
that were reported for the measurement model will also be reported for the 
structural analysis.  
 
The most common modeling strategy involves a comparison of competing 
models – nested or non-nested.82 Model difference can then be tested for 
statistical significance by following the recommendation from Anderson and 
Gerbing (1988, p. 419): “significance between models can be tested by a χ2 
difference test with degrees of freedom equal to the differences in degree of 
freedom for the two models”. The only requirement if this procedure is to be 
followed is that the number of constructs and indicators are the same for the 
different models (i.e. that we have a set of nested models). If the models are 
non-nested, we have to rely on a comparison of the parsimonious fit 
measures (AGFI, and the normed χ2) since the χ2 difference test is 
inappropriate in this case (Hair, et al., 1998). Only nested models are 
compared; hence, possible significant differences among models are tested 
by χ2 difference tests (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988; Rust, Lee, and Valente, 
1995).  
 
Results 
Three different nested models were compared (S1, S2, and S3). Model S3, 
which is the proposed model described in Figure 5-1 has direct effects from 
all transaction costs on subsidiary performance (γ31, γ32, β31, and β32). In 
addition, some effects from “maladaptation costs” on “bargaining costs” and 
“monitoring costs” (γ11 and γ21), and from “bonding costs” on “monitoring 
costs” and “bargaining costs” (γ22 and γ12) are also proposed. Model S1 has 
no bonding cost effects towards “bargaining costs” and “monitoring costs” 
(without γ22 and γ12), but is otherwise equal to Model S3. Model S2 is also a 
reduced version of Model S3 with no direct maladaptation cost effect on 
“performance” (without γ31), otherwise equal to Model S3. Hence, Model S1 
< Model S2 < Model S3. All models have the same number of observed 
indicators and latent constructs as the measurement model estimated earlier 
(see Model 4 on page 93). Fit indices and χ2 differences for the three 
competing models are presented in Table 5-8.  
                                                     
82 “A model M2 is said to be nested within another model, when its set of freely 
estimated parameters is a subset of those estimated in M1, and this can be denoted 
M2 < M1” (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988, p. 418).  
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Table 5-8: Fit indices and χ2 differences for three competing structural models 
Fit statistics 
 
Model S1 
 minus γ12 and γ22 
Model S2 
minus γ31 
Model S3 
 
χ2 
  (df) 
  p-value 
110.49 
(97) 
.1650 
100.17 
(96) 
.3653 
97.83 
(95) 
.4006 
RMSEA 
  p-value close fit 
.030 
.92 
.017 
.97 
.014 
.98 
NCP 13.49 4.17 2.83 
GFI .92 .93 .93 
AGFI .89 .90 .90 
RMR .076 .067 .065 
NFI .93 .94 .94 
NNFI .98 .99 .99 
CFI .99 .99 .99 
IFI .99 .99 .99 
CN 179 (179.46) 196 (196.89) 199 (199.80) 
Δ χ2:    
 Model S1 − Model S2 (1 df) 10.32***  
 Model S1 − Model S3 (2 df) 12.66***  
 Model S2 − Model S3 (1 df)   2.34  
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
 
 
All three models show relatively excellent fit by most of the fit statistics. 
However, Model S1 has a somewhat low CN value (CN = 179), and an 
AGFI below the recommended threshold value of .90 (AGFI = .89).  When 
testing for significantly differences, it is observed that Model S2 and Model 
S3 are significant better fitted than Model S1. χ2 for Model S1 is 110.49 with 
97 degrees of freedom. For Model S2, the respective values are 100.17 and 
96, and for Model S3: 97.83 and 95, which gives a Δ χ2 of 12.66 with 2 
degrees of freedom and a significance of p < .01 (critical value = 9.210) for 
the difference between Model S1 and Model S3. The respective numbers for 
Model S1 and Model S2 are: Δ χ2 = 10.32 with 1 degree of freedom, p < .01 
(critical value = 6.635). However, there is no significant difference between 
Model S2 and Model S3 with respect to fit. Δ χ2 = 2.34 with 1 degree of 
freedom (critical value for p < .10 = 2.706).  
 
In addition to comparing the fit between structural models, Anderson and 
Gerbing (1988) also recommend a final comparison of fit differences 
between the structural model and the measurement model. If a significant 
difference is observed, there are reasons to believe that it is possible to 
improve the structural model by respecifying it. The formal χ2 difference test 
is reported in Table 5-9 together with some of the recommended fit indices 
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used when comparing structural models with a baseline model (RMSEA, 
NNFI, CFI, and IFI). 
 
Table 5-9: Comparing the structural models with the measurement model 
Fit indices Measurement 
model 
(Model 4) 
Structural 
model 
(Model S1) 
Structural 
model 
(Model S2) 
Structural 
model 
(Model S3) 
χ2 (df) 
   Δ χ2 (df) 
97.00 (94) 
— 
110.49 (97) 
17.49*** 
100.17 (96) 
3.17 
97.83 (95) 
.83 
RMSEA .014 .030 .017 .014 
NFI .94 .93 .94 .94 
NNFI .99 .98 .99 .99 
CFI .99 .99 .99 .99 
IFI .99 .99 .99 .99 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
 
 
The results from the χ2 difference test, presented in Table 5-9, indicate that 
Model S1 needs some improvements since the χ2 difference is highly 
significant (p < .01 (3 df)). On the other hand, there are no significant 
differences between the measurement model (the baseline model) and the 
two structural models: Model S2 and Model S3. Hence both structural 
models seem to be well specified. Therefore, in accordance with the logic 
presented by Anderson and Gerbing (1988, pp. 419-420), one should accept 
the theoretical model of interest if not a constrained or unconstrained model 
is significantly better fitted. However, since the theoretical model of interest 
(Model S3) is exploratory, the conclusion regarding the best overall model of 
Model S2 and Model S3 must be based on theoretical grounds rather than on 
a statistical basis.83 Still, some indications of what is the most proper model 
can be given by the parameter estimates for the three competing structural 
models presented in Table 5-10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
83 There are probably many other parametric structures that summarize the data 
equally well if the relationships are based on empirical grounds rather than on 
theoretical grounds (Bagozzi and Baumgartner, 1994).   
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Table 5-10: Parameter estimates for three competing structural models 
Model  MalCost 
ξ1 
BondCost 
ξ2
BargCost 
η1
MonCost 
η2
 
R2 
 
 
 
BargCost 
η1 
 
γ11 = .68 a
(6.63) b 
p < .001 c 
γ12 = −.23a
(−2.68) b 
p < .01 c 
 
— 
 
— 
 
.53 
Model 
S3 
MonCost 
η2 
 
γ21 = .62 a
(6.13) b 
p < .001 c 
γ22 = .22 a
(2.37) b 
p < .01 c 
 
— 
 
— 
 
.41 
 Perf 
η3 
γ31 = −.26a 
(−1.57) b 
p < .10 c 
γ32 = .23 a
(2.44) b 
p < .01 c 
β31 = −.22a
(−1.48) b 
p < .10 c 
β32 =  −.15a 
(−1.20) b 
ns 
 
.37 
 BargCost 
η1 
 
γ11 = .69 a
(6.84) b 
p < .001 c 
γ12 = −.22a
(−2.64) b 
p < .01 c 
 
— 
 
— 
 
.55 
Model 
S2 
MonCost 
η2 
 
γ21 = .63 a
(6.22) b 
p < .001 c 
γ22 = .22 a
(2.45) b 
p < .01 c 
 
— 
 
— 
 
.42 
 Perf 
η3 
 
 
— 
γ32 = .23 a
(2.31) b 
p < .05 c 
β31 = −.38a
(−3.38) b 
p < .001 c 
β32 = −.26a 
(−2.35) b 
p < .01 c 
 
.36 
 
 
 
BargCost 
η1 
 
γ11 = .70 a
(6.75) b 
p < .001 c 
 
— 
 
— 
 
— 
 
.49 
Model 
S1 
MonCost 
η2 
 
γ21 = .59 a
(5.94) b 
p < .001 c 
 
— 
 
— 
 
— 
 
.35 
 Perf 
η3 
γ31 = −.26a
(−1.63) b 
p < .10 c 
γ32 = .23 a
(2.77) b 
p < .01 c 
β31 = −.24a
(−1.74) b 
p < .05 c 
β32 =  −.13a 
(−1.12) b 
ns 
 
.36 
a Standardized coefficients 
b t-values 
c One-tailed test 
ns: not significant 
 
 
In all three models, transaction costs explain approximately 36 percent of the 
variance in subsidiary performance, which is almost at the same level as in 
the OLS regression presented in Table 5-1 Model A. However, both Model 
S3 and Model S1 present some rather low, or insignificant relationships. Due 
to both a direct effect and some indirect effects of maladaptation costs on 
performance (see Model S3), it is observed that monitoring costs have no 
significant effect towards performance (γ32 = −.15, t = −1.20, p < .12) and 
the rather strong effect of bargaining costs that is observed in Model S2 (β31 
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= −.38, t = −3.38, p < .001) has almost become insignificant when the direct 
effect of MalCost is included as in Model S3 (β31 = −.22, t = −1.48, p < .10).  
 
Furthermore, there are strong indications of some kind of relationships 
between MalCost on the one hand and BargCost and MonCost on the other 
hand, as proposed in the alternative research model. In Model S3 (as well as 
in the other two models), MalCost has a strong and significant effect on 
BargCost and MonCost (γ11 = .68, t = 6.63, p < .001; γ21 = .62, t = 6.13, p < 
.001). These effects are only slightly lower than the effects estimated in 
Model S2 where the direct effect between MalCost and Perf is included. 
However, this direct effect is relatively weak with γ31 = −.26 (t = −1.57, p < 
.10), and excluding this effect had only modest effects on the explained 
variance in subsidiary performance (Δ R2 = .01 – going from .36 to .37). 
When excluding the relationships between MalCost and BargCost and 
between MalCost and MonCost, and keeping everything else equal, a rather 
poor fit was obtained (RMSEA = .086; NFI = .88; AGFI = .80), and the 
explained variance in subsidiary performance dropped to 28 percent.  
 
Hence, it seems reasonable to conclude that maladaptation costs affect 
subsidiary performance more through bargaining costs and monitoring costs, 
than through a direct effect when only transaction costs are included as 
explanatory variables in the model. Therefore, it may be that Model S2 is 
more in line with reality than the two other models, which is a discussion 
that will be followed up in a later chapter. 
 
It is also worth emphasizing that bonding costs have a strong and significant 
positive effect on performance whatever model is proposed. In Model S2, the 
effect of ξ2 on η3 is significant at p < .05 (γ32 = .23, t = 2.31). The same effect 
size is observed in Model S3 and Model S1 although the significance level is 
somewhat higher (p < .01). Hence, the findings in the OLS regression with 
regard to the positive effect of bonding costs towards subsidiary 
performance are very much in line with the results in this LISREL analysis. 
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6 Discussion and implications 
 
The purpose of this closing chapter is to discuss the theoretical and 
managerial implications of the major findings in this study. First, the direct 
effects of transaction costs on subsidiary performance will be discussed (i.e. 
H1-H4), with a special emphasis on the divergent effect of bonding costs. 
Then, the consequences of using alternative performance measures are 
considered, followed by an elaboration on the effects of maladaptation costs 
and bonding costs, introduced in the structural equation model. The 
moderator effects (H5) are then assessed, before the measurement of 
transaction costs is discussed. The chapter concludes with implications for 
management, limitations, and future research. 
 
Discussion of findings – theoretical implications 
The whole logic of the TCE framework is build upon the assumption that the 
most efficient governance structure is the one that minimizes the transaction 
costs in the long run. Consequently, a strong association between transaction 
costs and performance has to be present. Unfortunately, very few studies 
have tested whether this relationship is true or not (Benito and Tomassen, 
2003; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). The reason for that may have something 
to do with the reluctance of going into details in the behavior and 
understanding of the transaction costs (Williamson, 1985), which also is 
expressed by the lack of measurements of such costs across different 
governance structures, especially those that are generated within hierarchical 
solutions (Masten, Meehan, and Snyder, 1991; Rindfleisch and Heide, 
1997). 
 
The main objectives of this study have therefore been threefold: First, it is a 
test of the underlying presumption in TCE that postulates a strong 
relationship between transaction costs and performance. As such, it is also an 
answer to the call for more research on this theme (Benito and Tomassen, 
2003). Second, it is a test of the moderating effects of two different foreign 
operation modes on the relationship between transaction costs and 
performance. Since the literature to a great extent has treated transaction 
costs as rather uniform across markets and hierarchies, it has been pertinent 
to discover whether different kinds of governance structures create different 
kinds of transaction cost effects on performance. Third, it is also a response 
to the call for more research on internally generated transaction costs 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). 
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In addition, and as a consequence of the three objectives, it has been 
necessary to identify and measure both within-firm-generated transaction 
costs and subsidiary performance in a more proper way. These issues are 
also addressed to some extent in the following section. 
 
An additional purpose, which has emerged more or less from the empirical 
observations and the statistical tests in the study, has been to raise a debate 
about possible interdependences between the different types of transaction 
costs. However, since this is rather novel, and very much an empirically 
driven theme, the main discussions will be developed along the findings 
from the focal research model. 
 
Transaction cost effects on foreign subsidiary performance 
This study is among the first to test the relationship between transaction 
costs and subsidiary performance in an international setting. Based on a 
transaction cost perspective, four hypotheses were developed about negative 
relationships between transaction costs and subsidiary performance. Hence, 
there is an assumption that transaction costs have a negative association with 
performance. The findings provide support for three out of four hypotheses. 
There is a significant and negative relationship between bargaining costs and 
subsidiary performance, as well as between monitoring costs and 
performance, and maladaptation costs and performance. These results are 
also more or less in accordance with the findings of Nygaard (1992), 
although that study investigated an inter-organizational relationship.84  
 
With regard to bargaining costs (H1), there should be diminutive needs for 
ongoing negotiations between cooperative parities in a static relationship. 
However, negotiations are often rooted in changing conditions and ex ante 
bounded rationality from both parties (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Hence, 
developing a foreign subsidiary, especially from scratch, will most often 
generate unintended bargaining costs for the MNC. A set of business 
activities are to be developed, distribution channels must be settled, and 
personnel from other cultures, with different languages, are to be hired. All 
this creates uncertainty and a great risk of renegotiations of contractual 
elements, which create additional bargaining costs for the MNC. In general, 
these costs are therefore negative for the firm, even though renegotiations 
very often are necessary to bring the relationship back on track again. 
Ideally, such activities should not be necessary. Hence, the findings in this 
study are in line with the assumptions in the theory that bargaining costs 
attenuate the performance of the subsidiary.   
                                                     
84 Monitoring cost effects turned out insignificant in Nygaard’s study. 
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The same kind of logic could also be attributed to the monitoring costs (H2). 
The need for monitoring activities in for example a MNC may often stem 
from the possibilities of opportunistic behavior from agents in the foreign 
subsidiary. Thus, monitoring will in many cases be necessary to prevent 
larger losses if no control initiatives have been taken. However, both costs 
are undesirable for the MNC and should have negative associations towards 
subsidiary performance. As such, the significant negative effect of 
monitoring costs found in this research is consistent with the general 
theoretical assumptions.85  
 
Concerning the third hypothesis (H3), maladaptation costs stems from 
communication and coordination failures between parties which in turn 
make them unable to react rapidly to changing conditions (Williamson, 
1985). Hence maladaptation costs could be understood as the opportunity 
costs of ineffective and inappropriate responses. As such, a negative 
relationship between maladaptation costs and performance should be 
expected, which also is confirmed in this study. A relatively strong negative 
relationship towards performance is detected (p < .01). Hence, deficient 
information from the foreign subsidiary creates costs that are assessed as 
negative for the performance of the foreign subsidiary. 
 
With regard to the fourth hypothesis (H4), bonding costs have a strong effect 
on subsidiary performance, but the effect is positive, which is contradictory 
to the hypothesized relationship. The argument for a negative relationship 
was based on the fact that zero costs linked to bonding activities were 
usually better than positive costs. However, at certain points in time, more 
costs may be better than fewer costs because the MNC has to improve the 
value of the firm in some situations by for example increasing bonding or 
monitoring activities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This may be the situation 
in the present empirical setting, since the subsidiaries in this research are 
relatively young firms that most likely needed special treatment from the 
headquarters to increase their performance in their initial years. The mean 
age for the subsidiaries is 5.7 years, with a relatively even distribution within 
the age interval of 3-11 years (1990-2000). And since no subsidiaries are 
older than 11 years, many MNCs are probably still in the phase of 
                                                     
85 However, Jensen and Meckling (1976) claim that in some cases monitoring 
activities will reduce agency costs and thereby increase the value and wealth of the 
firm. Given a situation with outside owners, there may be a trade-off between 
resources spent on non-pecuniary benefits for the manager and resources spent on 
monitoring activities. If these costs can be traded against each others, reducing 
non-pecuniary benefits and increasing the control by auditing, formal control 
systems, and budget restrictions, will make it easier to detect undesirable behavior 
and thereby increasing the wealth (and value) for the owner of the firm. 
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developing the relationships between MNC and foreign subsidiary by 
initiating different bonding activities. In addition, bonding activities, in 
contrast to monitoring activities, are often associated with positive actions 
that are especially well accepted in the Norwegian management tradition 
with its focus on democracy, trust, involvement, and cooperation across firm 
levels (Byrkjeflot, 2002; 2003; Sejersted, 1993). Hence, an incurred cost 
today may have a positive effect on performance tomorrow, so to speak.  
 
It is nevertheless also opportune to ask whether the relationship between 
bonding costs and performance will ever be negative. The way bonding costs 
are measured and the type of activities they are generated from, may indicate 
that the managers evaluate such costs as necessary and as a direct 
consequence of inevitable, wanted, and important activities. And as such, 
they are assessed by the managers in the MNCs as positive for the 
performance of the foreign subsidiary – accordingly they are not seen as 
“ordinary” costs.86 The three other types of transaction costs are, on the other 
hand, consequences of rather undesirable conditions in the foreign 
subsidiary. Hence, even though the bonding activities obviously generate 
costs that in the short run should have had a negative effect on the economic 
results of the subsidiaries, they are rather seen as an investment for future 
success. If this is the fact, the relationship will probably never be negative, 
even though the foreign subsidiaries become far older than 11 years.  
Unfortunately, a formal test of the behavior of bonding costs controlled for 
the time factor is hard to undertake with the chosen cross-sectional research 
design,87 but since the foreign subsidiaries in the sample are of different age, 
a regression analysis of subsidiary age on bonding costs may reveal some 
information about the behavior of bonding costs within the limited time 
interval of 3-11 years.  
 
It is of course difficult to define exactly when a firm is going from young to 
old, but if bonding costs (BondCost) is regressed on the age of the subsidiary 
(SubAge) a significant negative relationship is detected (βSubAge = −.183, t = 
−2.334, p < .01). Hence, while the subsidiary is growing older, the level of 
bonding costs is going down. At the same time, it is also recognized that 
while the subsidiaries are growing older, their performance also improves 
(ref. Table 5-1 on page 111). This probably shows that the management in 
the MNCs consist of fairly rational persons that reduce the level of bonding 
                                                     
86 An additional and maybe somewhat speculative explanation could also be that by 
spending resources on bonding activities, the MNC managers bind themselves 
more personally to key persons in the foreign unit, and thereby have difficulties in 
evaluating the subsidiary in an objective way. 
87 Ideally, a longitudinal study should be undertaken to really investigate the 
behavior of variables over time (Churchill, 1999). 
 131
activities as the subsidiary becomes more experienced and well fitted to the 
goals of the MNC, and/or that the bonding activities become more efficiently 
fitted to the circumstances.88, 89  
 
There are at least two important implications of these findings. First, 
transaction cost variables have to be emphasized in future performance 
studies. Taken together, the four categories of transaction costs explain 
approximately 35 percent (adjusted R2 = .346) of the performance variance 
among the total sample of 160 foreign subsidiaries. Consequently, 
transaction costs play a significant role in explaining performance (in the 
way performance is measured in this study) and the theoretical assumption 
of a strong and negative relationship between three of these variables is by 
then confirmed also empirically. Second, bonding cost effects are for the 
first time measured, they have a significant positive effect on performance, 
but may capture other dimensions than what could typically be defined as 
cost components. Before bonding costs finally are established theoretically 
and empirically as a transaction cost dimension, future research has to 
investigate and test the relationship thoroughly in different settings and 
within different organizational forms. A discussion about the bonding costs 
dimension will be further developed later.  
 
Alternative performance measures – a brief discussion 
This study relies heavily on a perceptual and multi-item approach when 
measuring subsidiary performance. This could of course be criticized from 
different perspectives since they are both subjective and potentially 
inaccurate compare to accounting measures. Nevertheless, this has been a 
deliberate strategy. The literature review clearly showed that performance is 
a multi-faceted notion; hence, using single-item measures would most 
certainly have reduced the information in the data significantly. In addition, 
as also pointed on in the literature review, there are also difficulties with 
more objective data. There are differences in accounting practices across 
countries, which make it difficult to compare financial figures (Ramaswamy, 
1992). Financial figures are also difficult to get hold of (Dess and Robinson, 
                                                     
88 While controlling for only the age of the subsidiaries, an almost equal bonding 
costs effect towards subsidiary performance (βBondCost is going from .229 (t = 
3.200) to .262 (t = 3.647), Δβ = .033) is observed. Hence, the effect of bonding 
costs is at the same level even though the magnitude is going down. 
89 Running different regressions with the same independent variable (i.e. SubAge), 
but with the other transaction costs as dependent variable, no significant 
relationships were detected. Hence, age of the subsidiary does not affect directly 
the level of the other three types of transaction costs. These differences are 
difficult to explain, so a further discussion will only be conjectures. 
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1984), and the success of the foreign subsidiary often goes beyond short-
term financial calculus (Hill, Hwang, and Kim, 1990). By using survival as a 
proxy for performance, interpretation difficulties arise. It is difficult to 
exactly know when a subsidiary no longer exist. The “death” of a firm often 
occurs over time, and buy-ups and different transformations of the foreign 
subsidiary also generate interpretive difficulties (Barney, 1997).  
 
However, since both objective and subjective measures of performance have 
their strengths and weaknesses (Barney, 1997), different subsidiary 
performance measurements have been used in additional analyses. 
 
By using three more objective performance measures instead of a multi-item 
latent construct, the very distinct results presented and discussed above, 
turned out to be somewhat more ambiguous. Although the same tendencies 
are observed, the explained variance is much lower in all three models, and 
significant relationships are much less frequently observed. It is difficult to 
come up with a complete and reliable explanation for these results, but some 
of the explanations can probably be attributed to three different reasons, 
which all go back to the way these variables are measured.  
 
First, the way transaction costs are defined (as both direct costs and 
opportunity costs) and measured makes it difficult to directly attribute these 
costs to the annual balance sheet in the foreign subsidiary. Second, the 
transaction costs are only measured with observable indicators that constitute 
latent constructs of transaction costs. This way of measuring transaction 
costs seems to fit well when performance is measured in the same way (i.e. 
all variables are multidimensional and subjective), which seems to be logical 
since subsidiary performance often is more than sales or revenue for many 
MNCs (Barney, 1997; Benito and Tomassen, 2003). Short-term profit is 
regularly balanced with other more long-term and strategic oriented goals 
with regard to for example market presence and distribution arrangements 
when the performance is evaluated (Hill, Hwang, and Kim, 1990; Kogut, 
1988). Therefore, growth in sales or profit will only cover a fraction of the 
multi-faceted performance construct.  
 
Third, former research also indicates that the effect of production costs 
probably outshine the transaction costs effects on short-term performance 
measures, such as net operating income, since the transaction costs are 
caused by more structural reasons (Nygaard, 1992). Hence, if most of the 
transaction costs are attributed to a multi-dimensional construct with a more 
long-term perspective, using a single item measure of performance with a 
rather short-term focus, probably limits the possibilities of detecting any 
relationship between transaction costs and performance. 
 133
 
That being said, it must also be underlined that for the first time, significant 
relationships between transaction costs and more objective measures of 
performance are registered. Compared to the findings in Nygaard (1992), a 
much more coherent picture is observed in the present study. While Nygaard 
did not find any significant relationship at all between transaction costs and 
efficiency,90 this study reveals a distinct negative association between 
monitoring costs and growth in revenue (p < .05). Likewise, both bonding 
costs and maladaptation costs are associated with sales growth (p < .10). One 
should be careful when trying to explain these significant results, but it may 
have something to do with the fact that growth in sales and growth in profit 
are mean values for the three years between 1998 and 2000, which probably 
give a more long-term perspective than a one year profit or sales figure 
(which Nygaard’s efficiency measure was based upon), and thereby also 
makes it possible to catch some of the transaction costs effects if it is correct 
that the transaction costs effects only will be picked up by more “long-term” 
measurements.  
 
These findings indicate that it is important to consider multiple performance 
measures in performance studies of different kinds. Likewise, a multiple-
item approach can be fruitful, especially when the study deals with variables 
that in some sense are difficult to attribute and measure in an objective 
manner. In addition, performance measures that cover both long-term and 
short-term perspectives are sometimes important to employ, which also is 
emphasized by Ariño (2003) by her conceptualization of so-called outcome 
performance and process performance. According to her, both aspects have 
to be dealt with in further performance studies.91 
 
Interdependencies among the transaction costs 
So far, the discussion has taken for granted that the transaction costs effects 
on subsidiary performance could be modeled as direct effects. Three 
circumstances point towards an alternative modeling strategy. First, 
relatively high correlation coefficients were observed among some of the 
transaction cost constructs (see Table 4-11 on page 101). Second, it is 
                                                     
90 Efficiency was measured by net operating income/gross sales revenue. Explained 
variance was close to zero (adjusted R2 = .009), and β-coefficients between |.05 - 
.08|. Likewise, the signs went in the opposite directions for both control costs and 
bargaining costs when the results for the two models were compared.   
91 Although these aspects were developed with the intensions to measure 
performance in strategic alliances, much of the logic could be applied to studies of 
firm and/or subsidiary performance. 
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theoretically possible with both interconnections and some kind of trade-offs 
between these costs (Nygaard, 1992). Third, the relationships between the 
different costs will most certainly also change over time in a rather dynamic 
fashion. For example, a feeling of shared purpose makes organizations able 
to create an atmosphere that shapes the values and goals of their members. 
Hence, bonding activities incurred yesterday, may lead to the development 
of trust and commitment, which is of major importance in reducing 
opportunism and thereby also transaction costs tomorrow (Moran and 
Ghoshal, 1996). 
 
Instead of modeling the relationships as direct effects, the alternative 
research model (Figure 5-1 on page 120) presumed interdependencies 
between the transaction costs, and a structural equation modeling approach 
was therefore conducted to further investigate these possible relations. 
However, a cross-sectional snapshot will still give limited understanding of 
such dynamism as described in the third line of reasoning above. Hence, this 
way of modeling the relationships may give some new insights into only the 
static relations between transaction costs of today.  
 
The following discussion will by and large be concentrated around two 
major findings: first, and most importantly, the role of the maladaptation 
costs, and second, the effect of bonding costs.  
 
According to the results presented in Table 5-10, maladaptation costs and 
bonding costs are the two independent “drivers” in the model. Bargaining 
costs and monitoring costs, on the other hand, are intervening variables, 
which are highly dependent on especially the maladaptation costs 
(bargaining costs: γ11 = .69, η1 = 6.84; monitoring costs: γ21 = .63, η2 = 6.22). 
In addition, according to further analysis, 36 percent of the total 42 percent 
variation in monitoring costs explained by the model can be attributed to the 
maladaptation costs. The respective figures for bargaining costs are even 
higher with 51 percent and 55 percent.  
 
Since adaptation (internal as well as external) is seen as one of the most 
central economic problems of organization, maladaptation costs are also 
assessed as the most important of the transaction costs (Williamson, 1988, p. 
572). Therefore, given that the logic in the alternative research model is 
correct, these results seem quite logical. Maladaptation costs are those 
opportunity costs that most certainly are seen as sources for increased ex 
post transaction costs. When it is difficult for the subsidiary to anticipate 
changes in consumer preferences, distribution arrangements, competition in 
the foreign market, and/or is faced with opportunism, there is a great chance 
of misalignments. The most likely action then, is to increase both monitoring 
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and bargaining activities. The first is done to control for further detrimental 
developments, the latter is a necessity if contractual misalignments are to be 
corrected. Direct costs of these activities are therefore easy to spot and to 
attribute. It is much more difficult to do the same with the maladaptation 
costs. The management in the MNC most likely has problems with 
attributing these costs directly to the performance of the subsidiary, but may 
see them as sources for other observable costs that are the results of 
necessary actions. The results in fact indicate such an assumption. 
Maladaptation cost effects on subsidiary performance is mostly of an 
indirect nature and work through monitoring costs and bargaining costs. 
Explained variance in subsidiary performance dropped only from 37 percent 
to 36 percent when the direct effect from maladaptation costs on subsidiary 
performance was skipped (see Table 5-10). In addition, a rather poor fit was 
obtained when the maladaptation costs effect was modeled only as a direct 
effect on subsidiary performance (see page 125).  
 
Bonding costs have both direct and indirect effects according to the findings. 
Bonding expenses can certainly be attributed to subsidiary performance 
(with the same proviso as taken above), but it is also possible that bonding 
costs influence the level of bargaining costs and monitoring costs. The first 
relationship is probably the easiest to explain. Costs used on bonding 
activities, in many cases bring the foreign subsidiary more in line with the 
MNC headquarter, which then probably leads to reduced disputes about 
settled agreements (Anderson, 1988b). Bargaining costs that occur between 
headquarter and subsidiary will thereby go down (Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 
1999). The positive relationship on monitoring costs is more difficult to 
understand. Intuitively, frequent meetings, building personal relationships, 
and support from headquarters in conflicts with third parties, should develop 
a more trustful relationship, which thereby reduces the needs for monitoring 
(Chiles and McMackin, 1996). In addition there may also be a built-in 
control effect in increased communication and time together with the 
subsidiary (with the intention to bind the entities more closely together), 
which also should have reduced the need for control precautions.  
 
One reason for a positive relationship could be rooted in the need of 
evaluating activities that are introduced actively and consciously from the 
management in the MNC (i.e. bonding activities). However, saying so, it is 
of course also possible that the positive relationship is purely accidental. 
Therefore, a further discussion of this relationship will only be based on 
highly speculative arguments, so that an answer on the observed positive 
relationship between bonding costs and monitoring costs must instead be left 
to future studies. 
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Summarized, five key implications could be extracted from this exploratory 
modeling effort:  
 
1. The four different transaction costs are probably not independent 
variables, and cannot be treated as such in future research. 
2. Most certainty, there are trade-offs between such costs, which must be 
tested with longitudinal designs.  
3. Maladaptation seems to be the main source of other transaction costs in 
an intra-organizational relationship, and as such, this seems to be the 
most important transaction cost. 
4. Bargaining costs, monitoring costs, and bonding costs represent the 
direct effects of transaction costs on subsidiary performance. Much of 
these costs are observable direct costs.  
5. Maladaptation cost effects on subsidiary performance most certainly 
work through bargaining costs and monitoring costs, and not as a direct 
effect on subsidiary performance. 
 
This attempt at modeling transaction costs as interdependent variables has 
been highly exploratory, and far more empirically driven than theoretically. 
However, since the relationship between transaction costs and performance 
is seldom investigated, pushing the forefront of the accumulated knowledge 
about transaction costs and their behavior and effects may stimulate others to 
dig more deeply into the area. 
 
The moderating role of modes of entry 
The fifth hypothesis (H5) stated that the relationships between ex post 
transaction costs and subsidiary performance were dependent on whether the 
foreign subsidiary was established as a greenfield or as an acquisition. This 
logic was originally derived from the assumption that different operation 
methods cannot differ with regard to performance if everything else is equal, 
but moderate transaction costs effects on performance (Masten, 1993). This 
was also confirmed by the tests. Significant different transaction costs effects 
were observed across the groups of greenfields and acquisitions. 
 
Among the group of greenfields, bargaining costs and maladaptation costs 
seem to play an active role in determining the performance of the foreign 
subsidiaries. Building up a subsidiary from scratch can be difficult even 
though the MNC relative often uses expatriates in top positions in their 
greenfield subsidiaries. This is particularly common during the initial phases 
of the foundation and development of the subsidiary (Harzing, 2002). 
Distribution arrangements are to be developed and settled, and a whole 
workforce at different levels in the subsidiary must be recruited and 
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intensely supervised. In addition, the MNC has to deal with cultural, 
economic and political differences where language barriers are often present. 
All this, of course, creates an increased propensity to misalignments and 
renegotiations of former contracts and agreements, and as such, it is not 
surprising that these two transaction cost effects are so distinct among the 
MNCs with greenfield operations. On the contrary, an acquisition has often 
been a going business in the foreign market long before the take-over. Much 
of the external and internal arrangements are settled and relatively 
transparent, which probably reduces the propensity for serious 
misalignments and renegotiations. 
 
What about the non-significant relationship between monitoring costs and 
performance observed among the greenfields? Control of a subsidiary can be 
executed in many different ways. Expatriates can be used at different levels 
and/or in key positions in the foreign subsidiary. Centralization of important 
strategic decisions, as well as formalization and implementation of 
operational procedures are other methods. In addition, output control of 
different kinds (such as continuous evaluation of results, and financial 
reports) and planning systems can be employed (Harzing, 2002). Monitoring 
costs, as defined in this study, cover only part of the costs associated with all 
the control mechanisms that are available. Hence, the fact that monitoring 
cost effects turned out insignificant does not imply that no control 
precautions are executed in the greenfields. It may be that controls are 
executed by having for example a larger staff of expatriates or other 
trustworthy people in key positions in the foreign unit. Unfortunately, there 
are no data available for the whole set of subsidiaries to see if this is the 
fact,92 but according to the findings in Harzing (2002), expatriates tend to be 
more present in greenfields than in acquisitions. Hence, it seems plausible 
that control in greenfields is executed more by a direct presence of 
trustworthy personnel, than by administrative routines managed on an arms-
length distance, and that human presence in the foreign unit outshines the 
monitoring costs effects towards foreign subsidiary performance.  
 
According to TCE-reasoning, greenfields make it easier for the MNC to 
leverage its resources into the foreign market since the greenfield most often 
is more in line with the parent company with respect to cultures, 
administrative systems, and routines (Hennart and Park, 1993). Hence, this 
may be the reason for the relative weak presence of bonding cost effects 
                                                     
92 Inspecting a reduced data set (145 of those 160 MNCs), 27.8 % of the managing 
directors in the greenfields were Norwegians, compared to 18.8 % among the 
acquired firms, which points in the same direction as the findings by Harzing 
(2002). 
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among the greenfields. A take-over, on the contrary, demands proactive 
bonding activities since acquired firms have their own history, knowledge, 
reputation and workforce (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). Major changes among 
local personnel are seldom necessary due to competencies and resources 
embedded in the company, but it will often be important to bring the 
acquired firm more in line with the goals of the MNC; therefore it is not 
surprising that the bonding cost effects turned out significant among the 
acquired firms. Likewise, since the presence of MNC-personnel is limited 
within the acquired subsidiary, parallel with the bonding efforts, arms-length 
monitoring precautions have to be introduced to reduce the propensity of 
moral hazard due to information asymmetry between the acquired unit and 
the MNC (Williamson, 1985). 
 
Hence, for the first time it is showed empirically that different modes of 
entry have differences in transaction costs effects on subsidiary performance, 
which implies that the assumption of transaction costs differences between 
organizational forms of internal nature also is supported to some extent.  
 
Measurement of transaction costs 
Overall, it seems to be encumbered with some difficulties to dimensionalize 
and measure transaction costs by using objective measures. Thus, the 
preferred approach in the present study, which also has been the far most 
common approach in other studies, has been to identify observable indicators 
that define the theoretical and latent constructs of transaction costs (Buvik, 
1995; Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Noordewier, John, and Nevin, 1990; 
Walker and Poppo, 1991). Retrospective perceptions of indicators that may 
represent transaction costs have been collected through a questionnaire, and 
then associated with one or more theoretical constructs of transaction costs, 
assuming that both direct costs and opportunity costs can be measure by 
using a Likert-scale. This is a practice that goes back to the psychometric 
tradition of Nunnally (1967) and Lord and Novick (1968), which 
acknowledges that theoretical concepts are hard to measure in a multifarious 
world and therefore have to be measured by multiple items. And according 
to Nygaard (1992), this may also yield a more abundant and prolific basis for 
both future research and managerial understanding and applications.  
 
Although the approach in this research is the most common one, the debate 
of whether it is fruitful to measure transaction costs at all, or how to measure 
transaction costs, has been going on for a long time. This subject is for 
example addressed in a speech to the Western Economic Association:  
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“It has been argued that it is fruitless to study transaction costs, 
because it is frequently impossible to measure them. This view 
is wrong. Fundamentally, measurement involves an assignment 
of numbers for the purposes of ranking, and precision in 
measurement can only be judged by the extent of agreement 
among different observers. To say that cost is measurable, or 
measurable precisely, does not necessarily mean it is 
measurable in dollars and cents. If we are able to say, ceteris 
paribus, that a particular type of transaction cost is higher in 
Situation A than in Situation B, and that different individuals 
consistently specify the same ranking whenever the two 
situations are observed, it would follow that transaction costs 
are measurable, at least at the margin. Testable propositions 
may then be obtained, and that is the important thing.” 
(Cheung, 1998, p. 517)  
 
In general, there has been a strong belief among many researchers about the 
difficulties of measuring transaction costs. And at least three important 
obstacles have been emphasized: (1) obtaining reasonable data on 
contracting costs is difficult because these costs occur on both sides of the 
dyad (i.e. you have to collect data from both sides); (2) the costs of ex post 
contractual failure are very difficult to anticipate ex ante; (3) some of these 
costs are also opportunity costs, which certainly complicates an attempt to 
measure transaction costs if specific monetary units were to be associated to 
the costs (Masten, Meehan, and Snyder, 1991; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). 
The first is perhaps not that difficult to solve (see for example Dahlstrom and 
Nygaard (1999)), but the two latter elements are of course much more 
challenging, especially if the assumption is that most of the transaction costs 
are either anticipated future costs and/or opportunity costs.  
 
Hence, in an attempt to solve the measurement problems described above, 
Masten, Meehan, and Snyder (1991) proposed to measure the costs of 
internal organization instead of the transaction costs of market transactions, 
since organization costs “tend to occur in a more routine fashion” (Masten, 
Meehan, and Snyder, 1991, p. 13). This study was also the first that really 
tried to put “dollars and cents” on the transaction costs. However, there are 
several problems with the study, although the approach seems adequate. 
First, the definition of transaction costs is rather broad and comprises costs 
that go far beyond the description of transaction costs set by Williamson 
(1985) and others (Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992; Pilling, Crosby, and Jackson, 1994). Actually, they seem to be more in 
line with general organizational costs (although very specific for one firm), 
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which in fact also is the notion used by the authors. Second, the study is 
based on a small number of observations from one particular firm in a highly 
idiosyncratic industry. And this idiosyncrasy is also reflected in the way 
organizational costs are described. Hence, cost definitions associated with 
management of very specific processes and components in one particular 
firm, reduces the possibilities of using the same cost definition across firms 
and industries. Third, it is the anticipated hours used on the processes and 
components that are measured, so even though these costs are measured by 
monetary units, still the level of these costs is based on subjective 
assessments. Since the transaction costs never occur in annual reports or 
financial documents, a subjective assessment of these costs will most 
probably be the main source for identifying them, but these figures will not 
be more objective if dollars or kroner are used as measurement units instead 
of points on a Likert-scale.93 Fourth, only direct costs have been measured. 
Hence, opportunity costs are still unmeasured, and will certainly remain so if 
the only acceptable way of measuring transaction costs is through more or 
less “objective” monetary figures.  
 
But even though it seems an insurmountable task to measure all the 
transaction costs in a fully objective manner, the understanding and 
consequences of these costs will become much more unambiguous through a 
continuous development of the theoretical constructs of transaction costs. 
Although the effort of measuring transaction costs in an objective manner 
was criticized above, the idea is important and has to be followed up in 
future studies. Both objective as well as more subjective measurements seem 
to be necessary to develop, since the costs are both observable direct costs as 
well as opportunity costs. And this measurement problem is not trivial, either 
is it insignificant, because “stronger tests of the theory, and estimation of the 
actual costs of organization are possible only if the measurement problems 
[.............] can be resolved” (Masten, Meehan, and Snyder, 1991, p. 4). One 
measurement problem is of course the comparison of costs across 
organizational forms (i.e. the costs for the not chosen alternatives), the 
second is the problem that the costs are difficult to observe and measure. 
Among other things, the latter is addressed in the present study, although 
from a psychometric point of view. 
 
As already presented in the theory chapter, the point of departure for the 
operationalization of transaction costs was a skeleton of such costs, first 
                                                     
93 Another issue is, of course, that by using continuous scales, the measurement 
precision is perhaps enhanced compared to when measuring costs on ordinal 
scales that are treated as continuous scales.  See also previous discussion about 
level of measurement on page 61.   
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presented by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Dahlman (1979), and Williamson 
(1985). Later research has developed the understanding of the costs, but still 
it has been of great pertinence to improve the present understanding due to 
both generalization matters and dimension issues (Rindfleisch and Heide, 
1997). And both areas are addressed in this study through the attempt of: (1) 
using the same conceptual understanding of transaction costs that are used in 
inter-organizational research, in an intra-company context; (2) the 
development of an additional dimension of transaction costs. 
 
(1) Intra-company transaction costs 
Even though Demsetz (1993, p. 161) prefers the notion of “management 
costs” instead of transaction costs on the costs of governing transactions 
within firms, and the fact that these costs manifest themselves somewhat 
differently across organizational forms (ref. the moderator analysis pp. 114-
118), the same set of human and environmental factors seem to be relevant 
for both (Williamson, 1975). Hence, the transaction costs that arise through 
intra-organizational coordination also stem from communication distortion, 
monitoring actions, bonding activities, and adaptation problems, which occur 
due to for example opportunism, specific investments, information 
asymmetry and uncertainty.  
 
Within the tradition of psychometric measurement, the present study is the 
first to measure internally generated transaction costs. All other studies have 
been measuring transaction costs that occur among independent contractual 
parties. According to the present study, transaction costs definitely exist in 
intra-organizational relationships, which confirms the assumptions put 
forward by several others (Demsetz, 1993; Masten, Meehan, and Snyder, 
1991; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Moreover, much of these costs are in 
fact direct costs linked to monitoring actions, bonding activities and 
bargaining, even though opportunity costs certainly are present by the 
ineffective and inappropriate responses to changing conditions and the 
failure of reaching efficient agreements with the foreign subsidiary. Hence, 
part of the transaction costs should not be that difficult to measure in a more 
objective manner, although the current measurements have been done 
retrospectively and through Likert-scales in this study. But since internally 
generated transaction costs often tend to occur routinely, it may also be 
possible to anticipate future costs of an internal nature by following some of 
the suggestions raised by Masten, Meehan, and Snyder (1991), although it 
seems fruitless to attribute objective monetary units to all of these costs. 
 
The general magnitude of the transaction costs differs quite substantially 
(mean values ranging from 2.33 for MalCost to 4.26 for BondCost), but 
taken together, the general level of bargaining, monitoring, and 
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maladaptation costs are relatively low (see appendix 2-a). On the other hand, 
the level of bonding costs is considerably higher.  
 
First, it would have been rather surprising if the general level of the three 
types of transaction costs had been substantially higher. By internalizing the 
market for intermediates, when the firm is faced with high market 
imperfections, transaction costs will be reduced compared to a situation 
where the firm had relied solely on market transactions (Williamson, 1985). 
Even though it is tempting to conclude that any other non-equity solution 
would have implied a higher level of transaction costs when anything else 
constant, this research cannot infer anything as to whether the firms were 
faced with such high transaction costs that the chosen mode of operation was 
the most efficient one. The measurement of transaction costs has been done 
after the choice of entry mode, so ex ante costs and ex post costs for the not 
chosen alternatives are not known. The fact that strategic considerations, 
such as the need for market presence and scale and scope economies, may 
also weaken such reasoning (Hill, Hwang, and Kim, 1990; Kim and Hwang, 
1992; Kogut, 1988).  
 
Second, it is perhaps not so surprising either, that the level of bonding costs 
seems to be substantially higher than the level of the three other types of 
transaction costs, since most of the bonding activities are activities typically 
necessary for the MNCs to execute if they want to become more integrated. 
But, this may also raise a question of whether the variable is measured in 
such a way that the items do not capture the same interpretation of the 
variable across different governance structures. Especially one item of the 
bonding costs variable is too context-specific (time spent on building a 
common company culture). Whether this item can be used in totally different 
organizational forms is doubtful, but a definition of bonding costs has to be 
developed so that the meaning is useful across organizational forms, not only 
for internal circumstances.   
 
This also raises a more substantial inquiry of whether “bonding costs”, as 
defined in this study, are more like ordinary organizational costs 
disconnected from the contractual arrangements between headquarters and 
subsidiary. The fact that a positive relationship between these costs and 
subsidiary performance was registered may indicate that the respondents 
evaluate at least these costs differently from the rest of the transaction costs. 
A closer inspection of the correlation matrix (appendix 3), leads to the 
conclusion that the two items that really drive the positive relationship 
towards performance seems to be the two items that also have a high positive 
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correlation towards the bonding cost construct.94 Both these items describe at 
least well accepted activities in management of companies, also activities 
that may go beyond a strict transaction cost definition.  
 
Since this research only has measured bonding costs for two kinds of 
ownership modes, future research may use the variable across different 
governance structures to really test whether this definition is useful.  
 
(2) Transaction cost dimensions 
Former studies have developed several dimensions of transaction costs, but 
the most consistent one has probably been Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999), 
which this study has drawn on to a great extent in the dimensionality of three 
out of four of the transaction costs. The three dimensions in their study are 
also confirmed in this study. The scales of “bargaining costs”, “monitoring 
costs”, and “maladaptation costs” are almost identical with respect to 
reliability values (Cronbach’s alpha). All are in the reliability range of α = 
.72 – .81, which deviates very little from the reliability of the scales 
developed by Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999). The constructs also revealed a 
high degree of discriminant validity and unidimensionality; hence, there are 
manifest evidences on the multi-dimensionality of the transaction cost 
notion. 
 
In addition to the three former developed scales, this study has proposed an 
additional dimension, which was called “bonding costs”. Hence, a four-
dimensional definition of transaction costs is put forward in this study. This 
solution was also confirmed when running the measurement model in 
LISREL. Excellent fit indices were reported. For the first time, bonding 
costs have been operationalized and used in a study of transaction costs. 
Four items constitute this variable and a satisfactory α-value of .71 was 
registered. However, there are indications that this construct has to be further 
developed (average variance extracted value of .42, which is below the 
recommended value of .50) – especially two items seems to need more 
consideration even though they both have significant factor loadings.95 The 
first item was probably too little specific and too vague to be understood 
uniformly by the respondents, which may have led to a rather low factor 
loading on the construct (λ6 = .49). The second question may describe rather 
unfamiliar actions since many of the foreign subsidiaries probably operate 
                                                     
94 Item 2: “We spend a lot of time in developing personal ties between headquarter 
and the foreign subsidiary”. 
   Item 3: “We spend a lot of time in developing a common company culture” 
95 Item 1: “We spend a lot of time in communicating with our foreign subsidiary”. 
  Item 4: “We spend a lot of time together with our foreign subsidiary in order to 
solve conflicts with third parties”. 
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quite independently in their respective local markets. In addition, the 
wording of the question could be a bit confusing because it is not quite clear 
that the conflict with third parties has to do with a conflict that is difficult or 
important for the foreign subsidiary to solve. The conflict could as well be at 
the MNC level. This ambiguity is reflected in a low factor loading on the 
construct ((λ9 = .39).  
 
There are also indications in the study that some of the other constructs have 
to be improved. Monitoring costs are probably more than those costs 
covered by the construct used in this study. Monitoring precautions can for 
example be of both administrative and human nature. Personal presence 
through expatriates and/or trustworthy persons in the foreign subsidiary may 
reduce the needs for more formal arms-length control routines. This study 
did try to develop additional measures for the monitoring cost variable, but it 
did not succeed in that attempt (ref. the test of unidimensionality, which also 
revealed that a two-dimensional solution was not possible due to too low 
factor loadings on a common factor for the three additional items). It is also 
notified that the initial intention of capturing both “quality” and “quantity” 
of the bargaining costs construct fell apart. Future studies may try to develop 
items along these two dimensions. 
 
In sum, within the tradition of psychometric measurement of transaction 
costs, this study has measured transaction costs in a relatively rigorous 
manner. Structural equation estimation of the measurement model verified 
that the measurements by and large are highly satisfactory regarding validity 
and reliability, even though there is scope for improvement in the 
operationalization of monitoring costs, bargaining costs, and bonding costs. 
For the first time, intra-company transaction costs in an international 
headquarter-subsidiary context have been measured. And as such, this study 
contributes to the accumulation of knowledge about transaction costs in 
general, and intra-company transaction costs in particular. 
 
Implications for practice 
Basically, four major managerial implications can be drawn from this study. 
First, transaction costs that occur between MNC-headquarter and foreign 
subsidiary are important determinants for the performance of those units.  
Hence, reducing these costs must be important for management in MNCs. 
Second, working hard with bonding efforts is important, and especially 
important in the initial phase of the relationship. Third, monitoring costs are 
detrimental to the performance of the subsidiary, hence it is important to 
reduce the needs for these costs. Monitoring efforts can be carried out in 
different ways, and personal presence may reduce the amount of formal 
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control procedures. Fourth, maladaptation seems to be extremely important 
to evade, but the effects of maladaptation costs are most distinct among de 
novo entrants. 
 
This study shows that internalizing cross-border activities through either 
greenfields or acquisitions does not prevent the occurrence of transaction 
costs. Even though these costs are modest in magnitude, they have a 
significant influence when the MNCs evaluate the performance of their 
foreign subsidiaries. Since they explain close to 35 percent of the variation in 
performance, the management must also emphasize these costs when going 
abroad. In general, several of these costs are negatively correlated with 
subsidiary performance, which imply that it is important to manage those 
subsidiaries in such a way that these costs are to be kept at a minimum level. 
Although outside the scope of this research, this also emphasizes the 
importance of carefully selecting the most proper governance structure ex 
ante. Not doing so, increases the probability for misalignments and increased 
bargaining and monitoring costs ex post (Williamson, 1985). If companies 
make wrong decisions, or are forced to enter a market through non-preferred 
modes of entry, the MNCs most certainly have to change the headquarter-
subsidiary relations over time by for example increasing the level of control 
in the subsidiaries (Harzing, 2002). These extra costs would not have been 
necessary if a more proper entry mode had been chosen in the first place.  
 
It seems important for Norwegian managers to bind the foreign subsidiary 
more closely to the MNC, and a successful integration of a subsidiary has, 
according to the findings, vital and positive effects. Communication of 
different kinds, solving third party disputes together with the foreign 
subsidiary, building personal relationships, and a focus on developing a 
common corporate culture, are all components that seem to have a positive 
effect when it comes to the evaluation of the foreign subsidiary. Especially 
important are the two latter activities. Saying so, it must also be emphasized 
that proactive bonding activities are most pertinent among the acquired 
subsidiaries. Hence, MNCs that acquire foreign companies must be aware of 
this positive effect in particular. It may not be that important in greenfield 
operations because already from the beginning the subsidiaries are more in 
line with the goals of the MNCs (Hennart and Park, 1993). In addition, 
supplementary analyses indicate that bonding costs are most visible in the 
beginning of the relationship, and that they also reduce the negative costs 
that occur through bargaining activities, which reinforce the impression that 
using bonding costs proactively to improve performance in the foreign 
subsidiary will be a prudent strategy for the MNC.  
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Monitoring costs have negative effects for the performance of the subsidiary. 
However, that does not imply that managers should stay away from control 
precautions, but it points towards the necessities of limiting some of the 
reasons that make monitoring in the foreign subsidiary necessary. The raison 
d'être of control costs lies, among other things, in the hazards for 
opportunistic behavior (Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999). These hazards can 
for example be reduced by more cooperation between the parties, which 
often leads to a development of mutual goals (Anderson, 1988b). Likewise, 
Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1999) emphasize the importance of formalizing 
operating procedures since this increases the possibilities that duties and 
responsibilities become much more apparent and thereby reduce the 
possibilities of moral hazards. The proactive actions that lie behind the 
monitoring costs are to a certain degree most distinct when MNCs acquire 
foreign firms, surely because of the build-in control effect that lies in the 
way de novo entrants are established and developed through a more direct 
attendance of people from the MNC (Harzing, 2002). However, firms cannot 
conclude that it is only in acquired firms that monitoring is necessary. Most 
certainly, the monitoring costs take only different forms, and some of these 
forms are not covered by the definition used in this study.  
 
Even though the greenfields are easier to align to the MNC due to 
compatibility with respect to culture, systems, and routines (Hennart and 
Park, 1993), maladaptation costs effects are more powerful among these 
foreign units. It is therefore important for management to emphasize these 
problems both ex ante and ex post of the foreign entrance. An optimal choice 
of operation method is of course of major importance since the alternatives 
increase costs along many paths (Harzing, 2002). A sound choice requires 
that the MNC is well aware of the objectives with the new entry, which also 
requires a thorough understanding of MNC characteristics and industry 
conditions. Ex post of entrance, poor and incomplete information from the 
foreign subsidiary creates information that is difficult to use or may be not 
necessary for the MNC at all, which creates extra costs for the MNC. An 
even more serious problem is of course that poor information may lead to 
wrong decisions with possible disastrous consequences for the foreign 
subsidiary. In addition, and according to the more exploratory part of this 
research, the management in a MNC has to be aware of the fact that 
misalignments seem to reinforce the negative effect of both bargaining costs 
and monitoring costs on performance. Therefore, building communication 
and performance systems that manage to detect problems at an early stage 
are of major importance.96  
                                                     
96 Balance scorecards could be an example of such systems (Kaplan and Norton, 
1996).    
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Limitations and future research 
Doing empirical research will always be a balance between dilemmas, 
ceteris paribus, it is always desirable to maximize generalizability, 
precision, and realism, but according to McGrath (McGrath, 1982, p. 74), 
“ceteris is never paribus in the world of research”. Hence, all empirical 
research has certain limitations – and that also applies to this study. And by 
an identification of limitations, avenues for future studies are also revealed. 
Therefore, limitations and future studies are considered jointly in the 
following section. 
 
Only Norwegian MNCs are represented in the sample, which implies that the 
results cannot automatically be extrapolated to other geographical settings. 
Caution must be observed. However, this is not a serious limitation since the 
foremost purpose of this study has been to test a normative proposition in the 
TCE framework, which entails a rather homogenous empirical context. In 
that sense, questions could rather be raised whether the empirical context is 
still too heterogeneous for proper theory testing purposes. Both large and 
small firms, across different industries, are present in the database. Likewise, 
firms with different international experience and age are represented. A 
heterogeneous population will decrease the possibilities of identifying 
statistically significant effects with respect to the main independent 
variables, because of the number of possible extraneous variables that make 
it hard to purge alternative explanations for the observed relationships in the 
data (Cook and Campbell, 1979). Even though control variables were 
included in the equation, the problem of heterogeneity in the data is a 
weakness of the study. Future studies should therefore try to limit the context 
to only one single industry, in one particular country, and include more 
control variables that may correlate with both the focal independent variable 
and the dependent variable. 
 
This study relies on single key informants from the MNC headquarters for 
the constructs in the model. Although much effort has been made to really 
find the knowledgeable person in the headquarters, this is still a limitation of 
the study. Relying on just one person opens up for biases in the measurement 
of the constructs. In future studies using multiple informant strategies from 
both sides of the dyad (since transaction costs also occur on both sides), and 
from different sources in each set of units is recommended.  
 
The cross-sectional design is not able to detect the direction of influence in 
the model. Neither can lagged effects, such as an incurred monitoring cost 
today with negative effects on performance in the short run, and positive 
effect in the long run (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), be revealed. Thus 
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longitudinal studies are required in future research to really understand the 
dynamics in the relationship between transaction costs and performance.  
 
Endogeneity problems cannot easily be controlled for statistically in this 
study. Since it is reasonable to assume temporal effects between transaction 
costs and subsidiary performance (bad performance in t0 increases 
transaction costs in t1, which probably affects performance in t2), there are 
also some possibilities that the error terms between the independent and the 
dependent variables are correlated and give biased estimates. Hence, it is 
important to control for such a problem. This could be done in at least two 
ways: (1) striving to collect better data; (2) making an assumption of 
endogeneity in the data, and directly incorporating that relationship into the 
estimation (Schugan, 2004). The first point has been impossible to carry out 
for the present study due to ex post time- and resource restrictions, but it is a 
sound advice for future studies. The second point requires instrumental 
variables in the data set that could generate proxies for the explanatory 
endogenous variables (here: the four transaction costs). Both high explained 
variance in the reduced equations, and low correlations with the error in the 
dependent variable are necessary if the second remedy is to be used. Poor 
instruments also give unreliable parameter estimates in the final regression. 
Hence, a limitation of this study is the confined number of instrumental 
variables available. However, that being said, it must also be emphasized 
that finding these exogenous variables could be a tremendous task. Models 
always have boundaries, If not, the daring assumption that the model 
contains all relevant factors must be maintained, and that is perhaps more 
than what anyone is able to do in real life research. Therefore, according to 
Schugan (2004), “by allowing different types of exogenous constraints, we 
might make our models far more applicable to realistic settings than if we 
seek to make all variables endogenous.” 
 
To really understand the nature and effects of transaction costs on 
performance, future studies should also try to develop the just opened 
avenue that explores possible interconnections and trade-offs among the 
different types of transaction costs. Interesting aspects were revealed in this 
study, but the attempt was very much empirically driven. Later studies have 
to carefully develop theoretical propositions that could be tested in a 
rigorous manner. In addition, both long-term and short-term performance 
measures have to be considered (Ariño, 2003).  
 
The measurements of the variables in the model can still be improved. 
Several of the transaction cost dimensions are quite limited in their 
description, and hence several more items and dimensions have to be 
developed in future research. For example, the deviating result from the 
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hypothesized relationship between bonding costs and subsidiary 
performance may also be rooted in the measurement of these costs. The 
conceptualization of bonding costs in this study deviates from the 
understanding of such costs developed in agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) and adapted in some TCE-based literature (Williamson, 
1985). Hence, with rather low values on one of the reliability measures 
(average variance extracted = .42), this construct needs to be further 
developed. Monitoring costs are obviously also more than what is covered 
by the present definition, so in that respect the study of Harzing (2002) may 
help in developing the measurement of such costs. In addition, performance 
measures that cover both long-term and short-term perspectives are 
sometimes important to employ, which also is emphasized by Ariño (2003) 
in her conceptualization of so-called outcome performance and process 
performance. Both aspects have to be taken care of in future performance 
studies.  
 
In the real world of MNCs, strategic considerations often lead to situations 
where firms may select a governance structure that is not efficient for the 
specific transaction in terms of TCE considerations, but which is the best 
alternative for the firm as a whole (Hill, 1990; Kogut, 1988). Empirical 
research also shows that short-term anomalies will most likely occur and 
coexist with efficient governance structures during a time span (Armour and 
Teece, 1978; Monteverde and Teece, 1982; Rumelt, 1974). Therefore, 
comparing organizational forms with respect to the effect of transaction 
costs on performance (i.e. the moderator test) could lead to wrong 
conclusions with respect to the upshot of transaction costs. A higher level of 
transaction costs could be accepted in one situation just to fulfill other 
dimensions of performance than a purely economic one. Hence future 
research may try to control for the strategies that were behind the 
organizational form(s) that are under investigation. 
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Conclusion 
With few exceptions, research within the TCE-tradition has been little 
concerned about the relationship between transaction costs and performance. 
Instead, transaction costs have been used as proxies for performance (Buvik 
and Andersen, 2002; Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Heide and John, 1988; 
Masten, Meehan, and Snyder, 1991; Noordewier, John, and Nevin, 1990). 
However, if the normative assumptions in the theory are to be tested 
rigorously, this relationship has to be verified empirically, which also 
requires a thorough understanding and measurement of both transaction 
costs and performance. This research has contributed to all three elements by 
identifying and testing both transaction costs and performance in a thorough 
manner by using multiple items and multiple methods, and it has given better 
insights into a relatively unexplored topic by formally testing the 
relationship between transaction costs and performance. In addition, bonding 
costs, which is a novel variable, is measured. Although there is room for 
improvements, introducing this variable has revealed some new insights, and 
avenues for future studies. 
 
Another contribution lies in the increased insight on how foreign entry 
modes modify the relationship between transaction costs and performance. 
This study demonstrates that different types of transaction costs differ with 
respect to intra-organizational forms. Some former performance studies 
within the field of international business have proposed direct entry mode 
effects towards performance in the attempt to explain that some modes of 
entry are superior to others (Li and Guisinger, 1991; Woodcock, Beamish, 
and Makino, 1994). This way of modeling the relationship may be flawed 
since, ceteris paribus, different operation methods cannot differ with regard 
to performance; they rather moderate the transaction costs effects on 
performance (Masten, 1993). This last point is confirmed by this study.  
 
Finally, this dissertation has also started an exploration of possible 
interconnections between the transaction costs. Exploring this avenue further 
may contribute to a more thorough understanding of the dynamics among 
transaction costs. 
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APPENDIX 1: Key figures – MNC and FDI 
 
Company parameters MNC FDI 
Number of employees: 
   mean 
   maximum 
   minimum 
   portion of companies within (%): 
   0-10 employees 
   1-100 employees 
   101-500 employees 
   501-1000 employees 
   1001-2000 employees 
   2001-5000 employees 
   >5001 employees 
 
854 
27,500 
10 
 
— 
44.4 
31.9 
9.3 
7.5 
3.8 
3.1 
 
93 
2,325 
2 
 
35.6 
87.5 
8.8 
0.6 
2.5 
0.6 
— 
Turnover (thousand NOK): 
   mean 
   maximum 
   minimum 
   portion of companies within (%): 
   0-10 million 
   11-50 million 
   51-100 million 
   101-500 million 
   501-1000 million 
   > 1001 million 
 
1,203,501 
34,083,000 
11,468 
 
— 
16.3 
15.6 
42.5 
8.1 
17.5 
 
152,945 
7,716,000 
200 
 
25.0 
42.9 
12.9 
13.4 
3.2 
2.6 
Profit (thousand NOK): 
   mean 
   maximum 
   minimum 
 
125,457 
5,171,000 
−585,000 
 
11,231 
1,578,000 
−350,000 
International sales (%): 
   mean 
   maximum 
   minimum 
 
48.4 
100.0 
2.5 
 
— 
— 
— 
Main activity (%): 
   manufacturing 
   sales 
   service 
   retailing 
 
55.0 
— 
26.9 
18.1 
 
27.5 
49.4 
23.1 
— 
Portion acquisition/greenfield (%) — 34.4/65.6 
Location (%): 
   Europe 
   North-America 
   South-America 
   Asia 
   Africa 
 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
 
81.9 
6.9 
1.3 
8.7 
1.2 
Mean age of FDI (in years)  5.7 
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APPENDIX 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
2-a: Descriptive statistics for all initial items and final variables 
Observed 
variables 
Mean Std Skewness Kurtosis Min. Freq. Max. Freq. 
Bargaining costs 
 Item 1* 1.881 1.230 2.034 4.672 1.000 78 7.000 2 
 Item 2** 3.544 1.689 .245 −.882 1.000 19 7.000 7 
 Item 3a 3.212 1.371 .351 −.335 1.000 15 7.000 2 
 Item 4a 3.275 1.341 .435 −.322 1.000 9 7.000 2 
 Item 5** 2.781 1.608 .922 −.060 1.000 33 7.000 4 
 BargCost      3.244                           .312        −.319 
Monitoring costs 
 Item 6 2.350 1.337 1.173 .943 1.000 46 7.000 1 
 Item 7 3.581   1.544 .022 −.821 1.000 17 7.000 3 
 Item 8 2.556 1.268 .754 .127 1.000 34 6.000 5 
 Item 9** 2.538 1.278 .885 .550 1.000 34 7.000 1 
 Item 10** 3.962 1.617 −.011 −.899 1.000 10 7.000 8 
 Item 11** 2.550 1.321 .810 −.045 1.000 35 6.000 5 
 MonCost      2.829                           .664           .294 
Bonding costs 
 Item 12 4.362 1.646 −.263 −.856 1.000 7 7.000 13 
 Item 13 4.537 1.475 −.295 −.602 1.000 3 7.000 12 
 Item 14 4.244 1.729 −.110 −1.038 1.000 8 7.000 16 
 Item 15 3.837 1.617 −.103 −1.031 1.000 13 7.000 3 
 Item 16** 2.681 1.468 .833 −.151 1.000 34 7.000 1 
 Item 17** 3.469 1.939 .265 −1.295 1.000 30 7.000 9 
 BondCost     4.245                         −.176        −.370 
Maladaptation costs 
 Item 18 2.356 1.460 1.020 .122 1.000 57 7.000 1 
 Item 19 2.006 1.179 1.410 1.594 1.000 65 6.000 2 
 Item 20** 2.181 1.317 1.434 1.732 1.000 56 7.000 1 
 Item 21 2.625 1.545 .897 −.203 1.000 41 7.000 1 
 MalCost       2.329                           .938           .152  
Performance 
 Item 22 4.194 1.482 −.268 −.489 1.000 7 7.000 8 
 Item 23** 4.213 1.603 −.278 −.708 1.000 9 7.000 10 
 Item 24 3.756 1.862 .077 −1.125 1.000 23 7.000 13 
 Item 25 4.306 1.392 −.351 −.498 1.000 5 7.000 3 
 Item 26** 4.263 1.627 −.388 −.739 1.000 11 7.000 8 
 Item 27 4.831 1.323 −.608 .039 1.000 2 7.000 11 
 Item 28** 5.056 1.250 −.792 .469 1.000 2 7.000 12 
 Perf            4.272    −.269 −.290     
* Excluded items due to excess kurtosis and skewness 
** Excluded items due to cross-loadings or too low factor loadings 
a Reversed item 
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2-b: Univariate and multivariate normality – construct level 
 Skewness Kurtosis Skewness and 
Kurtosis 
Variables Z-score P-value Z-score P-value χ2 P-value 
Univariate        
BargCost (lvs.) 1.991   .046*     −.213   .831        4.011   .135 
MonCost (lvs.) 3.905   .000*     1.412   .158       17.239   .000* 
BondCost (lvs.) −.890   .374     −1.572   .116        3.265   .195 
MalCost (lvs.) 4.375   .000*      .687   .492       17.239   .000* 
Perf (lvs.) −1.675   .095      −.427   .670        2.977   .226 
BargCost (s.s.) 1.632   .103     −.853   .394        3.392   .183 
MonCost (s.s.) 3.272   .001*      .874   .382       11.471   .003* 
BondCost (s.s.) −.932   .351     −1.049   .294        1.970   .373 
MalCost (s.s.) 4.352   .000*      .549   .583       19.238   .000* 
Perf (s.s.) −1.412   .158      −.746   .456        2.550   .279 
       
Multivariate 
(lvs) 
3.471 .001* 1.613 .107 14.649 .001* 
* non-normal at α = .05 
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APPENDIX 3: Correlation matrix – item level 
 
 BAR1 BAR2 MON1 MON2 MON3 BON1 BON2 BON3 BON4 MAL1 MAL2 MAL3 PER1 PER2 PER3 PER4
BAR1 1  
BAR2 .625 1  
MON1 .337 .276 1  
MON2 .247 .205 .437 1  
MON3 .199 .172 .526 .438 1  
BON1 .080 −.034 .153 .317 .186 1  
BON2 −.138 −.218 .025 .061 .088 .417 1  
BON3 −.179 −.265 .066 .123 .141 .358 .641 1  
BON4 .055 .029 .070 .088 .093 .268 .322 .289 1  
MAL1 .437 .493 .393 .293 .314 .119 −.031 −.137 .113 1 
MAL2 .303 .405 .370 .264 .313 .099 −.118 −.072 .004 .573 1
MAL3 .442 .436 .380 .274 .216 .093 −.041 −.083 .094 .679 .523 1
PER1 −.333 −.366 −.231 −.083 −.198 −.081 .197 .234 .034 −.279 −.332 −.298 1
PER2 −.275 −.265 −.238 −.215 −.153 −.145 .156 .120 .001 −.329 −.297 −.373 .583 1
PER3 −.258 −.335 −.217 −.113 −.161 −.019 .238 .243 .084 −.302 −.358 −.341 .645 .548 1
PER4 −.351 −.353 −.265 −.176 −.184 .022 .205 .177 .043 −.363 −.346 −.250 .629 .468 .605 1
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APPENDIX 4: Item to total correlation – preliminary 
model 
 
Scales Items Item-to-total 
correlations 
Corrected  
item-to-total 
correlations1 
Bargaining costs Barg3 
Barg4 
.90 
.90 
.63 
.63 
 
Monitoring costs Mon1 
Mon2 
Mon3 
.81 
.81 
.80 
.56 
.50 
.56 
 
Bonding costs Bond1 
Bond2 
Bond3 
Bond4 
.70 
.80 
.79 
.64 
.44 
.63 
.57 
.36 
 
Maladaptation costs Mal1 
Mal2 
Mal3 
Mal4 
 
.89 
.78 
.89 
.85 
.78 
.65 
.81 
.71 
 
Performance Perf1 
Perf2 
Perf3 
Perf4 
Perf5 
Perf6 
Perf7 
.84 
.83 
.80 
.80 
.67 
.76 
.67 
.78 
.65 
.79 
.72 
.54 
.68 
.59 
1This is the correlation between the single item and the remaining items on the 
construct (calculated in SPSS – reliability analysis). 
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APPENDIX 5: Fit indices – tc dimensions 
 
 
Fit statistics Transaction costs  
4-dimensional solution 
χ2 
  (df) 
  p-value 
53.00 
(48) 
.287 
RMSEA 
  p-value close fit 
.026 
.86 
NCP 5.00 
GFI .95 
AGFI .91 
RMR .066 
NFI .94 
NNFI .99 
CFI .99 
IFI .99 
CN 220 (220.97) 
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APPENDIX 6: Residual analyses and regression plots 
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6-a: ZRESID against ZPRED 
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6-b: SRESID against ZPRED 
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MONITORING COSTS
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6-c: Partial regression plot – performance against monitoring costs 
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6-d: Partial regression plot – performance against bargaining costs 
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BONDING COSTS
43210-1-2-3-4
P
E
R
FO
R
M
A
N
C
E
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
 
6-e: Partial regression plot – performance against bargaining costs 
 
 
 
 
 
MALADAPTATION COSTS
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6-f: Partial regression plot – performance against maladaptation costs 
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Observed Cum Prob
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6-g: Normal probability plot 
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APPENDIX 7: Cover letter 
 
 
 
 
Tusen takk for at De tar Dem tid til å svare på denne undersøkelsen! 
 
På et tidligere tidspunkt har De/dere alt sagt dere villig til å delta i en undersøkelse angående 
utenlandske datterselskaper etablert av norske bedrifter. Nå kommer altså spørreskjemaet!   
 
Undersøkelsen tar for seg forskjellige sider vedrørende forholdet mellom morselskap og 
datterselskap, samt prestasjonene til disse  internasjonale datterselskapene. Undersøkelsen er 
en del av et doktorgradsarbeid ved Handelshøyskolen BI.  
 
Spørreskjemaet er utformet på en måte slik måte at det ikke skulle være nødvendig å grave 
seg verken dypt og/eller langt ned i gamle historiske data. Men når det er sagt, er det likevel 
viktig å merke seg at den som fyller ut skjemaet må kjenne både morselskapet og 
datterselskapet relativt godt. Det skal dog ikke være mulig for utenforstående å finne ut 
hvilket morselskap og hvilket datterselskap som er med i undersøkelsen. Derfor er det ingen 
direkte informasjon i spørreskjemaet som kan identifisere selskapene. Listen over selskaper 
som har vært med i undersøkelsen blir arkivert i en database uavhengig av spørreskjemaene, 
men for at det skal være mulig for den som utfører undersøkelsen å kunne vite hvem som har 
svart og hvem som ikke har svart, vil spørreskjemaet og svarkonvolutten være påført en kode 
som samsvarer med et linjenummer i databasen. Databasen er underlagt konsesjonsplikt. 
 
Les nøye gjennom instruksene gitt i spørreskjemaet, og lykke til med utfyllingen (som trolig 
ikke vil ta mer enn ca. 30 minutter). 
 
Dere som returnerer spørreskjemaet i utfylt stand, vil på et senere tidspunkt få tilsendt en 
rapport som oppsummerer funnene i undersøkelsen.  
 
Vennlig hilsen 
 
 
Sverre Tomassen 
Institutt for strategi, Handelshøyskolen BI  
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APPENDIX 8: Reminder 
 
 
 
Direkte utenlandsinvesteringer og deres prestasjoner 
- et forskningsprosjekt fra Handelshøyskolen BI 
 
 
 
Til ansvarlig for utenlandsaktivitetene 
 
Påminnelse 
For en tid siden mottok Deres firma et spørreskjema vedrørende ovennevnte tema. Vi kan 
ennå ikke se å ha mottatt en tilbakemelding fra dere, noe som det sikkert kan være flere 
grunner til. Skjemaet kan ha kommet til feil person, og mange av dere har i tillegg dårlig tid, 
men vi håper likevel at De kan ta Dem tid til å fylle ut skjemaet og returnere dette i vedlagte 
svarkonvolutt. 
 
For orienteringens skyld legges ved det tidligere introduksjonsbrevet samt et spørreskjema. 
Dersom det første skjemaet er kommet bort kan dere benytte det som er vedlagt i denne 
sendingen.  
 
NB!  
Dersom selskapet ikke lenger har internasjonale datterselskap(er), eller at datterselskapet er av 
en slik art at spørreskjemaet ikke passer i det hele tatt, ber vi vennligst om at dere returnerer 
skjemaet ved for eksempel å skrive en setning på forsiden av spørreskjemaet om hvorfor 
skjemaet ikke er fylt ut. 
 
Vennlig hilsen 
 
 
Sverre Tomassen 
Institutt for strategi, Handelshøyskolen BI  
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APPENDIX 9: Questionnaire – 4 pages 
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